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Abstract
This dissertation examines why national and
international policies intended to protect limited natural
resources in developing countries are not effectively
implemented. It employs a comparative case study analysis
to show the obstacles to environmental policy implementation
in three developing countries, Barbados, St. Lucia and St.
Kitts, and three foreign assistance agencies, the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Organization of American States.
The decision making process within the countries and
donor agencies is closed, preventing key stakeholders from
participating. In two instances, the mutually reinforcing
behavior of top officials in the countries and the donor
agencies led to decisions that prevented natural resources
from being protected. In all three cases, strategies to
implement environmental policies failed to account for four
major elements; national politics, behavior in the donor
agency, the culture of decision making and economic
necessity. Key stakeholders, parties that had a major
interest in the decision making process, were excluded in
all three cases.
The existing decision making process in both developing
countries and donor agencies is dysfunctional. It excludes
key stakeholders and fails to account for the four major
elements of policy making in developing countries. An
alternative approach to decision making is proposed, a
negotiated partnership for sustainable development. By
applying the theory of negotiation and conflict resolution
a more open decision making process can be created that
accounts for the interests of the stakeholders and
integrates the four major elements of the public policy
process. A negotiation mdel is proposed to help promote an
open decision making process. It includes preconditions,
specific procedural steps and advice on how to implement
them.
Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence E. Susskind
Professor of Urban and
Environmental Planning
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PREFACE
Despite the recent surge of interest in the
environmental problems in developing countries, there has
been little success in finding effective ways to resolve
them. The purpose of my research has been to find out why
these problems seem so intractable. There is really no
precedent or the complexity they contain. The fields of
development planning, economic development, political
science, community participation, anthropology and
environmental planning all offer valuable insights into the
knotty nature of environmental problems, but solutions are
harder to come by.
One thing that is becoming increasing clear is that
environmental problems cannot be separated from the
intricacies of national culture and politics. Any solution
to the environmental crisis, one that promotes lasting
change in the public policy processes of affected countries
and the many agencies that are hooked into international
development, has to account for the crucial roles of culture
and politics.
If the public policy process is to respond to the
environmental crisis in a meaningful way, which will require
substantial reforms, a approach has to be found to account
for the complex nature of the problem. One way to
accomplish this is to apply the theory and practice of the
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emerging field of negotiation and conflict resolution. A
basic premise of conflict resolution is that all of the
parties affected by an action should have a voice in an open
dialogue to express their interests. Then, out of this
sharing of interests emerges a collaborative effort to solve
what is perceived as a common problem. The parties find
that they have more in common than they imagined.
Adversarial behavior diminishes, people talk openly, common
ground is forged to create an elegant solution that everyone
is satisfied with. If all goes well, the parties may find
themselves better off than before. This model of decision
making does work, as experience has shown in the United
States and Europe, but it remains largely untested in
developing countries.
I believe that a collaborative negotiation process can
be successfully used to address environmental problems in
the developing world. But the differences in political
systems and national cultures between developed and
developing countries require the United States-based model
of negotiation to be modified to accommodate them. Despite
the difficulties involved, I believe that a negotiated
partnership holds the greatest promise for effectively
addressing the complexities facing the global commons.
My goal in writing this dissertation is to examine the
reasons why efforts to protect natural resources are
failing, and how they can be improved. Advice is offered to
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policy analysts to enable them to more accurately account
for the constraints and opportunities in donor agencies and
developing countries when attempting to protect limited
natural resources. To accomplish this, I have tried to tell
this story from the perspective of people who are involved
in international development, in developing countries, donor
agencies and non-governmental organizations.
The case study format that I use to tell this story has
required me to interpret key events that have occurred in
different countries and organizations. Obviously, the cases
are told from my vantage point. Experts from the Caribbean
and donor agencies have reviewed the cases, and several
suggested changes have been made to ensure accuracy.
However, any errors that remain are my own.
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CHAPTER ONE
Statement of the Problem and Introduction to the Cases
This dissertation tells a story about the failure of
laws and policies that are supposed to protect the natural
environment in developing countries. In the 1970s and 1980s
the rapid destruction of tropical ecosystems caused a major
controversy that is still raging. In the Caribbean, which
has been the focus of my research, fisheries are being
depleted, fresh water supplies polluted, reefs destroyed,
forests illegally cut and entire large stretches of coast
eroded. Large development projects displace local villages
and fail to create the economic opportunities their
supporters promise. Experts question if the current rate of
development can be sustained in the long run, given the
environmental problems that are surfacing.
In response to the environmental crisis that exists in
many parts of the developing world, environmental groups in
the United States have pressured Congress to force
international development assistance agencies, including the
World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development
and the Inter-American Development Bank, to reform their
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lending practices to protect the environment. New laws have
been adopted, policies written, regulations introduced, and
consultants sent abroad to implement them, but this approach
has not worked. As a result, limited natural resources that
are unde_ severe pressure to feed fast growing populations,
pay off foreign debt and improve the standard of living
continue to be mismanaged. If this trend continues, there
may not be enough natural resources left to provide economic
and political stability in the future.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the
reasons why national and international policies created to
stem the tide of environmental destruction in developing
countries often fail. I will present four basic
propositions, which I believe to be true, that show why this
is happening. The first three propositions relate to
conditions in developing countries that prevent
environmental policies from being implemented.
First, national political leaders often exert near
total control over a closed public policy process.
Development decisions are made in private. Stakeholders
that have a interest in preserving natural resources, and
who provide vital services for the society, such as farmers,
fishermen, herders, foresters and charcoal producers, are
excluded from development decisions. National planning
agencies and civil servants are controlled by powerful
ministers who believe that environmental planning causes
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unnecessary delays in the development process. Civil
servants who believe that their government has an obligation
to reject projects that damage the environment may loose
their jobs, and occasionally face even greater risks. A St.
Lucian familiar with one development controversy in that
country said: "Civil servants, when faced with pressure from
the political leadership, may bleed inside if they disagree
with a development project, but can't speak due to politics,
it is too dangerous to their families." Governments respond
to the political aspirations of leaders who favor short term
solutions to economic problems and wish to remain in power.
Second, many developing countries possess unique
cultural characteristics that outsiders, such as donor
agencies, do not understand. When outside parties attempt
to intervene in the political process, which happens when
donor agencies introduce new environmental policies as a
condition of approval for development projects, they fail to
understand the strong influence that culture has on the
public policy process. In countries which have a low level
of political and economic development, the affects of
culture are especially pronounced.
The pace of life in countries with tropical climates
is slower than it is in continental societies. It takes a
long time for new public policies to be accepted, as
politicans wish to slowly gauge their effect on the society.
People often develop indigenous methods of dealing with
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political problems, and guard against interference by
outside parties, a distrust born from a long history of
political and economic dependence on more powerful
countries.
Political decisions are made based largely on personal
relationships, man-to-man communication, ties within
political parties and patronage appointments. An one man
who has worked in St. Kitts for several years said:
"Outsiders don't understand the tremendous intensity of
politics, everything is political. A large part of the
culture is political, intense personal communication is part
of culture, and most conversations are political." I call
the close relationship between politics and culture the
"culture of decision making." If outsiders do not
understand this phenomenon, they will not be able to
effectively work within the political systems of developing
countries.
Third, decisions to develop limited natural resources
are based primarily on economic factors. National policies
that strongly favor development have been created to respond
to persistent high unemployment, balance of payment deficits
and the need for hard currently to buy imported food, oil
and other necessities. But, the way that governments have
responded to these economic problems conflicts with their
own environmental policies, effectively cancelling them out.
For example, in St. Lucia, and several other countries,
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the Cabinet offers financial incentives to outside
investors, such as repatriation of profits, a waiver of duty
on construction materials and subsidies for infrastructure.
These incentives are usually given before civil servants
have a chance to evalute the effect of a project on national
environmental policies. The incentives constitute an
informal political approval, overriding any environmental
policies that exist, preventing them from being implemented.
As an official in St. Lucia said: "Cabinet approval of
concessions does suggest what government wants, and whose
wrath will be incurred if a project is denied."
A second way that economic conditions prevent
environmental policies from being effective is the lack of
financial incentives to protect natural resources. In most
instances, countries have not developed a strategy to
implement environmental laws and policies, and part of this
void is a lack of economic incentives to promote
conservation. Donor agencies that possess the financial
resources to establish such linkages also are failing with
their environmental policies.
Donor agencies have made some progress in making
reforms in their lending programs to protect the
environment. But this progress has been piecemeal and
generally ineffective. This is because there are
countervailing forces at work within donor agencies.
Environmental technicians, of which the donors have very
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few, try to enforce policies intended to lessen the damage
that projects cause, while top agency officials, who are
often political appointees, seek to complete projects and
maintain the flow of development assistance without delay.
The top officials generally prevail, with the result that
environmental concerns are not integrated into project
design and implementation.
The donor agencies have other systemic problems as
well. Most donors place a strong emphasis on environmental
analysis at the front end of a project, but do not give
enough attention to how to protect natural resources when it
is being built. Since environmental protection depends on
the effective implementation of specific measures to protect
natural resources, this means that environmental policies
are undercut and resources damaged. In addition, several
donors delegate the responsibility for implementing
environmental policies to countries where projects are
located, where governments almost always lack the resources
and political will to carry them out. National political
leaders depend on the prestige that large donor-funded
project bring, and exert tremendous pressure to get them
approved and built, even though Projects may be a white
elephant, they but are big and look good," as a senior civil
servant said in Barbados. By defining development within
the constraints of the single project cycle, the donors have
created a system that is biased against the long term
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solutions that are needed to resolve complex environmental
problems.
The Need to Create an Open Public Policy Process
As I have described, there are several constraints that
cause environmental policies to fail. Efforts to protect
limited natural resources sometimes take one or two of these
constraints into account. More often, they fail to account
for any of them. My dissertation explores the way national
politics, the culture of decision making, economic necessity
and the behavior of donor agencies affect the implementation
of natural resource management policies. I suggest a series
of strategies I believe will take account of these four
forces and will allow natural resource management policies
to be effectively implemented.
I do not believe that developing countries can design,
adopt and implement environmental policies on their own.
They lack the requisite political will, and are resistance
to the institutional reforms that are needed. The closed
decision making system in these countries needs to be
opened. To do this, countries need more support and
guidance from donor agencies and environmental NGOs. Donor
agencies have a major stake in the development process.
They possess substantial financial and human resources that
developing countries need to support environmental reform.
These resources give donors the leverage to promote reforms
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in borrowing countries.
In addition to donor agencies, there are two other
stakeholders that need to be brought into the decision
making process. Environmental NGOs and natural resource
users both have an important role to play. NGOs need to
keep pressuring donor agencies to allocate more resources to
the reform movement, and most importantly, to take more of
a leadership role by creating a new framework within the
development process to overcome the obstacles to
environmental policies that exist in their own agencies.
Natural resource users provide vital services for their
societies. Fisherman, farmers and herders provide food and
jobs, helping countries to conserve much needed foreign
exchange for other purposes. Charcoal producers provide
fuel for cooking and heating. These are only a few of the
different resource users who have special knowledge about
the natural environment. This native knowledge can be
tapped to help develop strategies for managing limited
natural resources that is necessary to sustain economic
growth, but this is rarely done.
To implement environmental policies, a new paradigm
needs to be created. Rather than trying to awkwardly
squeeze environmental reforms into existing development
procedures, donor agencies should sponsor a new
collaborative negotiation process to overcome the obstacles
to environmental protection and account for the interests of
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parties that have a stake in natural resources. I propose
that donor agencies work cooperatively with political
leaders, resource users and environmental NGOs in developing
countries, as well as international environmental NGOs based
in the United States, to negotiate how specific strategies
can be created to protect natural resources that are now
damaged by development projects.
To accomplish this, I describe a series of steps that
treat this open decision making process as a negotiation
process. Each of the four major stakeholders can help make
a negotiation process work. National political leaders can
allow civil servants to objectively evaluate development
proposals to determine how fragile natural resources can be
protected, rather then making decisions in private without
the benefit of objective criteria or professional expertise.
Political leaders can also let resource users and NGOs have
a voice in the public policy process.
Donor agencies can work to implement their own
environmental policies by accounting for the behavior.of
their professional employees, often political appointees,
who prefer to maintain the flow of project funds rather than
yielding to recommendations made by their own environmental
technicians. Environmental NGOs in the countries can create
downward linkages with resource users to establish a local
base of support, showing them how economic and environmental
concerns can be linked to increase ressure on politicians
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to preserve the natural resources they depend on. NGOs can
also educate donors and international NGOs of the need to
understand the local culture of decision making, the
interplay between culture and the political system, when
they try to implement policies to protect the environment.
International environmental NGOs can contribute their
expertise in natural resource management, project
administration, education and fund raising, and develop
closer ties with local NGOs who are familiar with local
political systems, cultural and economic conditions.
Next, I discuss the pre-conditions for a successful
open decision making process and characterize the tasks that
need to be done at each step and ways of doing them.
Finally, I analyze the idea of negotiation from the
perspective of the stakeholder groups, and talk about why
and how they might be motivated to move in this direction.
The Case Study Approach
To gather evidence to support my major ideas, I have
used cross-national comparative case research, based on
information gathered in three Caribbean countries and
international organizations headquartered in Washington,
D.C. Several sources of information were used to create the
chain of evidence in the cases, including open ended
interviews, public and private reports, newspaper archives,
and my own experiences living and working in the region.
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The evidence was then organized in three ways; an annotated
chronology of key events, and summaries of the major themes
and lessons that emerged from each case. After the evidence
was collated, I refined my major working hypotheses that
formed the framework for each chapter.
I encountered some difficulties during the field
research, due to the politically sensitive nature of the
cases, and my participation in policy dialogues that are
generally not open to outsiders. All of the cases were
extremely controversial, due to the large size of the
projects, the political stakes involved, and in two
instances, substantial opposition to them. But, I found
that it was a major benefit to be in the countries when the
controversies were unfolding. Insights into the public
policy process were easier to obtain by examining them
through the lenses provided by the cases. It gave meaning
to my major themes, such as the role of culture in policy
implementation, that would have been very difficult to
quantify in any other way.
To maintain my objectivity, interviews were conducted
with people from a variety of backgrounds who represented a
wide range of opinions about the relationship of economic
development and environmental management. I presented
myself as an outside participant-observer, gathering factual
data to describe why environmental policies were failing in
the three countries. My affiliation as a research associate
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with the Centre for Resource Management and Environmental
Studies at the University of the West Indies, Barbados, gave
me the credibility that was required to gain access to the
people I interviewed. In most instances this affiliation,
combined with my role as an outside observer, was
advantageous. It created the legitimacy that was needed for
people to share confidential information about how their
political systems work.
To gather the information needed to construct the
cases, I interviewed a total of sixty eight people in four
countries; Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and the United
States. Among those interviewed were senior civil servants,
appointed and elected politicians, representatives of NGOs,
as well as representatives of the three donor agencies
involved in the cases, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the
Organization of American States. With follow-up interviews
to check facts and keep track of events in the cases as they
unfolded, I made more than 100 separate contacts with the
sixty eight parties.
Primary sources in each country received drafts of each
chapter, and were asked to check my chronology of key events
for accuracy, and to review my basic propositions, such as
the relationship of culture to the public policy process.
The resulting comments helped me refine the cases.
All interviews were kept confidential, and were
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recorded by taking notes by hand; I did not use a tape
recorder, as I felt it would inhibit the subjects. A few
people I interviewed were not comfortable with my role as a
participant-observer, but this only happened with a few
senior civil servants. Ironically, these people invariably
referred me to other people, such as recently retired senior
civil servants, who proved to be among my most valuable
sources of information.!
Why the Caribbean?
I selected the Eastern Caribbean as the focus of this
study for several reasons. The environmental problems in
the three countries I have chosen, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and
Barbados, are well documented. The study sites are easily
accessible, so carrying out a research program does not
present any major obstacles.
These tropical islands all maintain a delicate
ecological balance, so the affects of over-development are
easily seen. In spite of damage to the environment due to
the stress of centuries-old intensive plantation
agriculture, many natural resources that are needed to
sustain human settlements survive in relative abundance,
including fisheries, rich soil, forests and fresh water. As
in other developing countries, these resources are under
Please refer to Appendix A for additional explanation
of the sources of information for the cases, and the research
design and methods that were used.
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severe pressure to feed a fast growing population, to pay
off foreign debt, and to improve the local standard of
living.
All three of the countries I have selected to study are
democratic with small public institutions and policy making
processes that are easy to understand. The existence of
clear environmental problems, simple public policy processes
and the dilemma posed by the demands of economic growth on
limited natural resources make these countries an ideal
subject. Despite some differences, the islands are
representative of other nations with similar environmental
problems, enabling this research to be applied to other
developing nations.
Most importantly, if national and international
agencies are serious about stopping environmental
degradation in the developing world, the small size and
accessibility of these islands present the best opportunity
to do so. If effective solutions cannot be found to the
environmental problems in the Eastern Caribbean, there is
little hope they can be successfully addressed in other,
more complex societies within the developing world.
Attempts have been made in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and
Barbados to implement new environmental policies to protect
natural resources. Unfortunately these efforts have
generally failed, resulting in the degradation of island
ecosystems. To understand the extent of this problem, the
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environmental laws and policies of these countries need to
be examined.
International foreign assistance agencies have also
played a key role in environmental policy making in all
three countries. Even though these agencies claim to have
an interest in promoting environmental values, in many
instances the projects they sponsor fail to do so. To
understand why this is true, the environmental laws and
policies of international agencies also need to be examined.
The Case Studies
St. Kitts
National environmental legislation in St. Kitts
includes laws to control the use of land, forests, water,
beaches, wildlife and public areas. In most instances, no
regulations have be created to implement legislation, and if
regulations do exist, they are not enforced.
The Town and Country Planning Ordinance was passed in
1949 but has no regulations to implement it. The Land
Development (Control) Ordinance, passed in 1966, requires
that development plans be approved by the Minister of
Development, but there are no regulations to accompany it.2
2 Information about the history and status of older laws
relating to different aspects of natural resource management
is contained in the Description of National Legislation
Related to Natural Resource Management, Report SKN,
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resource
Management Project, November, 1986.
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As a result, there are no controls over new developments
being built on steep hillsides, on fragile soils or in areas
with flooding problems from intense seasonal rainfall.
A Forestry Ordinance was adopted in 1904 with the Chief
Agricultural Officer in charge of regulations intended to
control clearing, burning and charcoal production. This
legislation does not include provisions to establish and
manage forest reserves. Field surveys in 1989 showed that
this law remains largely unenforced. The result is clearing
and burning of forest areas that contribute to erosion and
siltation of downstream water catchment areas.
The Pesticides Act of 1973 does not have any
regulations to implement it, and pesticide misuse and
contamination of neighboring lands are growing problems.
The Pesticides Board accompanying the Act has apparently
stopped functioning.3 Sand mining on beaches is supposed
to be regulated by the Beach Control Ordinance. To stop
illegal sand mining, which provides beach sand at low cost
to make the foundations for new buildings, a quarry was
opened up near the Canada Estate in the mid 1980s to protect
the nearby beach. However, mining of the beach has
continued, degrading the adjacent mangrove habitat in
Greatheeds Pond and destabilizing the coastal sand dune
system.
Fish that are caught and marketed by local fishermen
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3 Ibid.
are a major source of protein for the people of St. Kitts.
The Fisheries Act of 1984 allows for the regulation of
shellfish such as lobster and conch that are heavily fished
and exported to earn foreign exchange. However, both
fisheries remain largely unregulated, resulting in a severe
decline of the local fishery (SK 13). The Watercourses and
Waterworks Act adopted in 1973 established a Water Board to
manage fresh water resources. Its responsibility includes
pollution abatement. A field survey of the many drainage
channels on the island, including a river that drains into
the main beach in the capital of Basseterre, shows that
water pollution is evident in virtually every settled area.
The existence of these environmental problems was
confirmed during a workshop with civil servants responsible
for resource management in St. Kitts in 1987. During the
workshop, problems documented included the improper dumping
of industrial waste in the main harbor in Basseterre,
unregulated dumping of garbage in watercourses, uncontrolled
construction in coastal areas, destruction of coral reefs,
coastal erosion, the failure of beach protection projects,
and the removal of mangroves due to sand mining.4
In 1985 the Parliament passed legislation establishing
an Environmental Department with a wide range of duties,
4 The proceedings of the workshop are summarized in the
Report on the St. Kitts-Nevis Coastal Resource Management
Project, John K. Gamman, prepared for the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resource Management Project,
August 1987.
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including taking over all functions related to environmental
management from the Physical Planning Section of the Central
Planning Unit.5 The department has not been funded and has
no staff. The responsibility for environmental concerns is
scattered among various ministries, so that no one office is
accountable for them.
After the 1989 national election the Cabinet eliminated
the ministerial portfolio for the environment, which had
been held by the Premier of Nevis, the sister island of St.
Kitts. This action reflected the low priority given to
environmental protection by the national political
leadership. The failure of the St. Kitts government to
enforce its own environmental legislation was an indication
of what would happen when the government decided to
intensively develop the island's southeast peninsula.
USAID and the Southeast Peninsula Development Project
In early 1984 representatives of the St. Kitts
government asked the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) to provide financial and technical
5 Fernaldo Soler, 1988. Development Control and
Physical Planning: The Case of St. Kitts and Nevis. Prepared
for the Organization of American States Department of Regional
Development and the OECS Natural Resource Management Project.
This report summarizes the administrative structure of the
physical planning process in St. Kitts and problems that it
has encountered due to the lack of a clear mandate from the
political leadership. It also predicts how these problems
will be increased with the added responsibility of the
Southeast Peninsula Development Project.
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assistance to develop the island's southeast peninsula as a
major tourist destination. Since the Agency first became
involved with the southeast peninsula project in St. Kitts,
one of its stated goals has been to carry out the mandate of
the U.S. Congress to preserve the island's natural
resources. But the efforts of USAID to protect the
environment of the peninsula have not been successful.
The 4000 acre peninsula is considered to be one of the
best examples of a native wildlife area in the Eastern
Caribbean. Its abundant natural resources include coral
reefs, salt ponds, sea grass beds, mangroves, and wetlands.
The fragility of these resources makes them particularly
vulnerable. They could easily be destroyed given the lack
of a strong national policy to protect them.
Officials within USAID's Regional Development Office in
the Caribbean (RDO/C) expressed their concern about the
peninsula's natural environment as early as mid 1985: "RDO/C
considers the adoption of a land use and environmental
policy as essential to guiding the development of the
peninsula along an appropriate path".6
As required by its Congressional mandate, USAID is
required to assess the potential adverse environmental
6 St. Kitts - Nevis Country Supplement to the Caribbean
Regional CDSS, 1986-90; Regional Development Office/Caribbean
(RDO/C), June, 1985. The CDSS outlined USAID's strategy for
developing the project. It was intended as a way to diversify
the economy by expanding it into non-sugar agriculture,
tourism and light manufacturing.
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effects of its projects by preparing Environmental Impact
Assessments to mitigate damage to natural resources. The
staced purpose of this procedure is to "...permit
consideration of alternatives and mitigating features in
project design".7
In early 1986 an independent consultant completed the
Environmental Assessment. It identified several possible
environmental impacts of the project, including coastal
erosion, damage to reefs, wetlands and mangroves,
degradation of the marine ecosystem, destruction of wildlife
habitat, and disposal of dredge materials. The report
contained several recommendations intended to mitigate this
environmental damage, including the establishment of special
conservation zones, formation of a new Environmental Unit
within the government to improve its capability to address
environmental problems, and preparation of building
guidelines and a Land Use Management Plan.8
In July, 1986, the Land Use Management Plan was
published. It also contained several recommendations to
protect the natural resources on the peninsula. Key
recommendations included: 1. Adopt legislation establishing
USAID, 1988. AID Policy Paper: Environment and
Natural Resources. The Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination, USAID, Washington, D.C. The U.S. Congress
amended the Foreign Assistance Act in 1981 to require that
USAID prepare environmental impact assessments.
8 Island Resources Foundation, 1986. Environmental
Assessment Report on the Proposed Southeast Peninsula Assess
Road, St. Kitts, West Indies.
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an advisory board to oversee planning and environmental
aspects of the project. 2. Adopt laws for beach control,
marine pollution, fisheries management, and parks and
protected areas. 3. Establish an Environmental Unit within
the Planning Unit. Most importantly, the report stated:
"Prior to commencement of Southeast Peninsula construction
projects, Government needs to provide the necessary legal
and administrative framework within which an orderly but
creative process of development can take place without
causing environmental damage".9
In September, 1986 the Project Grant and Loan Agreement
financing the project was signed by St. Kitts and USAID. In
November, Parliament approved the Southeast Peninsula
Development and Conservation Act establishing a five member
advisory board. The board is appointed by the Minister of
Development, and is responsible to reviewing development
proposals and conservation guidelines for the peninsula.
In response to pressure from USAID, Parliament then passed
the National Conservation and Environment Protection Act in
April, 1987 (SK 12). Major elements of the Act included a
comprehensive law to replace outdated environmental statues
that were outdated and unclear, and establishment of a
national Conservation Commission to implement the law.
Over the next two years, consultants prepared several
reports documenting the natural resources on the peninsula,
9 Ibid, page 5 of the Executive Summary.
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and recommending how the government should preserve them.
The road penetrating the peninsula, the largest part of the
project, was completed in early 1990. But at the time the
road was completed, the government had still not taken
several measures to increase its institutional capacity for
environmental planning.
By mid 1990 the advisory board was functioning,
reviewing development proposals that included 140 and 400
acre residential projects, and a 250 room hotel. Yet, the
Conservation Commission still was not appointed, despite
repeated assurances from the Attorney General that its
appointment was imminent (SK 12, 17, 21; Soler, 1988). The
Chairman designee of the Commission resigned, after saying
that the government was not interested in incorporating
conservation into the peninsula developments (SK 8). The
National Conservation and Environment Protection Act was not
implemented, the Environmental Unit still did not exist, and
laws for beach control, marine pollution, fisheries, parks
and protected areas remained unenforced. The outlook for
the natural resources on the peninsula, despite a long and
involved program to increase the environmental
accountability of the government, was not good.
St. Lucia
In St. Lucia, legislation exists that is intended to
regulate several aspects of natural resource management, but
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it is only partially enforced. This has resulted in
environmentally destructive land use practices and pollution
problems that degrade the island ecosystem. The Forest,
Soil, and Water Conservation Ordinance, originally adopted
in 1946 and amended in 1983, is intended to regulate
forestry activities, promote conservation and establish
forest reserves.10 The law is accompanied by enforcement
powers including fines and criminal prosecution. However,
it is estimated that only 10.8% of the forested areas on the
island are protected. This has led to deforestation on
steep slopes cleared for agricultural production, causing
erosion and sedimentation problems.11 A field survey in 1989
showed that forest lands are being cleared for agriculture,
grazing and charcoal production in many parts of the isLand.
The Water and Sewage Authority Act established an
enforcement mechanism to regulate water pollution, but raw
sewage is discharged directly into the main harbor in
Castries posing a health hazard. Similarly, the Pesticide
Control Act adopted in 1975 established a board empowered
10 For a description of all of the environmental
legislation in St. Lucia, refer to the Description of National
Legislation Related to Natural Resources Management fr St.
Lucia, Report 1 SLU, prepared for the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States Natural Resources Management Project,
November, 1986.
11 Taken from Short Run Gain - Long Term Pain, a Report
of an Environmental Retreat held for Community Leaders at the
Pastoral Center, Marisule, October 14-15, 1987. This report
discusses several types of environmental problems in St. Lucia
and recommends ways to help resolve them.
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with enforcement capabilities, but no regulations have been
enacted to control pesticide use.12 This lack of enforcement
has allowed water supplies to be contaminated by toxic
chemicals used for agricultural production.
In addition to these regulatory problems, the political
leaders of St. Lucia have forestalled several efforts by
civil servants to create a comprehensive national policy for
the environment. In 1982 a National Environmental
Commission was proposed by the Chief Forestry Officer. The
purpose of the Commission was to establish a government
agency to eliminate overlaps and gaps in the jurisdiction
of natural resources, and to form a national consensus on
the environment. All of the major interest groups from both
the public and private sectors were to be represented on the
Commission. However, the Prime Minister felt that the
Commission would delay development projects so it was never
given its official Terms of Reference by the government (SL
6). As a result, there is no organization within the
government to coordinate the resolution of environmental
problems. The failure of the national planning authority to
perform long term planning, due to a refusal by Cabinet to
authorize the required legislation, has contributed to this
12 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Natural
Resources Management Program, 1986.
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problem.13
The Pitons Controversy: A National Park or Resort?
The Pitons controversy involves two competing proposals
to develop the same site in the Piton mountains. One
project is sponsored by private international investors
proposing to develop a large tourist resort on the Jalousie
Estate, a 316 acre parcel in the saddle between the Gros and
Petit Pitons, two forested peaks on the Caribbean Sea that
are the national symbols of St. Lucia. The second project
is the establishment of a Pitons National Park, proposed by
the Organization of American States.
The two proposals are in conflict as the Jalousie
Estate would house the park headquarters under the OAS
proposal, but would be developed as the tourist resort under
the proposal by the private investors. Both projects have
involved attempts to implement environmental policies to
protect natural resources.
The proposal to privately develop the Jalousie Estate
started in 1981 when the Cabinet issued an Alien Landholding
License to Sir Colin Tennant. This decision also started
the Pitons controversy, as when the Cabinet issued the
license, it reversed its own earlier decision to acquire the
13 Fernando Soler, 1988. Development Control and
Physical Planning: The Case of St. Lucia. Prepared for the
OAS and OECS Natural Resource Management Project. This report
outlines the administrative framework of the national planning
process and makes several recommendations about how to improve
it.
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site as part of a Pitons National Park. Tennant never did
build a resort on the site, and in 1988 sold it to the
Swiss-based M-Group Resorts, who then received a new license
from the Cabinet. The Development Control Authority gave
the new developer an Approval in Concept for a tourist
resort on the Estate shortly after they purchased it.
After it gave conceptual approval for the report, the
DCA required that the developer provide an Environmental
Impact Assessment to ostensibly protect the natural
resources of the Estate. However, the scope of the
Assessment was limited to site planning concerns, and did
not include an evaluation of whether or not the Jalousie
Estate was an appropriate site for the resort. The
Assessment was written by a consultant hired by the
developer. It was rejected by the DCA as being biased in
support of the project. A second Assessment was then
prepared by a new consultant hired with the assistance of
the United Nations Development Program (SL 5). This
assessment was accepted by the DCA as adequately addressing
a limited range of site planning concerns.
When the Cabinet issued the second Alien Landholding
License in 1988 to the Swiss-based M-Group Resorts, it also
granted financial concessions (repatriation of profits, duty
free import of construction materials, etc.) and a promise
that the government would use public funds to build the
major access road needed to serve the project. These
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decisions by the Cabinet placed immense pressure on planning
officials to approve the project, even though the
environmental assessment process was not finished. In the
words of an official familiar with the project; "The
development permit itself is not before the Cabinet, but
Cabinet makes its wishes well known with its tacit support,
so the choice to not develop the site is no longer feasible
for DCA technicians" (SL 5).
When the government granted the Approval in Concept for
the resort, plans for the project were not available to the
public. The approval was granted without a public hearing,
preventing environmental groups or concerned citizens from
voicing their concerns. Before the Development Control
Authority finished reviewing the second environmental
assessment, and before it had issued any permits allowing
the site to be developed, the developer posted "No
Trespassing" signs on the beach and main road, pre-empting
the long standing public use of the site for fishing,
boating, and picnicking. The developer then brought a
bulldozer to the beach, proceeded to grade it, and started
construction of a jetty as part of a marina to serve resort
guests. Meanwhile, the government started to build the
access road it had promised the developor, also without the
required permits.
At about same time, in early 1989, the Department of
Regional Development of the Organization of American States
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was submitting a formal proposal to the government for the
Pitons National Park. The proposal stated: "The proposed
development of a large private hotel on the Jalousie Estate
is incompatible with the overall concept of the Pitons
National Park and could also hamper the conservation or
preservation of the unique cultural and natural attractions
of the area."14
A group of businessmen from the nearby town of
Soufriere who had formed the Soufriere Development Committee
(SDC) had asked the OAS to prepare the proposal. The main
objective of the national park was to provide economic
opportunities for this remote part of the island that were
compatible with the natural environment. The vision of park
planners was to create growth strategy that was
environmentally sustainable.
When the park proposal was given to the government, it
was not released to the public. The government did not
adopt the proposal. In mid 1990 the Organization of
American States closed its St. Lucia office. It had not met
it objectives to create a national park that would protect
the natural resources of the Jalousie Estate and surrounding
lands. In mid 1990, the government gave the developer
permission to build the resort. Neither the government or
14 Organization of American States, 1989. Proposal for
the Development of the Pitons National Park. Department of
Regional Development, Executive Secretariat for Economic and
Social Affairs, General Secretariat, OAS.
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OAS had met their objectives to protect the fragile natural
resources of the Pitons. A second large tourist project,
the La Gros Piton Resort Village and Aerial Tramway was
proposed in mid 1990, carrying 250,000 tourists a year to an
eleven acre resort built on the top of the Gros Piton. It
appeared inevitable that the environment of the Pitons would
be drastically changed, with the government pursuing an
agressive strategy to intensively develop the area.
Barbados
Like St. Kitts and St. Lucia, Barbados has many laws
intended to protect the environment, but they are generally
not enforced and have resulted in serious damage to natural
resources. The Beaches Protection Act of 1890 prohibits
removal of sand from the foreshore, while the Fisheries
Regulation of 1904 is supposed to regulate the harvesting of
sea turtles and sea eggs.16 Yet, the beaches of the south
coast were heavily mined to supply construction materials
during the building boom of the 1970s, and remain unstable,
while sea eggs and sea turtles are becoming scarce due to
over-exploitation and habitat destruction (B 16).
Legislation exists to establish marine reserves, but
15 Earl Bousquet, Changing the Face of the Pitons. In
the St. Lucia Star, March 31, 1990.
16 See A Review of Coastal-Related Legislation in
Barbados, Kenneth Atherley, Coastal Conservation Project
Unit, March, 1987. Sea eggs are taken from sea urchins and
are a delicacy in the West Indies.
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coral reefs are harvested to sell souvenirs to tourists,
damaged by boat anchors, and degraded by raw sewage and
agricultural runoff.17 The Tree Preservation Act was passed
in 1981 but lacks an enforcement mechanism, so trees
continue to be illegally harvested, causing deforestation,
erosion and sedimentation that damages water catchmentation 
areas.
The Coastal Conservation Project Unit has recommended
that a comprehensive Coastal Zone Management Act be passed
but the government has taken no action. Government
officials have publicly stated that competing uses are
depleting limited natural resources, such as reefs and
beaches.18 If poor enforcement, badly written legislation
and a lack of awareness by the public have not contributed
enough to Barbados' environmental problems, the political
leadership sent a strong message that there will be no
improvements in the near future when it replaced the
Ministry of Tourism and the Environment with the Ministry of
Sport and Tourism in 1987. This action dropped the
17 Wayne Hunte, Ph.D., 1989. Short-Term Perspectives
and Marine Resources in the Caribbean. The 25th. Anniversary
Lecture Series of the University of the West Indies. Dr.
Hunte is Director of the Bellairs Research Institute in
Barbados. This paper summarizes several environmental
problems related to the coastal zone and marine environment
that exist in Barbados and throughout the region.
is Leonard Nurse, Ph.D., 1988. The Barbados Coast: A
Planning and Management Evaluation. A pper given at the
OAS Workshop on Coastal Zone Management, Miami, Florida,
December 12-16, 1988. Dr. Nurse is Project Manager of the
Coastal Conservation Project Unit.
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environment to a sub-Cabinet position in the government,
reflecting a de-emphasis of the environment by the political
leadership.
The Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor
In 1982 the government of Barbados asked the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) to provide the financial and
technical assistance needed to build a large fisheries
harbor in the capitol of Bridgetown. The harbor is a large
project, especially by island standards. It includes slips
for 150 boats, a boat repair facility, an ice plant and fish
processing facilities, a vending area, rum shop and fuel
docks. To build the harbor required massive cutting and
filling of coastal land, and construction of a large
breakwater to guard against storm surges. The jetty and
harbor are next to the Constitution River which houses
several boats and drains a large part of urban Bridgetown.
Between 1982-84 the IDB undertook several steps to
evaluate the feasibility of the project, including a Country
Programming Paper, and orientation and analysis missions for
its Washington, D.C. staff that resulted in a Project
Report. A Loan Proposal was then prepared and submitted to
the Bank's Board of Directors as the last step prior to
executing a Project Agreement. The Barbados government and
the bank signed the Project Agreement in late 1984.
While evaluating the feasibility of the harbor, the
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bank did not examine its potential adverse impact on the
natural environment. Possible environmental impacts
included depletion of local and regional fish stocks,
sedimentation of the harbor mouth and the adjacent river
mouth, and degraded water quality in the harbor due to
improper waste disposal from live-aboard fishermen.
One of the project.; major objectives was to increase
the production of the fishing industry. Technical experts
from the Bank assumed that the population of flying fish,
the mainstay of the Barbadian fishing industry, was
sufficient to sustain the increased fishing pressure the
harbor would create (B 34, 43, 17, 42) 19, but this judgement
was made without any scientific evidence about the status of
the fishery. In addition, when the government decided to
redesign the harbor and extent the large breakwater in 1986,
the Bank had the opportunity to assess the effects of the
project on coastal resources, but decided to proceed without
doing so (B 17, 31).
Several reasons have been given by Bank officials to
explain why the environmental impact of the fisheries harbor
was not integrated into the evaluation, design or
19 In 1982 the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization issued the Report of the Barbados Fisheries
Development Project, sponsored by the FAO Investment Center.
The report included a "quick and dirty" estimate of the
sustained yield of the Barbados fishery. It estimated than
an annual yield of 20,000 tons can be sustained. This is
more than three times the peak fish catch which occurred in
1983. There was no scientific evidence to support the
estimate (B 24).
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construction of the harbor. One official said that the
project simply "Pre-dated the environmental period of the
Bank" (B 34). Other officials explained that the Bank
focuses on analyzing projects, not implementing
environmental safeguards, as bank staff in the regional
offices are not trained in environmental management (B 35,
42). Whatever the reason, a multi-million public investment
was made without evaluating its negative impact on the
environment, including the ability of the fishery to sustain
it. Recently, in response to pressure from international
environmental groups and the U.S. Congress, the Bank has
initiated reforms to strengthen its capacity to integrate
environmental concerns into its projects. However, its
current proposal is to delegate the implementation of a new
Environmental Impact Assessment process to borrowing
countries which lack the political will and technical
resources needed to make such a program work.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Important Role of Interest Groups in the Development
Process
I hypothesize that it is the relationship between
interest groups within a country, and a policy making
process that excludes key stakeholders, that causes
decisions to be made that are environmentally destructive.
The failure of environmental policies can be explained by
examining how interest groups use their relationships with
political leaders to exert control over the development
process.
National political leaders want to maintain their
power, and do this by supporting large development projects
that are environmentally destructive but highly visible to
voters. Bureaucrats want to enforce policies to protect
fragile natural resources, but are dependent on politicians
for their jobs. This prevents them from enforcing
environmental policies. Political leaders and civil
servants are two interest groups among many that influence
the development process and how natural resources are
managed.
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The Importance of Interest Group Politics
Interest groups play an important role in the formation
and implementation of public policies. They represent their
constituents by forming a link between citizens and their
government and different political factions within the
political leadership. By studying how individual interest
groups behave and relate to each other we can find out how
they influence government and its policy-making process.1
The emphasis on the importance of interest groups in
policy making reflects the theory that society does not
consist of a monolithic organization such as the state, but
in Catlin's words is "an aggregate of individuals organized
into various groups, sometimes contrary, sometimes mutually
inclusive, sometimes overlapping."2 The importance of
interest groups in developing countries, such as the island
states of the Eastern Caribbean, often reflect the power of
the individual who values political goods more than the
1Jeffrey M. Barry, 1984. The Interest Group Society,
Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Barry discusses the roles and
functions of interest groups, including the roots of a group
theory of politics. This work was based on experience in the
United States but contains a good overview of interest group
theory.
2George E.G. Catlin, 1930. A Study of the Principles of
Politics, London: George Allen and Unwin, as discussed in
Interest Groups in American Society, L. Harmon Zeigler and G.
Wayne Peak, 1972, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. The
author describes interest groups as a political concept within
the context of democratic societies.
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health of the natural environment.3
The behavior of interest groups offers insight into the
reasons why there is often a gap between the purpose and
result of national policies. While policy making is often
seen as a formal and predictable process, unintended
consequences often result. By examining the interplay
between interest groups we can explore aspects of the
policy-making process that may not be revealed by an
analytic policy analysis.4
In the context of the Eastern Caribbean it is essential
to examine how different interest groups, including the
political leadership and agencies of the government
interact, as policy implementation depends largely on the
politics within the executing agency.s An analysis of the
3 See Catlin, Principles of Politics, pp. 371-375, for
a discussion of how the desire for personal power often
influences the behavior of individuals involved in the policy
making process. Catlin describes the thirst for power as one
where political goods are valued more than peace and order in
society, a corollary to how the desire for power motivates
politicians to make development decisions that damage the
environment.
4Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, 1969. The
Political Economy of Change, Berkeley: University of
California Press. The field of political economy has been
developed to examine aspects of the public policy process that
are not clearly identified by standard analytic research
methods.
5Jamal Kahn, 1982. Public Managcement: The Eastern
Caribbean Experience, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris
Publications.
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informal linkages between interest groups portrays the
evolution and direction of policy change.
Characteristics of Interest Groups in the Eastern Caribbean
Governments and public institutions in the Eastern
Caribbean are small, and so are the number of interest
groups, so that relatively few individuals exert great
influence over the policy-making process. Interest groups
themselves are usually small, with no more than a few
members. Typically, a single official within a small
agency, with close personal ties to a minister or senior
civil servant, is the chief representative of an interest
group.
The role of the individual within an interest groups
is magnified due to an emphasis on personalism and charisma
in the region. The effect of personalism and charisma are
amplified, due to the emphasis on informal relationships,
oral traditions and "man-to-man" politics that characterize
decision making.6
The development of interest groups, and their
relationship with governments, has not been static. As the
economies and political systems of countries have matured,
6 Ibid. Khan describes the importance of personal ties
between elites and politicians and the importance of this
within the informal decision-making mechanisms that influence
public policy implementation (pp. 43-44, 76).
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the strategy and influence of key interest groups has.
changed. Bureaucratic elitism and interest group
manipulation, dominated by land owners, sugar producers, and
general importers, has been augmented by formalized
political parties, trade unions, and influential outside
groups such as international foreign assistance agencies and
multilateral development banks (MDB). 7 With the increase in
international development assistance in the region, the
importance of outside interest groups, such as the MDBs, has
grown.
Local interest groups influence political leaders and
bureaucrats responsible for carrying out environmental
policies. These groups include local land owners, the
business community, industrial and trade associations, the
tourist industry, and private investors. Some interest
groups which have a stake in implementing environmental
policies are not as influential. These groups include
environmentalists, educators, community groups, and resource
users such as fishermen and farmers who depend on the health
of the environment for their livelihood.
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7 Ibid., p. 43.
Interest Groups and Stakeholders
There are some important distinctions between interest
groups and stakeholders. Interest groups are existing
organizations with an expressed interest in the outcome of
a public policy decision. Stakeholders also have, as the
name implies, a stake in the outcome of a government
decision or policy, but may not be organized into a group.8
In many developing countries, stakeholders that have an
interest in minimizing the adverse environmental effects of
development decisions do not have a formal voice in the
decision-making process. Stakeholders who have an interest
in promoting effective environmental policies are generally
newly organized and do not belong to existing interest
groups.
By identifying and examining both interest groups and
stakeholders, it becomes evident who is included and who is
left out of key policy decisions that cause environmental
destruction. The ability of different parties, whether they
are organized into groups or not, to strengthen or weaken
environmental policies is a result of their underlying
8 Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987.
Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving
Public Disputes, New York: Basic Books (pp. 11, 13, 25, 103-
104, 239-240). The authors discuss how to identify
stakeholders, the need to involve all stakeholders in the
decision-making process, and how to include stakeholder
attitudes and perceptions in negotiations and policy making.
39
interest, who represents them, and their strategy of
influence. The issue of who has access to power and how
they use it is also important.
Parties that have an interest in public policy
decisions that impact the environment can be divided into
two groups, those that are included in development decisions
and those that have a stake but are left out. Parties that
are typically included in development decisions include the
political leadership, private investors and developers,
local civil servants, labor unions, and selected members of
the local business community.
Parties That are Included in Development Decisions
The Political Leadership
The national political leadership is headed by the
Prime Minister, who is leader of the majority party and
chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prime Minister
also holds a major cabinet portfolio, usually doubling as
Premier and Minister of Finance or Planning. The Prime
Minister often exerts great personal influence in an
informal manner through oe-on-one conversations and public
oratory, reinforced by charisma and the force of
personality.
In recent years in the Eastern Caribbean, since many
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countries have gained national independence, political
parties have become better organized. The emergence of
community-based political parties, reinforced by patronage
appointments of party members to top government jobs,
creates an intense loyalty to the political leadership. The
concentration of power among a few political leaders is
further accentuated by their tendency to make decisions
personally, without bringing outsiders into the policy
making process. Outsiders can be senior civil servants,
technical experts from foreign assistance agencies, or
members of the public. The Prime Minister sits atop a
network of influence, persuasion, pressure, and obligation,
fueled by relative isolation that perpetuates
particularistic role play and factionalism based on
political ideology, party affiliation, and social class.9
The Prime Minister, Cabinet, and top officials such as
permanent secretaries have a primary interest in staying in
power. They do this by promoting policies that increase
9 Khan, Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean
Experience, pp. 50, 51, 76. Khan also discusses the work of
Simey, who cautions that management issues in the West Indies
tend to become submerged in a welter of conflicting
personalities (T.S. Simey, 1946. Welfare and Planning in the
West Indies, Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Also see Monte
Palmer, 1985. Dilemmas of Political Development: An
Introduction to the Politics of the Developing Areas, Itasca,
IL: Peacock Publishers. Palmer describes the role of
charismatic politicians in political development, including
how such leaders operate outside the boundaries of traditional
authority.
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economic growth, reduce unemployment, and preserve foreign
exchange. The agenda of economic growth is often
highlighted by large, highly visible development projects
which are approved just before or after national elections.
In most of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean,
virtually all decisions that affect natural resources are
made directly by political leaders with little or no input
from the public. The Cabinet or a single minister usually
initiates and must approve all large development projects.
The wide range of decisions made by political leaders is a
sign of the ubiquitousness of government as the major
stakeholder in these societies.
Private Investors and Developers
When development projects are proposed and funded by
private investors, they usually directly approach the
political leadership to "test the waters," instead of first
applying for a development permit using formal planning
procedures. In this way an informal project approval may be
obtained from a member of the Cabinet, usually a minister
with the portfolio similar to the project (ie. a resort
developer will approach the Minister of Tourism) prior to
submitting the project to the national planning authority.
When a project is formally submitted to the planning
agency for its review, developers benefit from pressure
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exerted on civil servants by political leaders through party
affiliation, patronage-dominated relations, subservient
relations, and direct interference.10 Private investors and
political leaders have complementary objectives, to bring
in foreign exchange that promotes investments and economic
growth.
Civil Servants
Civil servants involved in development decisions that
impact natural resources work in a central planning unit,
physical planning office, or in some specialized area of
natural resource management (fisheries, forestry,
agriculture, or water quality). An office within the
central planning unit, usually either Town and Country
Planning or the physical planning section, is the lead
agency for evaluating development projects. To understand
how civil servants influence the outcome of development
projects, it is necessary to review how the planning process
typically works.
When a proposed project is reviewed for conformity with
10 Khan, Public Manaqement. He discusses the dominant
factors in the relationship between politicians and civil
servants which were confirmed by my field work. In all of
the countries studied, it was found that civil servants
working in planning agencies feel pressured to promptly review
and approve development proposals, often ignoring time-
consuming environmental requirements (B 2, 22, 30; SL 5).
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planning laws and policies, the chief planner is responsible
for informally consulting with technical experts in other
agencies (fisheries, forestry, agriculture, water
engineering, public works, transportation, coastal
management) to determine how a project will impact natural
resources. The consultative process used for evaluating
projects is informal, and the way that it is used depends on
the discretion of the chief planning officer, who reports
directly to a permanent secretary and a minister. When
planning officials are pressured to approve projects that
have received informal approvals from ministers or the
Cabinet, the input of natural resource managers is usually
ignored.
This abuse of the consultative process usually results
in developments that damage natural resources. For example,
in the late 1980s permission to build the Sierra Hotel on
the south coast of Barbados was denied by all government
agencies, including the office responsible for managing
coastal resources. But the hotel was built because a key
minister had a financial interest in the project (B 3).
This project resulted in severe beach erosion that affected
the new hotel and adjacent properties. Numerous interviews
with local officials and subsequent field observations
showed that it is not uncommon for projects to be approved
in this ad hoc fashion in Barbados, St. Lucia or St. Kitts.
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The general interest of civil servants involved in
natural resource management is to carry out government
policies in a way that meets their professional standards
and protects the resources. This is very difficult for
several reasons. Planning agencies operate under the same
financial and technical constraints as other ministries, and
as a result, their staffs are routinely overworked. The
planning authority only makes recommendations; its decisions
are not binding, but are referred to the lead minister who
reports to Cabinet which makes the final decision. By
placing the responsibility for development decisions,
including the enforcement of environmental protection
standards, in the political directorate, authority is
effectively removed from the civil service.
In addition, the way in which natural resource managers
are spread among disparate ministries which have narrowly-
defined responsibilities for different sectors of public
management prevents a coordinated approach to evaluating the
environmental effects of development projects. Civil
servants are in a double bind; they wish to use their
technical training to integrate natural resource management
with development planning, but find it politically
infeasible to implement environmental policies due to their
close personal ties and dependency upon the political
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leadership for jobs.11
Unions and Trade Associations
Unions and trade associations are indirectly involved
with the development approval process. In the past several
years these groups have increased in size and solidified
their place in Eastern Caribbean society. Due to the
overwhelming need for foreign exchange and employment, these
groups often publicly support large development projects.
A case in point is the National Workers Union in St.
Lucia, the largest union in the country with 5,000 members.
The union publicly supported construction of a large tourist
resort in the proposed Pitons National Park, in the belief
that it would generate local jobs and increase government
support to rebuild the west road connecting Castries with
Soufriere.12 Unions and trade associations generally support
the ruling political party in its effort to attract foreign
investment. They utilize local media and regular meetings
of their membership to support projects that provide jobs,
which in turn weakens the authority of civil servants
officials who lack the resources and jurisdiction to
11 Ibid.; see page 76.
12 The St. Lucian Weekend Voice newspaper, Saturday,
May 13, 1989.
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respond. 13
Members of the Business Community
The members of this interest group are individuals and
companies in the local business community who benefit
directly from the economic benefits often credited to
development projects. Their interest in a specific project
are usually represented directly by themselves, as opposed
to representation by a trade association or chamber of
commerce. It is common for key members of the business
community, who also belong to the ruling party, to be
appointed to influential government advisory boards or
commissions where they can represent their own interests.
The business community promotes its influence through
close ties to political leaders in a variety of ways. For
example, politicians are depending more and more on their
patrons in the business community to provide money and
manpower in national election campaigns. It is also common
for politicians, both elected and appointed, to own a local
business, or have a financial interest in one. For example,
a member of Parliament may have a local business as a
13 John Forester, 1989. Planning in the Face of Power,
Berkeley: University of California Press. Forester
discusses, in Chapter 3, how the exercise of private economic
power combines with politics to counteract the implementation
of plans. He describes how this contributes to the intensely
political nature of the planning process.
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contractor, supplier, or attorney for a developer or
investor. When such a politician meets with other political
leaders to determine if a project should be approved, he
represents his own business interests as well. This creates
a pro-development liaison between political leaders and the
business community that values economic development more
than environmental protection, and places these individuals
in conflict with parties often left out of the policy making
process whose primary interest is the protection of natural
resources.
Parties That are Left Out of Development Decisions
Stakeholders that are left out of the policy-making
process when development decisions are made often lack
direct and personal access to the political leadership.
Many of these stakeholders are unorganized and have no
formal representation. This includes local resource users
such as farmers, fishermen, and small landowners. If these
parties are organized, such as a farming or fishing
cooperative, they usually are hesitant to become advocates
in the policy making process, as this behavior will place
them in competition with established political leaders.
Other stakeholders that are usually excluded from
policy making include those that have recently organized and
have not been in existence long enough to build the personal
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relationships with political leaders needed to affect the
policy dialogue. These groups can include environmental
groups, regional universities, and research centers, based
in the country, region, or abroad.
Stakeholders that are unorganized or that have recently
formed, such as environmental groups, need to increase their
political power to obtain a stronger bargaining position
when negotiating with political leaders. 14 Governments in
the region have not agreed to share authority with most
stakeholders, so they have little influence in the public
policy process.
The Public, Including Resource Users and Beneficiaries of
Development
Individual ministers and the cabinet control the
development review process, so there is no opportunity for
members of the public to take part in development decisions.
Formal public meetings to obtain the feedback of local
citizens are not held.
14 Peter Bartelmus, 1986. Environment and Development,
Boston: Allen and Unwin. Bartelmus describes the major
stages in the national planning process and how the potential
for ecologically sound development is affected at each stage.
He cites a report prepared in 1976 by the United Nations
Environment Program, titled "Ecodevelopment," which recommends
that "the style and rate of development ... be determined by
those people most affected." However, this recommendation did
not account for the political realities of existing power
structures and the difficulty of gaining access to them.
49
If the political leadership decided to sponsor public
hearings, it is uncertain what effect it would have, given
a cultural pre-deposition against community participation,
a perception of powerlessness, a sense of self-doubt and the
acceptance of dependency.15 However, the lack of public
participation means that resource users (farmers, fishermen,
and charcoal producers, etc.) who have special knowledge of
local environmental conditions are not consulted during the
development review process. Local knowledge of the natural
environment is hard to find, given the general rejection of
land-based manual labor due to its association with slavery.
This condition, combined with illiteracy among rural
dwellers who tend to be the resource users, means that it
would take a concerted effort to tap the knowledge of these
individuals. In general, members of the public who may have
an interest in preserving environmental quality are few in
number, unorganized, and not consulted.
G.E. Mills, 1966. "Educating and Training for the
Public Services in the West Indies," Journal of Administration
Overseas, July 5, 1966. Also see Edwin Jones, 1976,
"Bureaucracy as a Problem-Solving Mechanism in Small States:
A Review in Terms of the Current Literature," in Vaughan Lewis
(Ed.), Size, Self-Determination, and International Relations:
The Caribbean, Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and
Economic Research.
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Local Environmental Groups
Environmental stakeholders are a disparate group, and
include individuals who are experts in natural resource
management, historians, anthropologists, architectural
preservationists, and naturalists. These parties are often
organized into small non-government organizations by one or
two key individuals originally motivated to carry out a
specific task, such as the preservation of a particular
area, building or wildlife species.
Pro-environmental groups and individuals have a limited
capacity to affect public policy decisions for several
reasons. These groups are small in size and lack the staff
that would enable them to work on more than a few small
projects at once. Most are self-supporting and must find a
way to financially support themselves, as few organizations
have the official support of national governments.
Exceptions to this are the National Trusts in St. Lucia and
Barbados which are officially recognized by their
governments. However, organizations such as these must be
careful to not alienate political leaders by taking sides in
environmental disputes or they can be branded as anti-
government or as being aligned with the Opposition party.
To keep government sponsorship, these quasi-governmental
organizations have to remain politically neutral, so they
are not able to serve as advocates for the environment in
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most disputes.
Most environmental groups have been formed in the last
few years. They lack the public base of support needed to
be effective political organizations, and find it very hard
to increase their constituencies. This is due to the
public's lack of awareness of environmental concerns, and a
perception that environmental protection results in lost
economic opportunities. In addition, governments are often
skeptical or suspicious about the role of non-governmental
organizations in general.16
Environmental stakeholders are usually motivated by a
personal environmental ethic, which is difficult to
translate into the economic terms that politicians
understand.17 This dilemma will require local NGOs to
develop new strategies if they are to make any substantial
contribution to protecting the natural resources in the
countries of the Eastern Caribbean.
16 See Summary Report on Eastern Caribbean Non-
Government Organizations, Island Resources Foundation,
Washington D.C. and the U.S. Virgin Islands, June, 1987. This
report lists all of the NGO's in the region in each country
that have or could have an interest in promoting environmental
protection, and discusses the limitations NGO's face when
trying to affect national public policies.
17Max Weber, 1958. "Politics as a Vocation," in From
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth and Mills (eds.), pp.
77-128. Weber talks about the "flame of pure intentions" and
the "ethic of responsibility" in relation to political
decision making.
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Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
This group of stakeholders includes educational
institutions, small regional foundations specializing in
natural resource management, and environmental groups based
in the region and the United States. The following
descriptions are not meant to be exhaustive, but are
included to give a general idea of the organizations that
are involved in the Eastern Caribbean.
The Centre for Environmental Studies and Natural
Resource Management (CERMES) at the University of the West
Indies, Barbados, trains students in a new degree program,
several of whom are now employed by governments in the
region. The Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA) is the
oldest environmental NGO in the region, and is located in
Barbados. Seventeen countries belong to the CCA. It
sponsors conferences, coordinates training, advises
governments and conducts environmental education programs.
The Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANRI), formerly
the Eastern Caribbean Natural Area Management Program, has
offices in St. Lucia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It
coordinates several natural resource management projects in
the region, and is helping several countries increase their
institutional capacity. The Island Resources Foundation,
located in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C.,
also works with several countries. It provides technical
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environmental services, works with USAID to prepare national
environmental profiles for several countries, has a new
program to organize small NGOs throughout the region, and
has published many papers on a wide variety of environmental
topics.
These organizations are providing a valuable
contribution to natural resource management in the region by
training technicians, developing programs to improve
environmental management, and performing field research.
However, because governments in the region do not have
formal mechanisms to allow these stakeholders to participate
in the policy-making process, they generally do not become
directly involved in development decisions. Two other
factors influence their involvement in the political
process. Regional organizations, such as CCA, cannot become
directly involved in local politics out of fear that they
will alienate their members in government. It is
politically more acceptable to serve a regional coordinating
role, and this helps assure a longer life for the
organization. In addition, regional organizations lack the
creditability within each country to work effectively on
local environmental issues. In general, organizations have
to have a local institutional presence on an island to have
legitimacy, and to know enough about the political system
and culture to be effective.
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An additional factor preventing these organizations
from being effective is the prevailing view among political
leaders in the region that environmental concerns are
obstacles to development. If these groups take a pro-
environment stand on a given project that political leaders
deem too strong, they will lose their access to the
government, rendering them ineffective in the future.
However, these organizations are collectively helping the
region to slowly form an environmental tradition.
Case Studies from the Eastern Caribbean
The role of interest groups in the development process,
and how they affect environmental policy implementation, is
the subject of the following case studies. The cases
describe large development projects in three countries, St.
Kitts, St. Lucia, and Barbados. By using the collective
evidence from the cases, I will show why attempts to
implement environmental policies have failed.
Country and Case Descriptions
St. Kitts
Discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1493, St. Kitts
became the first permanent British settlement in the West
Indies in 1624. It is one of several small islands in the
Leeward Group. St. Kitts became independent in 1983, and
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has a Parliament, headed officially by Queen Elizabeth II
who is represented by a Governor General. There is a
unicameral legislature, the fourteen-member House of
Assembly, which has eleven members elected by the public and
three that are nominated by the House (two on the advice of
the Prime Minister and one on the advice of the Leader of
the Opposition) 18
The Prime Minister leads the majority party and heads
the Cabinet, which consists of five Ministers and the
Attorney General. The legal system is based in English
common law. The Cabinet is the highest executive body, and
is directly responsible for formulating and implementing
national policy.
Each government department (e.g. Labor, Finance,
Tourism, Agriculture) is headed by a Minister. Civil
servants within each department report directly to a
Permanent Secretary, who in turn advises the Minister who
submits recommendations to the full Cabinet. The Cabinet
makes final policy decisions which are then approved by the
House of Assembly. The portfolio for Minister of the
Environment was held by the Premier of Nevis, the sister
18 For a more detailed history of St. Kitts, St. Lucia
and Barbados see; J.H. Parry and Philip Sherlock, 1971. A
Short History of the West Indies, London, MacMillian, or, Eric
Williams, 1984. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the
Caribbean. New York, Random House.
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island to St. Kitts which has its own central government,
but this portfolio was dropped in 1988.
The 46,000 residents of St. Kitts and Nevis live on two
islands that measure slightly more than 100 square miles.
Its citizens are mainly of African descent, whose ancestors
were brought to the region to provide slave labor for sugar
plantations. Adult literacy is estimated to be about 90
percent.19 The national economy is largely dependent upon
sugar which accounts for over 50 percent of its export
revenue. Efforts are underway to strengthen the economy by
diversifying the agricultural base and providing new
facilities for tourism. Economic problems have increased in
the 1980s, as indicated by an external debt of $40M, a 20
percent rate of unemployment, and a current account
deficit.20 Domestic savings have declined continuously since
1978, adding to fiscal difficulties caused by the
19 Refer to the Caribbean and Central American Databook,
published by the Caribbean and Central American Association,
Washington, DC, 1988; and Khan, Public Management, for a
thorough description of how the political system in St. Kitts
has evolved.
20 The most recent statistics for unemployment are from
the 1986 World Bank Economic Report, but during my field work
it was evident that the large influx of capital for the
Southeast Peninsula Development Project has lowered the
unemployment rate considerably. The actual unemployment rate
appears to be much lower than 20%, and some observers indicate
the work force is near full employment considering the large
number of Kittians who work in the informal sector and would
not appear in official statistics as being employed.
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deteriorating financial performance of the sugar industry.21
The Southeast Peninsula Development Project
The 4,000-acre peninsula on St. Kitts is unique in the
Lesser Antilles, as its large wilderness area has remained
relatively undisturbed. The intact ecosystem includes a
wide variety of marine and terrestrial resources, some of
which are in danger of extinction.22 Within the six square
miles of the peninsula, a very small portion of which is
developed, are found ten arcuate bays, several coral reefs,
salt ponds, sea grass beds, mangroves, wetlands, eleven
beaches, and a diverse pattern of wildlife habitats
including grasslands, forested hillsides, and valleys.
Natural resources that are particularly limited or sensitive
have been included in proposed parks and protected areas, as
part of the planning for the project. Proposed protected
areas and their associated natural resources include marine
reserves at South Friars Bay (conch), Majors Bay (lobster),
Guana Point (coral), and wildlife reserves at Nags Head
21The World Bank, 1986. St. Christopher and Nevis
Economic Report, Washington DC: The World Bank.
22Robert Norton, 1988. Resource Management Plans:
Wildlife Resources. Prepared for the Southeast Peninsula
Board, St. Kitts and Tropical Research and Development, Inc.
Norton gives a full description of natural resources on the
peninsula, and recommends management alternatives to assist
preservation efforts as the peninsula develops.
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(birds), and North Canoe Bay (endangered sea turtles).
Seventeen sites have been classified as "Landscape and
Conservation Management" areas, to protect sand dunes,
ponds, steep slopes, peaks, scenic vistas, forested areas,
wildlife habitats, and beaches. Eleven areas have been
identified as Historic and Archaeologic sites.23
The project elements include a 6.4-mile-long road to
provide access to the peninsula, in addition to public
utilities (water, power, and communication), to serve future
tourist developments including hotels, condominiums, houses,
shops, duty-free concessions, marinas, and a possible cruise
ship port. Construction of the road has been funded by the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The
USAID loan agreement includes a grant for $1.14M, a loan of
$11.40M, with St. Kitts contributing $4.1M, for a total
package of $16.64M.
The project has been closely tied to the National
Development Plan for St. Kitts. The Five Year Plan for
1986-90 emphasizes the development of the tourism sector to
lead national economic growth. The general objectives of
increased tourism include generating foreign exchange
earnings, providing jobs, and a secondary boost to local
23 Island Resources Foundation, 1986. Environmental
Assessment Report on the Proposed Southeast Peninsula Access
Road, St. Kitts, West Indies.
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manufacturing and agriculture. The Plan contains specific
objectives, including 800 new hotel rooms, the doubling of
tourists from 50,000 to 104,000 annually, and an increase in
tourist revenue from $20M to $50M.24
Prior to the peninsula project, the government had no
organized national growth strategy. The Five Year Plan was
coordinated with the project, as evidenced by a 1985 study
on tourism prepared for USAID, which concludes that "the
maximum value of the peninsula lies in its ability to
broaden the island of St. Kitts as a tourist destination" as
it will increase tourist visits, add investor interests in
providing a tourist infrastructure, and improve foreign
exchange earnings.25
St. Lucia
St. Lucia is located in the Lesser Antilles. The
native Carib Indians fought off attempts by English settlers
to colonize the island between 1605 and 1641. The island
was finally settled by the French in 1650, and changed hands
several times between the British and French until it became
a British Crown Colony in 1814 under the Treaty of Paris.
24 National Development Planning of St. Kitts and Nevis:
1986-1990.
25 J. Beekhuis, 1985. Preliminary Outline of a Tourist
Strategy for USAID and the English-Speaking Eastern Caribbean.
Bridgetown, Barbados, USAID, the Regional Development Office
for the Caribbean.
60
St. Lucia was one of several trading centers in the
Caribbean where commodities such as timber, livestock, and
provisions for the sugar industry, including slaves, were
traded with European cities and Spanish and French colonies
in the region. The French culture has maintained its
dominance in St. Lucia, as expressed by a French Patois that
is widely used. Most St. Lucian's are of African descent,
brought to island to supply labor for the sugar industry in
the 17th century.26
St. Lucia is a Constitutional Monarchy. The top
executive officer in the state is the Governor-General, who
is appointed by and represents the British Sovereign as Head
of State. The Prime Minister is the top elected official in
the country, leads the majority party, and has to have the
support of the House. The Parliament consists of a
seventeen-member House of Assembly that is elected by
universal adult suffrage, while the eleven-member Senate is
composed of members appointed by the Prime Minister, the
Leader of the Opposition, and the Governor/General. The
26 Refer to Gordon K. Lewis, 1968. The Growth of the
Modern West Indies, New York: Monthly Review Press, and Parry
and Sherlock, 1971. A Short History of the West Indies,
London: MacMillan. These two books trace the growth of the
West Indies, including the early colonial period, the
relationship between fierce land wars in the region as related
to power struggles in the metropolitan capitals of Europe, and
the transition of colonial political systems into modern
democratic governments.
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legal system is based on English common law.
The 140,000 residents of St. Lucia, which measures 238
square miles, depend on income from private remittances by
St. Lucians living abroad, and income from agricultural
export crops, chiefly bananas. Growth of the banana
industry stabilized the economy in the 1950s, but
uncertainty over the future of banana sales, and the
inherent instability in depending on monocultural export
crops, has caused the government to aggressively promote
tourism as a source c¢f jobs and foreign exchange.
Current economic indicators include an annual growth
rate of 1-5 percent, 20-25-percent unemployment, and heavy
dependence on imports of manufactured goods, food,
machinery, fuels, and chemicals, which are not produced in
the country. A $34M national debt also requires an
accumulation of foreign exchange, placing additional
importance on the growth of the tourism sector.27
St. Lucia is mountainous, with fertile inland
agricultural valleys, and is ringed by beaches, small
27 Caribbean and Central American Association, 1989.
Caribbean and Central American Databook, Washington, DC:
Caribbean and Central American Association; and The World
Bank, 1987. St. Lucia; Economic Performance and Prospects,
A World Bank Country Study, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Both of these reports contain detailed information about
current economic conditions and trends in St. Lucia, and
contain data on the political system, international trading
partners, and a summary of economic conditions in the last
decade.
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harbors, and bays. The centerpiece of the case study are
the Gros and Petit Pitons, tall green peaks rising
dramatically from the Caribbean Sea. The Pitons are
considered the symbols of St. Lucia, as illustrated by their
presence in the national flag.
Development of the Jalousie Estate in the itons
The case involves two competing proposals to develop
the 316-acre Jalousie Estate, a former plantation located on
the beach between the Gros and Petit Pitons. A variety of
proposals have been put forward since 1981 to include the
Estate as a centerpiece of a proposed Pitons National Park
which would encompass 1,600 acres of surrounding land and
include a visitor's center to be built on the Estate.
Businesspeople and community leaders from the town of
Soufriere, near the Pitons, have formed the Soufriere
Development Committee, which has received assistance from
the Organization of American States to prepare a proposal
for the acquisition and development of the Pitons National
Park. While the centerpiece of the proposed park is the
Jalousie Estate and surrounding lands, it includes a
comprehensive plan to redevelop the coastline of Soufriere
to stimulate economic development in the area.
The proposal for the national park included a park
headquarters and visitor facilities on the Jalousie Estate,
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surrounded by a 25-acre botanical garden, a spice and fruit
tree plantation, a reserve for the protected St. Lucia
parrot, a mini-zoo, a small jetty on the beach to service
small boats and water taxis, a combination bar/restaurant,
museum, and picnic, camping, and hiking areas. The park
would serve as a field laboratory for research activities by
educational and scientific organizations and the natural
sciences. A funding source for the initial $1.63M needed
for land acquisition, roads, and buildings was not included
in the park proposal.28
The competing proposal to develop a tourist complex on
the Estate is sponsored by the M-Group, a Swiss-based
company, which has received an Alien Landholding License
from the Cabinet to purchase the site and approval from the
Development Control Authority to build on it. The tourist
28 Organization of American States, February 1989.
Proposal for the Development of the Pitons National Park,
prepared by the Department of Regional Development, Executive
Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs for the Government
of St. Lucia Tourism Development and Coordination Project.
The St. Lucian government, through the Soufriere Development
Program, requested technical assistance from the OAS in 1985.
This report summarizes the results of the planning process for
the proposed national park, and includes economic conditions,
natural and cultural resources, how the project would be
executed, and an assessment of its financial benefits. The
OAS plan is accompanied by a Master Plan for the redevelopment
of Soufriere, prepared by the Soufriere Development Program.
It includes a resort hotel closer to Soufriere as an alternate
the Jalousie project, a waterfront market mall, restaurants,
hotels, commercial facilities, condominiums, a spa, and
anchoring area for large cruise ships.
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resort involves a $25M private investment to build about 120
cottages and suites, sporting facilities, a health spa, and
docking facilities for yachts.29 When the Cabinet granted
the license it also gave the developer financial incentives
(duty-free import of construction materials and goods for
the hotel, a multi-year tax holiday, and expatriation of
profits), and agreed to build the access road to the Estate
at government expense.
The natural resources at stake in the Pitons include
the beach, prime near-offshore fishing grounds, open space
uses on the Estate, the vegetation and wildlife within the
relatively intact mountain ecosystem, and natural hot
springs and mineral baths. The proposed park also includes
important cultural and archaeological resources from past
human settlements in the area.
Both of the projects are consistent with a national
policy to diversify the agriculturally-based economy by
promoting tourism. The St. Lucia National Plan calls for
developing the island as a tourist destination through
improved marketing and airline services, to provide foreign
exchange, stabilize employment, and benefit local businesses
29 The Voice newspaper of February 18, 1989, summarizes
the elements of the proposed resort. Official information
from the government about what the project includes has not
been available. Several local newspaper stories have been
pieced together to help understand key elements of the case.
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that provide supplies to hotels and resorts. The Plan also
promotes "harmonization of the growth of tourism with
regional development thrusts," which is compatible with the
regional growth strategy in the national park proposal. The
Plan, and statements by the Prime Minister, reflect a target
of 3,000 new hotel rooms in the country by the year 2000.
There are currently about 2,000 hotel rooms.30
Barbados
Barbados was discovered by an English sea captain and
claimed in the name of King James in 1624. He found a lush
island that was uninhabited and covered by dense forests.
The island developed quickly, and by 1640 had a population
of 30,000, comprised mainly of immigrant landless farmers
tending tobacco and cotton crops. These indentured farmers
were bound to English landlords, and were a forerunner to
30 Government of St. Lucia, 1980 (?). St. Lucia
National Plan: Development Strategy. The Plan promotes the
development of tourism, but also notes that it can disrupt
"the socio-economic balance, aggravated by the fact that the
sector is extremely susceptible to external influence at times
of international boom and recession." The Plan also states:
"a more specific social problem requiring close monitoring
concerns local participation and interaction of tourists and
residents." On April 11, 1989, the Prime Minister addressed
Parliament regarding the Pitons controversy. He indicated his
commitment to developing the resort facility while supporting
the Park proposal. It is important to note the public
position taken on this controversy by the Prime Minister. As
the top political official and Leader of the Majority Party,
a public pronouncement is at least as important as objectives
contained in the National Plan.
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slave laborers imported to provide labor to the sugar 
industry.
Barbados has one of the oldest parliamentary
democracies in the western hemisphere. The foundation of
its political system was motivated by an "assault on the
oligarchy." The island gradually gained greater
independence into the 1900s, as urged on by widespread
riots in the West Indies in the late 1930s by residents
demanding political independence. A history of strong
unionism fostered the development of democracy, promoted by
the Barbados Labor Party and the Barbados Workers Union.
Barbados remained a colony of Britain under the old
representative system, and was granted independence in
1961.31
The national government is headed by the Governor-
General, who serves as the Head of State and is appointed
31 In The Growth of the Modern West Indies, Lewis
describes how the attitude of West Indians towards outsiders
was formed by the involvement of Colonial English interests
as the region developed. He tells a story about how England
appointed a Commission in 1956 to recommend a list of sites
for a new federal capital in the West Indies. The
commissioners knew nothing of life in the West Indies, and
"brought with them the social values of Englishmen for whom
the West Indies have traditionally been a promising employment
agency or pleasant vacation spot". Lewis tells of an incident
in Grenada reporting the remarks of a Dr. Groome, who said
that "the Federal House of Representatives surely did not need
an audience of gilded tourists to applaud its deliberations."
He mentions the attitude of the British towards the Colonies,
"which has always had something of a chauvinistic paternalism
about it."
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by the British Sovereign. The top executive officer is the
Prime Minister, who leads the majority party and is
chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prime Minister
is appointed by the Governor General as the member of the
House of Assembly who is capable of commanding the support
of a majority of its members.
Parliament is a bicameral body, with a Senate and a
House of Assembly. The Senate is appointed by the
Governor-General on the advice of other political leaders,
while the House of Assembly is elected by universal adult
suffrage. The normal term of office is five years, but the
majority party may require elections at any time to seek
support for its policies.32
The 270,000 residents of Barbados live on an island
measuring 166 square miles with a density of over 1,600
people per square mile, one of the highest population
densities in the western hemisphere. Over 90 percent of
the population is of African descent, with Europeans,
Indians, and Orientals the minority groups. Barbados is
known for maintaining cultural and social traditions
imbedded in its English Colonial heritage (the political
system, school system, and great popularity of cricket).
32Caribbean and Central American Association, 1989.
Caribbean and Central American Databook. Washington, DC:
Caribbean and Central American Association.
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Similar to other islands in the West Indies, Barbados
is heavily dependent on external markets. The economy is
based mainly on international tourism and agriculture that
are highly sensitive to external economic fluctuations.
During the 1970s Barbados broadened its economic base
through the rapid development of a manufacturing sector,
but the international recession of 1980-1981 created
serious pressures on the national economy.3 3
The Bridaetown Fisheries Harbor
The fisheries harbor project originated within the
political directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, in
1983. Its facilities include dock space for 150 boats, a
boat repair facility, ice plant, processing area, boning
and vending facilities, a rum shop and grocery, four fuel
docks, and a large jetty constructed of several hundred
interconnected cement dojos (B 17, 22, 29).
33The World Bank, 1984. Barbados Economic Memorandum.
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, January 16,
1984. Barbados has a trade deficit of about $300M, as it must
import food, fuels, building materials, chemicals, and
machinery. It has an external public debt of $642M, and an
unemployment rate estimated at about 18 percent. Like other
islands in the region, Barbados is adopting economic policies
to diversity agriculture, strengthen manufacturing, and
increase tourism to expand and stabilize the economy.
Barbados has no industrial raw materials, apart from small
quantities of oil and natural gas. Its primary natural
resources are fertile soil, fresh water, a tropical climate,
and white sand beaches.
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The Fisheries Harbor was financed with a $12.3M
funding package from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB). The Project Agreement also includes technical
components to strengthen the institutional capacity of the
National Fisheries Division to improve fishing gear
technology, processing, and marketing operations. These
programs are underway and end in mid-1990 (B 17, 31, 42).
The Fisheries Harbor Project is consistent with
national planning objectives contained in the Barbados
Development Plan, 1983-1988. The Plan states: "The main
factors which have tended to inhibit the growth of the
[fishing] industry are inefficient marketing and
distribution systems and inadequate facilities for
servicing and shelter." The Plan also contains policies
to improve marketing, upgrade the local fleet, and increase
the efficiency of fishing operations, so that the industry
meets 75 percent of local protein. Several specific
projects are outlined in the Plan, including construction
of a large fisheries harbor in the capital city of
Bridgetown.
The natural resources at stake with the development of
the Bridgetown Fisheries Harbor include both terrestrial
and marine resources, local and regional fisheries, the
stability of the interface between the near-offshore marine
environment and a major river basin, and overall local
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water quality.
The Importance of Interest GrouDs i Development Decisions
in the Eastern Caribbean
It is my belief that environmentally destructive
decisions take place in the Eastern Caribbean because key
stakeholders are excluded from the policy making process.
In addition, these decisions can be best be explained by
examining the relationship between interest groups that are
included in policy making, and the relationship between
these groups and political leaders.
Executive authority for creating and implementing
public policy in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados is held
by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Members of the Cabinet
are selected from elected members of Parliament by the
Prime Minister. Both the executive and legislative
branches of government are controlled by members of the
majority party, which consolidates the control it has over
the policy making process.
The Prime Minister, also known as the Premier, is the
head of state, exerting great influence over the Cabinet
and civil servants in different ministries, even though the
Governor General officially heads the Parliament as the
representative of the British sovereign. This influence is
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consolidated by appointing ministers to the Cabinet who are
sympathetic to the Premier's policies, and by giving top
positions in the civil service to loyal party members. As
the architects of the national policy making process, the
Prime Minister, Cabinet and top civil servants work
together to promote policies that will help keep them in
power and win the next election.
The national political leadership itself is a special
interest group that maintains relationships with other
special interest groups who have a stake in how government
policies are carried out. Politicians want to stay in
office. Developers want to profit from their investments.
A link exists between these private and public interest
groups that serves to reinforce both of their objectives.
How Political Leaders Represent Pro-Development Interests
In all three countries, the political leadership
represented pro-development interest groups to support
development projects that had environmental problems. In
each case, the developers used a different strategy of
influence. Certain stakeholders were included in the
policy making process while others were excluded.
St. Lucian's describe the Piton mountains as "the
breasts of their mother". These twin peaks, towering over
the land as they rise from the Caribbean Sea, are widely
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recognized as the symtols of St. Lucia. They appear on the 
national flag, and on the logos of countless businesses.
Should a resort be built between the Pitons, privatizing an
area where a national park is proposed? In the words of
St. Lucia writer Derek Walcott: "When the tribe sells the
Pitons it has sold its mother, it has turned her into a
prostitute" 34
How the Prime Minister and Cabinet Represent the Interests
of the Developer
In November, 1981, the Cabinet issued an Alien
Landholding License, required of all foreign landowners, to
Sir Colin Tennant, enabling him to buy the Jalousie Estate.
Tennant planned to develop the 316 acre site, located in
the heart of the Piton mountains, as an exclusive tourist
resort. By granting the license the Cabinet reversed its
earlier decision to acquire the estate as the key parcel
within the proposed Pitons National Park. However, the
developer apparently lacked the funds needed to build the
resort, so the site remained undeveloped throughout the
1980s.
A series of events took place from late 1988 to mid-
1989 underscoring how the Prime Minister and Cabinet
34 Taken from Jalousie Argument Borders on Prostitution,
St. Lucia Star, August 26. 1989, by Derek Walcott.
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represented the interests of the developer. In late 1988
the Cabinet issued a second Alien Landholding License to a
new developer, the M-Group, a Swiss based holding company.
Although there is no public record of the meeting at which
this decision was made, officials close to the project
reported that the Cabinet granted substantial economic
concessions to the developer such as repatriation of
profits, waiver of duties on construction materials and
supplies for the resort, and a multi-year tax holiday (SL
15). The Cabinet also gave an unusual incentive to the
developer by approving public funds to build the main
access road to the site.
In January, 1988, the Development Control Authority
(DCA) gave the developer an Approval in Concept for a
resort project without a public hearing. It is important
to realize that the Prime Minister holds the portfolios for
Planning and Finance. This gives him control over policy
decisions involving financial concessions and planning
approvals. In the words of one senior civil servant: "When
Cabinet approves economic concessions for the project it
does suggest what the government wants, and whose wrath
will be incurred if the project is denied. Cabinet makes
its wishes well known. The choice not to develop the site
is no longer feasible" (SL 5).
The Prime Minister took action in March, 1988, to show
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that he was willing to use his authority to represent the
interests of developers. He made headlines in local
newspapers when he presided over a ground-breaking ceremony
for the Windjammer Landing Villa Hotel. This project has
190 individual villas spread over several acres above the
Caribbean Sea, and includes a beach with private
recreational facilities. It is a large project. At the
ceremony, the Premiere joked that "We are all participating
in a criminal activity". He was right, as the DCA had not
issued any permits for the project. The civil servants in
the DCA were badly embarrassed. They fined the developer
and appointed an ad hoc commission to issue conditions
under which the project could be built. The villas were
completed in 1989. (SL 13; The Star, April 30, 1988). The
action of the Prime Minister showed how far he was willing
to go, including flagrantly breaking national laws, to
support the interests of private developers.
The Prime Minister took a similar action that
reflected his control over the national planning process
when he used the occasion of his annual address to
Parliament in April, 1988, to publicly support the
developers of the proposed resort at the Jalousie Estate.
During this widely reported speech he said: "...Government
bas indicated its approval to an investment group to
proceed with a touristic development on lands between the
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Pitons, without encroaching upon lands which have been
earmarked as a National Park and nature reserve." At the
time, the project had not received approval from the
Development Control Authority.
The response to the Prime Ministers public support of
the project was swift and blunt. Newspapers printed
editorials within the week asking how a large resort could
possibly be built in the center of the proposed park
without degrading it.35 When the Cabinet secretly gave the
landholding license and financial concessions for the
resort, while taking no action to implement the park
proposal, it clearly showed that the government favored the
resort.
The Developer's Strategy of Influence
The developer enlisted the support of other political
leaders in addition to the Prime Minister. In February,
1988, the developer presented EC$100,000 to the Soufriere
35 The St. Lucia Star's editorial of April 22, 1989 was
titled; "Must We Always Choose Sight Unseen"? It mentioned
that the government had not taken any public position on
either the resort or park, and concluded by saying; "It would
do us all a world of good if the government came clean with
all the facts of the matter. We should not be required yet
again to make our choices in the dark of ignorance". The
editorial in the St. Lucia Voice of April 29 was titled;
"Piton Confusion". It said that the resort and park cannot
both be located in the same area, and declared; "It is high
time that the government make its position clear".
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Hospital Committee. The payment was personally delivered
to the Minister of Health, who also holds the portfolio for
the Environment. In March the Minister of Communication
and Works initiated construction of the access road. In
May, after several newspapers published editorials
condemning the way that the Cabinet secretly approved the
resort despite the estates value as a national park, the
Minister told a reporter; "Government fully supports the
tourism development project, approval has been granted in
principle to the Jalousie Plantation Company, the
developers, and it's just a matter of time before approval
is granted in full for the commencement of construction"
(Weekend Voice, May 20, 1989). The same minister
threatened to revoke the broadcast license of a local
television station planning to televise a public hearing
sponsored by the Concerned Persons on the Environment, an
environmental group concerned about the negative impact of
the resort (SL 4, 8, 13, 15).
It is generally believed that the developers were
represented in negotiations with the political leadership
to gain support for the project by a local attorney, who
is also chairman of the M-Group (the developers company)
and Director of the St. Lucia Tourist Board. He also
obtained the support of the national tourist industry for
the resort. In April, when the Prime Minister used his
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speech to the Parliament to state his public support for
the resort, he also announced that he was increasing the
subvention to the Tourist Board by EC$5 million, thereby
linking the project to a national effort to increase
tourism.
The developer also funded a grassroots organizing
effort in the impoverished town of Soufriere near the
Pitons. A local Mason was hired to circulate a petition
in support of the project. In May, the National Workers
Union, the largest union in the country with 5000 members
and over 400 in Soufriere, announced its support for the
resort.
All of these actions reflect a focused effort by the
developer to orchestrate how the political leadership and
public were organized to support the project.
How Political Leaders in St. Kitts Control the Public
Policy Process
In St. Kitts a small group of political leaders, with
the advice of influential members of their political party,
possess the power to make public policy decisions that
effect the environment. Throughout the decision making
process for Southeast Peninsula Development Project, the
same few people have represented the government.
The primary representatives of two main interest
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groups, the national political leadership and landowners
on the peninsula, have been the Prime Minister, the
Minister of Development and the Attorney General. The
Minister of Development and the Attorney General have
represented the government in its negotiations with USAID
over the past several years. In turn, the Minister of
Development has represented peninsula landowners in these
negotiations (SK 12).36
The control that the Minister of Development exerts
over the development process in St. Kitts, and how the
implementation of environmental policies is discouraged,
can be seen by examining his role in the government. His
ministerial portfolio includes Agriculture, Lands and
Housing in addition to Development. His responsibilities
include overseeing the Central Planning Unit which reviews
development applications for the country. His multiple
portfolio makes him responsible for the enforcement of most
environmental laws. He controls the Southeast Peninsula
Land Development and Conservation Board, an advisory body
coordinating all development activities on the peninsula.
36 When the Southeast Peninsula Development Project as
initiated in the early 1980s, its 4000 acres were divided into
twenty-two parcels owned by about 30 private parties. The
peninsula was the only part of St. Kitts in left in private
ownership after the government formed the National Sugar
Corporation in 1975 and nationalized all of the sugar
plantations in the country. No working plantations existed
on the peninsula at the time.
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By holding these positions of authority, the Minister is
the major force in forming national policies that determine
how decisions are made that favor development or the
environment. The way that the Minister is choosing to
favor pro-development interests can be seen by examining
some of his actions.
The Minister appointed five members to the Southeast
Peninsula advisory board. The Board is responsible for
making recommendations to the Minister to provide for the
development, conservation and management of the peninsula.37
The Minister takes recommendations from the Board to the
Cabinet who makes all final decisions which are then
ratified by the House of Assembly.
However, the individuals appointed by the Minister
only represent development interests. No member of the
Board has a background or interest in natural resource
management or conservation. Board members include the
Permanent Secretary of Tourism, a Senator who also is a
private electrical contractor, a landowner/hotelier, a
private engineer and the public works engineer. The
hotelier is a major landowner on the peninsula and is a
37 The full purpose and jurisdiction of the Board is
contained in the Southeast Peninsula Land Development and
Conservation Act passed by Parliament in late 1986. The Act
was required by the Loan and Grant Agreement executed by St.
Kitts and USAID in Article 5, Section 5.1(a).
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founder of the Peoples Action Movement party, the majority
party in the country. He is a member of the governments
inner circle and wields much political influence (SK 8, 14,
17). He represents the interests of large landowners and
the tourist industry, and supports intensive development of
the peninsula, including projects he is sponsoring (SK 25).
He perceives the role of the Board as a "coordinator for
developers" (SK 18). This is in contrast with the legal
mandate for the Board which is to evaluate development
proposals, control pollution, preserve environmental
quality, and implement environmental protection plans.38
The Failure of National Environmental Policies
USAID required that St. Kitts pass new comprehensive
environmental legislation to replace outmoded and
ineffective laws in an attempt to improve how national
environmental policies are implemented. The National
Conservation and Environment Protection Act (NCEPA) was
passed in April, 1987. It required the establishment of a
National Conservation Commission to oversee environmental
management on St. Kitts and Nevis, including the southeast
peninsula. The government delayed gazetting (issuing
public notice) the Act until mid 1989 due to concerns of
38 Ibid.
81
peninsula landowners that its provisions for public access
to the coast would adversely effect their property rights
(SK 3).
More importantly, the Conservation Commission was
still not operational as of mid 1990. The designated
chairman of the Commission resigned to protest the lack of
action by the government to implement the Act (SK 23). The
government's decision to not empower the Conservation
Commission appears to be part of a strategy by the Minister
of Development and the Cabinet to set a precedent that
allows large projects to be built on the peninsula without
any political interference (SK 8).
The failure of the government to enforce the NCEPA is
consistent with other policy decisions that favor pro-
development interest groups. The Land Use Management Plan
prepared for the Southeast Peninsula project strongly
recommended that a new Environmental Management Uni be
established within the Central Planning Unit, but this has
not occurred. Virtually all of the environmental laws in
St. Kitts remain unenforced.
The authority to control public policy decisions that
affect the environment is held within the closed circle of
a few top political leaders. The chain of command that
controls decisions favoring the use of the peninsula for
intensive commercial development starts and ends with the
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Minister of Development, the Prime Minister, and the
Attorney General, who have thus far favored pro-development
policies while refusing to implement policies intended to
protect the island's fragile natural resources. Given the
obvious lack of enforcement of environmental laws
throughout the country, and the lack of political will to
mitigate environmental damage that development of the
peninsula will bring, the future looks bleak for one of the
most important wildlife areas in the Eastern Caribbean.
The Bridgetown Fishing Harbor
The development of the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor shows
that when large projects, often funded by donor agencies,
originate in the political directorate of a country,
strategic political interests cause environmental problems
to be ignored (B 2).
Expansion of the fishing industry has been a major
goal of the Barbados government for fifteen years.39 To
carry out this policy, the Minister of Agriculture
initiated two projects in the early 1980s. The first was
a small fishing complex at Ostins on the south coast. The
39 The Barbados National Development Plans for the years
1979-83, 1983-88 and 1988-93 describe how the fishing industry
will be improved with the intent of decreasing food imports,
lowering the balance of payments deficit, and providing
additional food protein for the population.
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second was a major fishing harbor in the capital city of
Bridgetown. This project, also known as the Cheapside
harbor after the neighborhood where it is located, was
initiated by the Ministry in 1983.
The Strategy of Influence of Political Leaders
When he initiated and successfully completed the
project, the Minister of Agriculture represented his own
interests and those of the national political leadership,
including the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The primary
interest of the leadership is to stay in power. At the
beginning of the project, the Minister formed a
coordinating committee with representatives from relevant
government offices, assigned his Permanent Secretary of the
Special Projects Division to be in charge of it. These
actions consolidated the authority of the ministry within
the government, giving it the political mandate necessary
to build the harbor.
The significance of the project being originated in
and coordinated by the political directorate is emphasized
by the following observation by a government official:
"Projects such as the fishing harbor are often decided by
one man, the Minister of Agriculture in this case, who
decides that the project is good, and will be visible, so
investigations of concerns like the environment are frowned
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upon, so bureaucrats don't or can't review them. Projects
like this may be a white elephant, but they are big, and
look good" (B 22).
In 1983, after the Ministry of Economic Affairs
reviewed the project, the government asked the nter-
American Development bank to provide funding for it. The
Bank agreed in concept, and after conducting its own
economic analysis, the Project Agreement was signed in
November, 1984. With the funding now in place, the
Ministry of Agriculture had to obtain permission from
national planning authorities before construction
commenced.
Political Control of the National Planning Agency
In Barbados the planning authority is the Town and
Country Planning Department. In September, 1985, the
Ministry submitted a site plan to the Department. It
included slips for 150 boats, facilities for boat repairs,
weighing, processing, and storing fish, a fish market, fuel
docks, grocery, rum shop, and a large jetty to protect
against storm surges (B 17, 22, 29).
When TCP evaluates a project like the harbor, it
solicits feedback from other government agencies that have
relevant expertise or jurisdiction related to it. This is
called the "consultative process". On one hand this
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process gives the planning authority considerable
flexibility. For example, it theoretically gives natural
resource managers the opportunity to have input into the
planning process so that potential environmental problems
can be identified. On the other hand, the informality of
this approach reduces the accountability of the planning
process because the minister who oversees the planning
department determines whose input to accept. The result
is that planning authorities give up control of the
development review process to the political leadership.
As part of the consultative process, TCP contacted the
Coastal Conservation Project Unit, the national agency
responsible for coastal management. The CCPU happens to be
funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, the sponsor
of the fishing harbor. Officials at the regional office of
the Bank asked the government to have the CCPU review the
project (B 17). The CCPU had not been asked by the
Ministry to help with the design of the harbor (B 20).
After reviewing the project, the CCPU staff identified four
major areas of environmental concern, including: 1. Long-
term degradation of harbor waters from sewage disposal from
live-aboard fishermen; 2. Adverse effects of dredging; 3.
Changes in coastal dynamics caused by the breakwater, which
could cause siltation of the harbor mouth or adjacent river
mouth, and 4. The impact of increased fishing pressure on
86
limited fish stocks in the region (B 5, 20). No scientific
information existed to address any of these concerns.
In January, 1986, Town and Country Planning approved
the site plan for the harbor. The environmental concerns
pointed out by the CCPU were not mentioned or included in
the conditions of approval (B 22). During the 1988-89
fishing season the catch of the Barbados fishing fleet
dropped 40%. It is not known if this is a cyclical drop or
the result of over-fishing (B 29).
The political leadership was the primary pro-
development interest group in this case. It wanted to
build the harbor without the possible delays that would be
caused by researching potential environmental problems,
even though the result could be the decline of the regional
fishery and sedimentation of the harbor. The manner in
which the government pushed this project through the permit
process, ignoring environmental concerns, supports the
contention that large projects do not receive a thorough
environmental evaluation when they are initiated in the
political directorate, especially if politicians want the
project approved before a national election (B 3, 20).40
40 There was a national election in May, 1986, four
months after the project was approved. In interviews, civil
servants said that ministers push large projects through the
planning process when are national elections coming up to
convince voters that they are productive. This means that
large projects, that normally require the most careful
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How Civil Servants are Prevented from ImDlementing
Environmental Policies
While national policies are formulated by political
leaders, civil servants are often responsible for
implementing them. At the same time that civil servants
work to implement environmental policies, they are
dependent on political leaders for their jobs. The
relationship between politicians and civil servants
prevents environmental policies from being implemented.
The events that took place in all three countries shows how
this happens.
After the Cabinet granted an Alien Landholding
License to Sir Colin Tennant in 1981, reversing its earlier
decision to acquire the Jalousie Estate as part of a
national park, a senior planner in the Central Planning
Unit wrote the "Proposed Policy of Development at the
Pitons, Soufriere". It included several recommendations to
the Cabinet to protect the natural resources on the Estate,
stressing its importance to the country. But, the Cabinet
refused to adopt the report, so these recommendations were
not implemented, despite the efforts of the Central
Planning Unit.
The Chief Forestry Officer (CFO) was the most
planning, often receive the least attention from planning
technicians.
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outspoken environmental advocate in the government. He
founded the Environmental Commission which the Prime
Minister has refused to certify, so it remains an
unofficial body. In late 1988, the Ministry of Tourism
asked the CFO to attend a meeting of officials who had
voiced concern about the environmental impact of the resort
project. He voiced concerns about the protection of the
sites prime agricultural lands, and asked the Ministry to
provide information showing how these lands would be
protected if the project was built. The Ministry failed to
provide the information requested, and excluded the CFO
from further discussions about the project (SL 6).41
Similarly, the Chief Fisheries Officer has an interest in
seeing that the prime fishing grounds adjacent to the
Estate are protected, but has no direct voice in the policy
process to present this viewpoint.
When the Organization of American States submitted the
formal Proposal for a Pitons National Park to the
government in March, 1988, t had to go through official
channels. The report was submitted to the Permanent
Secretary of Planning who controlled its distribution. The
Permanent Secretary is also the Assistant to the Prime
41 The Chief Forestry was the first civil servant to
advocate environmental reform in St. Lucia. He retired in
1990.
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Minister, who is also Minister of Planning. When interest
groups supporting the inclusion of the Jalousie Estate in
a national park wanted to obtain information in the park
proposal which summarized how the park would generate more
economic benefits than the resort, the report was not
available for them to use because its distribution was
controlled by the Permanent Secretary.
SL 9).
The frustration of civil servants who want to
implement policies intended to protect the environment is
summarized by a St. Lucian close to the Pitons controversy:
"Civil servants, when faced with pressure from the
political leadership may bleed inside, if they disagree
with the development project, but can't speak out due to
politics; it is too dangerous to their families" (SL 4).
The hesitancy of senior civil servants to pressure
political leaders to implement environmental policies is
also the result of a thwarted reform movement they
initiated in the 1970s. Individuals who had recently
returned to St. Lucia after obtaining graduate degrees
abroad started meeting to express their concerns about the
process of economic development in the country. But, their
jobs were threatened, and they realized that without
holding political office reform was not possible (SL 8).
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St. itts
The small size of the government in St. Kitts gives
political leaders near total control over civil servants
who could use their jobs to carry out environmental
policies to protect the natural resources on the southeast
peninsula. There are several ways that the political
system exerts control over civil servants, preventing them
from being involved in the planning process for the
peninsula.
The Physical Planning Section of the Central Planning
Unit is under the jurisdiction of the Minister of
Development. It has a dual responsibility for evaluating
development proposals and examining the possible adverse
environmental affects they could cause. But it remains
unclear what the role of the PPS is in the development
process for the Southeast Peninsula. The PPS is the only
agency responsible for environmental planning, but it has
no formal liaison with the peninsula advisory board. The
Board's staff offered to train planning officials in
environmental planning to help build the governments
institutional capacity, but were refused by the Minister of
Development (SK 17).
The problems caused by the lack of integration between
planning authorities and the Board were summarized in a
1988 which stated: "It is imperative that planning(s)
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standing, and management and tenure policies with respect
to the southeastern peninsula be defined. Given its high
touristic potential it could be subject to all sorts of
pressures, speculative and expansionist, in the near
future".42 The decision by the Minister of Development to
not integrate the national planning process with the
development of the peninsula has prevented civil servants
from implementing policies designed to protect its natural
resources.
Similarly, the government's refusal to create an
Environmental Unit and make the National Conservation
Commission operational has prevented civil servants from
being involved in environmental planning. These policy
decisions, combined with the fact that several national
environmental laws regulating coastal development, sewage
disposal, industrial pollution, garbage disposal and beach
mining are not enforced, has created an atmosphere where
civil servants know that politicians do not want them to
enforce environmental laws.
The political relationship between ministers and civil
servants in St. Kitts also prevents the natural resources
of the peninsula from being protected. The policy of the
42 Fernando Soler, 1988. Development Control and
Physical Planning: The Case of St. Kitts and Nevis. Prepared
for the OAS and the OECS Natural Resource Management Project.
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government is to strongly support the peninsula project by
attracting investors who will fund various commercial
projects. If a discussion was allowed among civil servants
about how environmental policies should be enforced on the
peninsula, it would lengthen the development process,
something that political leaders want to avoid (SK 4).
Civil servants are forced to follow the government's policy
of not enforcing environmental standards due to the control
exerted by political leaders over every aspect of the
development process.
Environmental Interest Groups Excluded from Development
Decisions
St. Lucia
During the controversy over the development of a
resort on the Jalousie Estate in St. Lucia, environmental
interest groups who wanted to preserve the site as part of
a new national park were systematically excluded from key
public policy decisions. Two key meetings between the M-
Group and government officials that resulted in decisions
to support the resort project were not open to the public,
preventing pro-environmental groups from attending.
The first meeting was in late 1988 when
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representatives of the developer met with the Cabinet to
seek a new Alien Landholding License. This meeting
resulted in the Cabinet granting financial concessions to
the M-Group to encourage development of the resort. The
second meeting was in early 1989 when the developer met
with the Cabinet and the Development Control Authority to
obtain an official Approval in Concept for the resort.
This decision, combined with the Cabinet approval, made it
unlikely that the detailed site plan for the resort would
be rejected.
Environmental interest groups were prevented from
participating in any of the decisions that determined the
future of the national park. Groups excluded from the
decision making process included civil servants responsible
for managing natural resources, such as the forest,
agricultural uses, and fisheries; the Concerned Persons on
the Environment; and individual stakeholders who use live
and work in the area. As a government official said:
"Development review is not public; the developer presents
technical information to the Cabinet without input from
others, so there is a bias for the developer due to the
process" (SL 5). The lack of public participation has also
prevented park advocates from building a local political
base to convince politicians of the need for the park (SL
2, 13).
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The Concerned Persons on the Environment was an ad hoc
group of professionals and community leaders who started
meeting in mid 1988 as a result of the secrecy surrounding
the resort project and its conflict with the proposed
Pitons National Park. Its members included leaders of the
Catholic Church, the National Trust, the Naturalists
Society, the Soufriere Development Committee, the
Organization of American States, the Caribbean
Conservation Association, and senior civil servants from
several ministries. The Concerned Persons was formed to
increase the collective bargaining power of its members.
To do this they sponsored unprecedented public meetings in
Soufriere and Castries to express concerns over the Pitons
controversy. The meetings were widely reported in the
local press, but offers from its most influential members
to meet with the Prime Minister were rebuffed (SL 4, 9).
The Catholic Church emerged as a major public voice in
the Pitons controversy. It opposed the resort to protest
the secrecy surrounding the public policy process, and was
against privatization of the Pitons, which are recognized
as the national symbol of St. Lucia as shown by their
appearance on the national flag (Catholic Chronicle, No. 4,
April, 1989). The opposition of the Church to the
commercial development of the Jalousie Estate is notable as
an estimated 90% of St. Lucians are Catholic. However, it
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is not clear that the Concerned Persons or the Church has
had any influence on the government.
Other parties that have an interest in protecting the
environment of the Pitons are unorganized stakeholders that
use the natural resources in the area for subsistence.
This includes several individuals and families who live or
work within the boundaries of the proposed park, such as
fishermen who use the prime offshore reefs, herders, small
farmers, squatters, and charcoal producers. These resource
users have not been involved in the planning process for
the park or the resort. Their interests in maintaining a
healthy natural environment are represented indirectly by
the Concerned Persons, but they have no direct access to
the public policy process, including the Prime inister,
the Cabinet or the Development Control Authority.
The closed public policy process in St. Lucia
prevented all environmental groups from participating in
the decision to use the Jalousie Estate as a private resort
or a national park. In early 1990 the government gave its
final approval for the resort and the Organization of
American States closed its St. Lucia office. The proposal
for the Pitons National Park has not been accepted by the
government. Soon after the resort was approved, another
developer submitted plans for the Gros Piton Resort Village
and Aerial Tramway, a resort on eleven acres at the summit
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of the mountain with a tram to ferry 250,000 people a
year.43 Planning authorities are deciding whether to issue
an Approval in Concept for it. The privatization of the
Pitons is becoming a reality. It seems likely that within
a few years the natural environment of the Pitons will be
irreversibly changed by several large tourism projects,
contrary to the goals of the proposed Pitons National Park.
St. Kitts
Environmental stakeholders in St. Kitts face a similar
situation. There are no environmental interest groups on
St. Kitts. Individuals that depend on the natural
resources of the peninsula are few in number. There are a
few herders, one charcoal producer, and several squatters.
These parties are unorganized, lack any formal
representation, and have no voice in the decision making
process. St. Kitts does have small organizations that
promote the preservation of historical homes and the famous
Brimstone Hill Fortress, as well as a horticultural
society, but they have not been involved with the peninsula
project. The Historical and Conservation Society in the
neighboring island of Nevis has not been directly involved
with the project.
43 Earl Bousquet, 1990. Changing the Face of the
Pitons. An article in the St. Lucia Star, March 31, 1990.
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There are several reasons why there are no
environmental interest groups in St. Kitts. There is a
general lack of awareness among the citizens about the need
to protect the environment. The low level of political and
economic development on the island has discouraged such a
group from forming, as it would be perceived as anti-
development and anti-government. The government controls
the flow of information in the society. The only two
regular newspapers on the island are published by the
majority and opposition political parties. The only radio
station on St. Kitts is run by the government news agency
(ZIZ Radio). The Public Information Officer decides what
issues to air on the radio and what stories to send to
regional newspapers. Differences of opinion between the
few individuals involved in policy making, including both
civil servants and politicians, are deemed confidential,
and people restrain from "airing their dirty laundry in
public" (SK 4).
Since no organized environmental interest groups exist
in St. Kitts, and the flow of information is controlled by
the government, environmental issues are not part of the
public policy debate. The result is a total lack of
political pressure on the political leadership to protect
the fragile natural resources on the southeast peninsula.
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Barbados
Barbados does not have a tradition of supporting local
environmental interest groups. Historically the public has
not been concerned about the environment, and there was no
public debate about the environmental consequences of the
fishing harbor. However, a public dialogue about
environmental problems is starting to occur (30, 33).
There are two pro-environmental interest groups in the
country, the Barbados Environmental Association and the
National Trust. The BEA has several members from the civil
service and business community. It was started in the late
1980s to promote an anti-litter campaign called "Keep
Barbados Beautiful", funded by the Canadian International
Development Agency. The Trust has successfully promoted
the preservation of historical buildings and landmarks.
Both of these groups are hesitant to become involved in a
public dialogue about larger environmental issues facing
Barbados because of the risk they would be branded as anti-
government.
The potential does exist for a public debate on
environmental issues to take place in Barbados due to the
openness of the media. Barbadians have an adult literacy
rate of over 90% and support three privately owned daily
newspapers. Indirect public participation in the policy
making process occurs through several national radio call-
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in shows.4 4 At most times of the day at least one call-
in show is on the radio. These shows are reportedly
listened to by Cabinet ministers, and have resulted in the
government taking action on issues of concern to the
public, such as an investigation of health concerns at a
major chicken plant in 1989.
Radio call-in shows could serve as a surrogate for
public hearings which are not part of the national planning
process. However, the fear does exist among civil
servants, who are among the best educated and
environmentally aware citizens, that their voices will be
recognized on the radio by politicians who will exact
retribution for any criticism leveled at the government.
Two key events occurred in Barbados during the late
1980s that raised the public consciousness about
environmental issues. The Trading Post fire destroyed an
industrial warehouse storing large amounts of toxic
chemicals. For the first time, officials had to find a way
to safely dispose of large amounts of contaminated material
that posed a public health hazard. The waste was finally
burned in the defense department incinerator which caused
44
44 Three of the best known radio call-in shows are Tell
It Like It Is, Getting Down to Business, and Gottaerperk
(which roughly means to catapult or to shout directly). These
shows are a good example of "bottom up" participation in the
public policy process.
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additional questions to be raised about resulting air
pollution problems. The controversy about how to safely
dispose of the toxic material from the warehouse became a
major public issue, and was in newspapers and on call-in
shows for several days.
The second event was a fire that destroyed the White
Park Road farm and garden shop housing pesticides,
herbicides, and fertilizers. The resulting air and water
pollution and subsequent clean-up problems also heightened
public awareness of the dangers of toxic waste disposal.
As a result of these key events, workers who are
exposed to toxic materials in their jobs are demanding that
they be provided with safety clothes, and the fire
department has started to train personnel in how to deal
with fires involving toxic materials. Public
consciousness about environmental issues in general has
risen in the past few years since cable television has been
available on the island. News accounts of international
environment problems such the Greenhouse effect, depletion
of the ozone, deforestation in the Amazon and oil spills
now reach many Barbadian households, and has marginally
increased their level of awareness of similar issues in
their own country (B 1, 3, 12). This combination of local
and international key events and conditions could lead to
an opening of the policy dialogue concerning environmental
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issues in general, and the affects of large development
projects on limited natural resources on this tropical
island.
Summary
How interest groups affect the public policy process
can be determined by studying their content and behavior.
Interest groups are an important element of the political
system in the Eastern Caribbean, and their behavior can
explain the gap between the purpose and result of national
environmental policies that are supposed to protect the
fragile natural resources of the region.
In all three countries political leaders used similar
strategies of influence to promote the interests of pro-
development interest groups. These strategies included
accepting money from developers, refusing to allow public
participation in decision-making, holding private meetings
to informally approve projects, using public funds to give
economic incentives to developers, and excluding key
environmental stakeholders from the policy making process.
The political leadership in all three countries
exerted their formal and informal authority to discourage
civil servants from implementing environmental policies.
Ministers regularly overrule civil servants and disregard
their recommendations to protect natural resources.
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Governments have dropped their ministerial portfolio for
the environment, limit access to information that supports
environmental interests, including the restriction of the
free press on St. Kitts, and focus on short-term planning
horizons that favors quick solutions to current economic
problems.
Political leaders also used their informal authority
to discourage the implementation of environmental policies.
They have created a pro-development atmosphere by
continually disregarding existing environmental laws while
maintaining strict control over civil servants through
patronage appointments and party loyalty. Political
leaders have also rebuffed the efforts of civil servants to
create new national policies for environmental protection,
such as the Environmental Commission in St. Lucia, by
withholding the official backing of the government.
Local environmental groups are forming in the region,
but they lack the access to political leaders that is
needed to influence public policies. Regional
environmental organizations have had little influence on
local development decisions. Resource users remain
unorganized and have no voice in the public policy process,
even though they stand to lose the most when decisions are
made that lead to the destruction of natural resources.
Given the pro-development bias of political leaders,
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the access to the government that pro-development interest
groups have, and the exclusion of environmental
stakeholders in national policy making, the future for the
limited natural resources of the islands looks bleak.
It is clear that an approach to development decisions
that includes the interests of all stakeholders needs to be
created if natural resources are to be protected. But
other crucial elements reflective of the public policy
process in developing countries also need to be taken into
account. Culture plays an important role in decision
making, especially as it affects the interactions between
donor agencies and national governments. The interplay
between culture and politics, what I call the culture of
decision making, also needs to be accounted for in
development decisions.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Culture of Decision Making and Environmental Policy
Implementation
Culture affects public policy implementation in two
ways. First, the patterns of behavior, customs and beliefs
that people acquire as members of a society shape the way
they perceive the settings in which they operate. Second,
decision making and particularly, the way power is
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, the ways
that political leaders relate to the governed, and the norms
of responsibility for civil servants constrain the way
policy options are evaluated.
These two effects of culture on public policy
implementation in the Eastern Caribbean are inseparable, and
the link between them has to be understood to see why it is
difficult to implement new environmental policies. Often,
when new environmental policies are adopted by developing
countries, they are based on models borrowed from the United
States or Europe. This is especially true when
international foreign assistance agencies require that new
national environmental legislation be adopted as a condition
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of development assistance. In almost all instances, these
imported policies do not take adequate account of cultural
conditions. Because cultural conditions are not respected,
efforts to implement new environmental policies often fail.
Some General Characteristics of Culture
According to Edward T. Hall, "Culture directs the
organization of the psyche, which in turn has a profound
effect upon the ways people look at things, behave
politically, make decisions, order priorities, organize
their lives, and last but not least, how they think".1
In addition to examining the importance of the "other
culture", it is important for a person to contemplate his or
her own beliefs and customs. This is especially true when
a person is working in an unfamiliar culture attempting to
find ways to implement new public policies. How a person is
perceived and the biases, beliefs and customs he or she
brings to a foreign country can lead to personal
misunderstandings that undermine their work.
Weiss (1987) identifies several "ghosts" that can make
it difficult to understand the effect of culture on policy
implementation.2 By ghosts he means factors that can
1 Edward T. Hall, 1976. Beyond Culture. Garden City,
New York; Anchor Books.
2 Michael Weiss, 1987. Negotiation and Culture: Some
Thoughts on Models, Ghosts, and Options. Dispute Resolution
Forum, National Institution for Dispute Resolution,
Washington, D.C., September, 1987.
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obscure the identifiable elements of a national, regional or
local culture and make it difficult to determine exactly
what mix of personal, societal or institutional factors
affect how people behave. The ghosts Weiss sees include:
1. how people are affected by different political, economic
and legal systems and organizations within a national
culture; 2. the wide variation in individual behavioral
styles people use to negotiate and communicate; 3. the
changes that take place over time in a culture; and 4. how
to account for individual versus group of behavior in a
culture.
Most cultures, whether they are national, sub-
national, or local exist on a continuum ranging from totally
homogeneous to widely varying heterogeneous. In
heterogeneous cultures, or those lacking long historical
traditions, it is harder to separate the ghosts and focus on
the underlying elements of the cultural milieu. In smaller
more homogeneous cultures, such as those of countries in the
Eastern Caribbean, the elements of culture are easier to
identify.
Once identified, important cultural factors can be
integrated into efforts to implement new public policies to
increase the likelihood they will succeed. The context of
a culture, and the beliefs, language and behavior of its
members must be taken into account in designing and seeking
to implement new policies.
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Cultural Context
Hall and Hall describe "context" as the information
that surrounds an event and is inextricably bound up with
the meaning of that event".3 Events combine with the
cultural context to produce different outcomes. Certain
indicators can be used to evaluate, and to some extent
predict, how different cultural contexts will affect the
implementation of new public policies.
Different cultures have different cultural contexts.
Countries in northern Europe tend to be low context, a
characteristic shared with white Americans. Countries in
Latin America, Southern Europe, and the Caribbean have high
context cultures. People from low context cultures, where
the models for new public policies often originate, are
described by Hall and Hall as being monochronic. People
from high context cultures, typical of societies in
developing countries that adopt imported public policies,
are described as polychronic.
Monochronic individuals are seen as those who operate
on strict time deadlines, show little flexibility, and
require great amounts of information to make a decision.
Polychronic people are more committed to people and human
3 Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, 1987. Hidden
Differences. Garden City, New York, Anchor Press. The Halls
discuss the importance of several elements of culture and how
they affect human relationships, including time, space,
personal space, and time as structure.
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relationships, are more willing to be flexible and deviate
from a fixed plan or strategy, and consider social
relationships to be more important than strict objectives.
These differences have significant implications for the
effectiveness of public policies that are transferred
without variation from low context to high context cultures.
Belief Systems
Belief systems are at the foundation of culture. A
belief system is made up of the values and attitudes
expressed by individuals, family groups and communities who
draw upon past events, experiences and traditions to form
beliefs about issues of importance to their society.
Elements of a belief system that relate to the public policy
process include perceptions about the validity of the
government and its leaders, and the acceptance of laws and
regulations that control personal behavior. This includes
how people accept or reject the role of government in
implementing environmental laws that alter personal habits.
Belief systems may be represented by a variety of
people, including religious leaders, village elders, clan
heads or women, who may not hold formal leadership positions
in the government. The values and attitudes of a belief
system may be expressed in ways that are difficult for
outsiders to understand, such as localized spoken languages,
and non-verbal behavior. It is generally very difficult to
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understand a belief system, and know how to operate within
its norms, without living in a culture for many years. If
an outsider does not understand a culture and its belief
system, he or she will have a hard time getting their
message across.4
In some ways it is even harder to become familiar with
the culture and belief system of small communities, such as
an island or rural village. The tradition of social
interdependence among residents of smaller, insular
communities may prevent an outside party from gaining the
legitimacy needed to influence public policy.5 This can
happen even when an outsider and local people speak the same
language.
Written and Spoken Lancguage
The languages of a society, both written and spoken,
4 See Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, 1987. Hidden
Differences. Garden City, New York, Anchor Press; and Pierre
Casse, 1981. Training for the Cross-Cultural Mind.
Washington, D.C., The Society for Intercultural Communication.
5 Sally Engle Merrie, 1987. Cultural Frameworks of
Mediation. Prepared for the Workshop on Transcultural Issues
in Dispute Resolution, University of Hawaii, June, 1987.
Merrie discusses how conceptions of conflict and dispute
resolution, common occurrences when new public policies are
adopted, are embedded within cultural frameworks. How people
view conflict, and traditions for resolving it, develop in
response to conditions that can be unique to a specific
culture. Since the adoption of new public policies, such as
environmental policies, changes the status quo, conflict will
result. Knowing how the members of a society deal with
conflict can help an intervenor gain creditability while
designing an implementation process that fits local
conditions.
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reflect the underlying culture. If language differences
exist it will invariably lead to misunderstandings. To
understand a culture, to be able to get inside of it and
perceive the world as its members do, a person has to
understand its languages.
There are two main types of language differences that
hamper cross-cultural communication. The first type of
difference relates to written language, and the second
relates to spoken language. It is important to consider how
both types of language impact the effectiveness of new
policy initiatives.6
When public policies originate in a developed country,
including legislation, administrative guidelines and
regulations, they typically take the form of long written
documents filled with complex legal and technical
terminology. For example, environmental legislation may
include words like "wildlands", "zoning" or "parks and
protected areas". These words have a clear meaning in the
United States or Europe, but are often not understood by
officials in countries that lack a tradition of carefully
6 See David Olsen, 1977. From Utterance to Text: The
Bias of Language in Speech and Writing. Harvard Educational
Review, 47(3); and David Olsen, Nancy Torrance and Angela
Hildyard (eds.), 1985. Literacy, Language and Learning: The
Nature and Consequences of Reading and Writing. New York,
Cambridge University Press. This book discusses the
differences between written and spoken language, how these
two kinds of discourse vary with oral and literal competency,
and the ways that culture can affect communication when a
native language is used.
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controlled land use and conservation.
Similarly, differences in the use of spoken words are
also rooted in culture. In many developing countries, oral
traditions are the main way that people communicate,
including political leaders who are responsible for
implementing public policies. Even if both countries
involved in the transference of policies use the same
language, such as the United States and an island in the
English-speaking Caribbean, residents of the developing
country will often use a localized version of the language,
such as creolized English.
Alleyne describes the Caribbean as having extremely
complex languages and almost every type of linguistic
phenomenon, including trade and contact jargons, creole
languages and dialects, ethnic vernaculars, and non-standard
dialects.7 In St. Lucia, the official language is English,
but everyday conversations are spoken in a French-based
patois. When people do speak English it is often not the
standard form. On several occasions while in St. Kitts I
have heard visitors ask local residents: "What language are
you speaking"? The inevitable reply was: "English".
Kittians speak English, but it is spoken very quickly with
a heavy accent, and can be hard for foreigners to
7 Mervyn C. Alleyne, 1985. A Linguistic Perspective on
the Caribbean. In Caribbean Contours, Sidney W. Mintz and
Sally Price, (eds.), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University
Press.
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understand.
Public policies that originate in developed countries
are based on their written tradition, not accounting for
subtle differences in written language, and larger
differences between written and spoken languages that can
exist between people from industrialized and developing
countries. Under the best of circumstances, these
differences lead to misunderstandings that hinder policy
implementation, because the parties simply aren't
communicating. Under the worst of circumstances, open
conflict can result. An example of how this happens can be
shown by the history of the Treaty of Waitangi in New
Zealand.
The signatories to the Treaty in 1840 were
representatives of the Sovereign of England and Chiefs
representing several Maori tribes. The English signed
versions of the Treaty written in English, while the Maori
chiefs signed multiple versions written in Maori. The
controversy over the Treaty has centered on the Maori right
to tino rangatiratanga" (unqualified exercise of their
chieftainship) over their "taonga" (lands, villages, and all
their treasures). There was, and remains, no literal
translation into English of these words. This has led to
continuous conflicts over natural resource management in
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many parts of the country.8
Behavior
It is important to consider behavior as an element of
culture because the successful implementation of new public
policies depends on effective interaction with people from
different cultures who will interpret behavior and exhibit
behavior quite differently. The emotional, verbal, and
behavioral cues that people use to transmit information vary
among different cultures. To build the personal
relationships demanded of high context people in developing
countries, one must understand the meaning of behavioral
cues that may not be obvious, even to people that have spent
considerable time observing them.
Behavioral cues range from subtleties such as dress,
posture, and composure to more obvious behavior like
patterns of speech, where people sit around a table, and who
speaks first during a meeting. These cues are often related
to a standard of etiquette that if breached can lead to a
lack of trust and deterioration of the relationship. It can
be difficult to grasp the specific characteristics of non-
8 Environmental Management and the Principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner
for the Environment, November, 1988. This report discusses
how the Treaty of Waitangi has affected environmental
management decisions, and the miscommunication that has
occurred over the different language versions of the Treaty.
New Zealand has created an independent Waitangi Tribunal that
deliberates to resolve conflicts arising from language in the
Treaty, but basic misunderstandings about how it should be
applied to environmental conflicts persist.
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verbal communication in a given culture.9
Non-verbal language is harder to understand than the
spoken word. Non-verbal cues such as the use of silence and
eye contact can vary widely among cultures. Direct eye
contact, long silences between spoken words, and the time
between interventions possess different meanings for
different cultures.
Scollen describes a communication system that varies
among different ethnic groups. Ethnicity is important to
consider because policy dialogues between developed and
developing countries often involve interethnic
communication. The way in which the components of this
system are used and perceived affects the quality and
outcome of interethnic communication. Some of the
components of the system include the traditions, skills,
knowledge, group membership, linguistic resources and
politeness phenomena that people bring to a conversation.10
9 Susan Goldstein, 1986. Cultural Issues in Mediation:
A Literature Review. Program on Conflict Resolution Working
Paper 1986-1, University of Hawaii at Manoa. Goldstein
discusses how cultural factors such as attitudes towards
conflict and confrontation, verbal and non-verbal
communication, self-disclosure, reason, logic, and self-
perception within the larger cultural context need to be
understood to resolve conflicts between different cultural
groups.
10 Ron Scollon and Suzanne B.K. Scollon, 1981.
Narrative, Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication.
Norwood, New Jersey, Ablex Publishing. The Scollons discuss
how interethnic communication is affected by communication
styles, and how the content and structure of information
affects exchanges between people from different ethnic groups.
They also discuss the concept of discourse as politeness
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Understanding how the politeness phenomena differs
between cultures can be crucial to successful communication
in a cross-cultural or interethnic dialogue. For example,
if a person from a high context or indigenous culture uses
long pauses while talking, and the other person from a low
context or mainstream culture is used to short spaces
between words, a basic misunderstanding usually occurs. The
indigenous person, using long pauses out of politeness, will
think that the mainstream person doesn't know how to listen,
and the mainstream person will think that the indigenous
person is not adept at expressing complete thoughts. Both
are wrong. By deferring to politeness this kind of
miscommunication can be lessened.
Things Go Wrong When Culture is Ignored:
Bad Communication
When people from different cultures enter into a policy
dialogue, they use different kinds of communication systems.
When one party to the dialogue, typically from a developed
country, employs a formal system, based on laws and
administrative structure, and the other party, typically
from a developing country, prefers more personalized,
informal methods of communication, it is very difficult to
reach a common objective, such as implementing a new public
phenomena, and offer suggestions for improving interethnic
communication by incorporating politeness in cross-cultural
dialogue.
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policy. If a person using the formal approach is an alien
to the society, it can prevent an informal, personal
relationship from developing. This in turn can hinder the
establishment of personal trust and reinforce the perception
of the formal party as an outsider who does not accept the
social norms that exists within the local culture.
As noted by Nader and Todd: "In particular, it is
important to see how things work in societies where the
boundaries between formal and informal systems are often
blurred, and can be crossed when convenient by participants
who understand and use the total system for specific ends,
and where law often plays a secondary role...".1
In many instances, conflicts arise when new public
policies are introduced because they infringe on a societies
informal system. These conflicts occur because the status
quo, the equilibrium of society, is being disturbed. They
may be marked by internal competition, strife, disturbances,
disputes, quarrels, and struggles, which relate to the
cohesion of the underlying social process. In developing
countries, especially when an indigenous population is
involved, the underlying social process is often more
11 Laura Nader and Harry F. Todd, Jr. (eds)., 1978.
The Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies. New York,
Columbia University Press. This book focuses on the
anthropology of law by examining ten actual disputes from
different countries, and discusses why certain types of
outcomes take place based on the relationship between the
formal legal system and localized, informal styles of
resolving conflict.
117
important than the formal legal process. The personal ties,
bonds, and cooperation that define formal surface
relationships constitute this social process.12 Yet,
outsiders rarely understand how the social process works in
a community that is unfamiliar to him or her. The result is
bad communication, and the start of a ruined relationship
that will almost certainly prevent the attainment of a
mutual objective.
Ruined Relationships
Culture is intertwined with political and economic
conditions, especially in societies where dependency has
marked the relationship. It is difficult to separate the
cultural elements that affect a relationship from political
and economic factors. Societies who are historically
dependent on more powerful countries, for whatever reason,
possess a form of cultural dualism based on the convergence
of their traditional lifestyles and dependency on the
outside group.
On one hand, relying on outsiders for new policy
initiatives may be frowned upon, as members of the society
would rather control their own affairs. At the same time,
12 Max Gluckman, 1965. Politics, Law and Ritual in
Tribal Society. Oxford, Basil Blackman. Gluckman discusses
the application of social anthropology to political struggles
and social order, especially in relation to rights to land and
property, which are comparable to control over natural
resources.
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societies that are dependent on outside parties to meet
their basic human needs such as food, education, and public
infrastructure can experience a weakening of their self-
determination. As self-determination weakens, so does the
ability to control internal affairs. This is often
complicated by other costs of dependency, such as massive
emigration which drains the community of educated
professionals and skilled laborers, and financial
concessions to outside investors to promote economic growth,
which in turn accelerates changes in traditional lifestyles
and culture.
Within dependent societies there is often a feeling of
exile, as people feel they have no control over their own
destinies. Communities can feel so disenfranchised that
outside parties are allowed to maintain control over the
policy making apparatus. This allows outsiders to exert
control over the political system, reducing sovereignty and
reinforcing feelings of dependency and exile.
Elements of Culture in the Eastern Caribbean
The indigenous Amerindian culture of the Eastern
Caribbean region included the Arawaks and the Caribs, who
were undisturbed for centuries until Europeans started to
colonize the islands in the 15th century. Although the
Caribs, who were more warlike than the Arawaks, successfully
defended some islands for many years, by 1630 there was a
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steady flow of Spanish, British, Dutch and French
immigrants. With the advent of plantation agriculture in
the 16th century, nearly five million Africans were forcibly
brought to the Caribbean to provide slave labor. Abolished
in the 1830s, slavery formed the basis for the current Afro-
Caribbean culture that dominates life in the region.13
The cultures of the islands have much in common due to
a shared plantation history, but they all possess unique
characteristics based on the relationship with their
particular European colonizer. This has created tremendous
cultural diversity among the small societies in the region.
The massive scale of social and economic change in the
region makes it difficult to trace how the residents of any
particular island formed their cultural identity, but some
general statements can be made.14
The indigenous Indian people who first populated the
islands were exterminated and replaced by a bipolar society
13 In Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean
Experience, Khan summarizes the pre-colonial history of the
region, and how political power gradually shifted from the
metropolitan capitols to the islands. In From Columbus to
Castro: A History of the Caribbean, (1970, New York, Random
House) Eric Williams discusses how power struggles between
European colonialists were fed by a world economy fueled by
monopoly control of gold, sugar and slaves in the Caribbean,
and the resulting impact of European cultures in the region.
14 In The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area Sidney W.
Mintz (Journal of World History, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1966) argues
that the mix of historical traditions, diverse origins of
Caribbean populations and complicated history of European
cultural impositions make it useless to assign a single
definition of culture to all Caribbean societies.
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whose resources were controlled entirely by forces outside
of the region. This resulted in a strong dependency on
outside governments and institutions for political and
economic control, and created distinct social classes based
on skin color. These social classes originated with the
master-slave relationship. People were, and still are in
many areas, classified by skin color, with white the upper
class, colored (light-skinned black, brown, yellow and
red)the middle class and black the lower class. The white
upper class are typically creole-elites, white descendants
of European heritage. The smallest islands in the region
such as St. Kitts are more ethnically homogeneous, but still
have a creole-white upper class that retains significant
economic power, although opportunities for non-whites are
increasing. Other islands, such as St. Lucia, tend to be
controlled by a light-skinned upper class, who distinguish
themselves from all others of all shades.15
The importance of color-based class lines is explained
here to underscore the complexity of Caribbean societies.
However, there are many exceptions to rules based on skin
color. The importance of skin color is decreasing as the
1s H. Hoetink, 1985. "Race" and Color in the Caribbean.
In Caribbean Contours (Mintz and Price, eds.), Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press. Hoetink describes how the
meaning attached to skin color and ethnicity evolved in the
Caribbean, and why it is different than in other societies due
to the colonial history in the region. He quotes Lowenthal
(David Lowenthal, 1972, West Indian Societies, London, Oxford
University Press) regarding the relationship between skin
color and political control of St. Kitts and St. Lucia.
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region modernizes and people of all classes benefit from
better economic opportunities.16 But, the societies of the
islands still place significant emphasis on the role of the
individual.
The plantation system diminished the strength of
African traditions as African blacks were assimilated into
a European-based creole culture. This prevented the
creation of a unified culture. In the vacuum of an
overarching culture, individualism started to dominate the
island societies, a type of behavior modeled on the old
master-slave relationship.1 7 Individualism has had a strong
impact on the political development of the islands. Several
countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean have been ruled by
charismatic and personalistic men who serve as top political
leaders for several years at a time.18
16 During my field work several Barbadians observed that
a black middle class is emerging on that island, and in St.
Kitts, perhaps one of the most stratified society's in the
region, recent economic opportunities support several small
and mid-sized black-owned businesses.
17 In The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area, Mintz
hypothesizes that a distinct quality of Caribbean social
organization, especially in local cultures with a long
plantation era such as those of the Eastern Caribbean, is the
heavy emphasis on individual dyadic ties, compared to
membership in larger social groups based on family. He
proposes that this is an adaptive response to the intense
westernization, long colonial history, heterogeneous
population origins, and special economic history of the
Caribbean.
18 In the West Indies this has included several Prime
Ministers, including Vere Bird Sr., Antigua; Dr. Eric
Williams, Trinidad and Tobago; Errol Barrow and the Adams
family in Barbados; and John Compton, St. Lucia; who all
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While some members of the island communities have
benefited from the opportunities of individualism, the bulk
of the population has not. The people in the islands
continue to delegate responsibility for social control to a
few strong individuals, a pattern that started in the
plantation era when they had no choice. This has helped
create a modern culture where people seem to distrust
innovation, are unwilling to take risks to change the status
quo, do not engage in long term planning, and have a
perception of helplessness in controlling their lives.19 I
heard these sentiments expressed during personal interviews
with civil servants who repeatedly said that their
governments lack the capacity for long term planning (B 10,
SK 4, SL 6).
In addition to individualism, feelings of alienation
and exile among West Indians affect their cultures and
served for many years (Bird and Compton are still in office).
19 See Khan's Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean
Experience. Chapter Three for a psychological-attitudinal
profile of the Eastern Caribbean. He describes these
societies as experiencing perceived powerlessness and
incapacity for self-governance, so that "policy makers tend
to create an impression of being powerful", and "Decisions on
all ranges of questions tend to be made by them
personally...". The observation of W.A. Lewis (The
Industrialization of the British West Indies, Port-of-Spain,
Trinidad: Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, 1957)
that "West Indians wait for something to happen" helps to
explain how people in the region do not take the initiative
to create social change, leaving the responsibility for policy
change to a few strong individualistic political leaders who
also often prefer not to take the initiative.
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political systems, preventing the region from developing.20
These characteristics are embedded in the culture and
influence how people think about their governments and
political systems. A feeling of exile is the result of
forced migration during slavery, when millions of Africans
were taken from the Ivory Coast. Having arrived in the West
Indies, they lived i. exile from their African homeland.
Their feelings of dispossession were magnified because they
were given no control over their new lives in the Caribbean,
They were torn from their African culture and were prevented
by the plantation system from choosing a new culture to
replace it, a double-exile.
In the words of the West Indian poet Derek Walcott:
Where shall I turn, divided to the vein?
I who have cursed
The drunken officer of British rule, how choose
Between this Africa and the English tongue I love?
Betray them both, or give back what they give?
How can I face such slaughter and be cool?
How can I turn from Africa and live? 21
Mintz notes that many Caribbean researchers have been
20 Neville C. Duncan, 1982. Political Systems and
Constraints on Cultural Sovereignty in the Anglophone Eastern
Caribbean. A paper presented at the Conference on Culture and
Sovereignty in the Caribbean, November 20-23 in Grenada.
Duncan says: "A consideration of the concept of alienation is
vital because development is essentially a process that
restores man to himself". He goes on to quote Marx that all
developments in human history tend "toward a single goal of
eliminating alienation among men and, thus, revealing to them
that they are masters and creators of their own social world".
21 From the poem A Far Cry from Africa, by Derek
Walcott, in Derek Walcott: Collected Poems, 1948-84. New
York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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struck by the relative absence of community-based activity
in the region. There is a general weakness in community
organizations, including those focusing on church, school,
political and social activities. This may result from the
lack of control that West Indians experienced for several
generations.22
Deliendency. Insularity and Distrust of Outsiders
There are several aspects of island culture that
contribute to the insularity in the Eastern Caribbean. The
process of colonialization initially produced a "culture of
silence". Africans brought to the islands as slaves were
prevented by their masters from keeping their native culture
alive. They were forbidden to practice ceremonies and
rituals that portrayed their mythology of life and death.23
In turn, the generations of slavery helped the
22 Mintz, The Caribbean as a Socio-Cultural Area. Mintz
states that the plantation system has contributed to the
development of a national identity in some Caribbean
societies, but in many others has retarded their development.
He mentions that the elements of the plantation system that
have created this situation are forced labor and forced
immigration.
23 See Paget Henry, 1983. Decolonization and Cultural
Underdevelopment in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in The Newer
Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy and Development (Paget
Henry and Carl Stone, eds.). Philadelphia, Institute for the
Study of Human Issues. Henry describes how Africans brought
to the Caribbean sought to define a new West Indian identity
to replace the cultural heritage left behind on the Ivory
Coast. Anglicization was brought into the Eastern
Caribbeancame with the plantation system, further suppressing
the development of a regional culture based on the African
experience.
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former Africans to form a strong collective identity, based
on their economic oppression and desire to be free people.
This group identity, born from a common experience as
victims of a racist slavery mentality, has not been allowed
to fully develop because of the islands geographical
isolation, and continued economic and political dependency
on larger nations outside of the region. These factors have
also created a mentality, common among islands around the
world, of "insiders and outsiders".
In the words of a Kittian, "an outsider is an outsider,
(but) if you are from here, everyone assumes you know
everyone else" (SK 8). There is an established
interdependency among islanders who are tied together by the
need to survive with limited resources and capital. There
is always the expectation that "outsiders come with a hidden
agenda" that "grows out of our past misuse" (SK 4). This
has led to a grudging acceptance of outsiders who are
basically not trusted.
Many West Indians believe that white outsiders are
often racist, or at least carry an air of superiority,
looking down on their small societies. This has been
attributed to an ignorance of West Indian culture and the
needs of people who live in small island communities (SK 4).
This has amplified the insularity of the region that exists
due to its geographical isolation and plantation history.
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Growing Influence of the United States
While European colonialization of the region has left
a strong legacy, the cultural milieu is constantly evolving
in response to internal and external conditions. The
uniqueness of the Caribbean, always recognized in the region
because of its religious expressions, linguistic diversity,
native music (calypso and steel drum ) and annual Carnivals,
is now known throughout the world. Bob Marley brought
reggae to a worldwide audience, along with an awareness of
its Rastafarian roots. An amazing number of writers have
emerged on the literary scene, including Walcott, Lamming,
Naipaul, Aime Cesaire, and Braithwaite. But the most
influential factor affecting the modern culture of the West
Indies may be its growing relationship with the United
States.
The United States has largely replaced Europe as the
metropolitan power in the region. Immigration to the United
States from the West Indies more than tripled from 1951 to
1980.24 Large scale immigration started when islanders had
moved outside of the region to find work when the plantation
economy severely eroded in the mid 1800s. This trend is
accelerating because the regional and local economies cannot
support the rapidly growing population.
The Caribbean has grown increasingly dependent on the
24 United States Bureau of the Census, 1984.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 126.
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United States to buy export crops and finance development.
The growth of tourism and industrialization has caused
building booms on several islands. The influx of
development has changed traditional land use patterns,
displaced communities, and degraded natural resources.
Resorts are being developed on beaches that displace local
fishermen, and new highways are dividing old villages.25
Satellite dishes have brought American cable television to
the most remote communities. Political leaders choose U.S.-
style development to bolster island economies. The result
is a dilution of the cultural diversity in the region,
another obstacle for West Indians trying to find their own
cultural identity.
The Culture of Decision Making
There is a close relationship between culture and
politics among the islands of the Eastern Caribbean. The
ways in which culture and politics interact has a major
effect on how new public policies are carried out, including
25 See A Close Encounter of the Third World: West Indian
Fishermen and Supertankers, by Stephen Koester, Cultural
Survival Quarterly, 11(2), 1987. Koester documents how the
new Hess oil refinery at Cul de Sac Bay on St. Lucia has
displaced several fishermen who can no longer fish. They
cannot move to another sites as it would result in "war" with
other fishermen who already have claimed them. The fishermen
who are displaced depend on artisinal techniques that they can
no longer use. In Gros Inlet on St. Lucia, a resort destroyed
two fishing beaches. These and similar developments threaten
artisinal fishermen throughout the region, who use techniques
their ancestors brought from Africa.
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policies intended to protect the environment.
"Outsiders don't understand the tremendous intensity of
politics here, everything is political. A large part of the
culture is political; intense personal communication is part
of the culture, and most of the conversations are political"
(SK 19). "Party politics is usually all of an issue. Most
organizations are split by party loyalties; opposition
members will oppose just to oppose, not due to any factual
position. Common people are not included in this, just
party leaders, so people develop apathy due to being left
out; (the) realities of politics go far beyond parties; it
tells where the power lies" (SL 7).
These observations by West Indians show how deeply
politics are imbedded in their culture. The power of
politicians grows from the dependency on individualism that
grew out of the plantation system. In many ways, the
plantocracy of the colonial era has been replaced by a
modern political plantocracy. This is especially true of
small islands that have a low level of political and
economic development. Strong personalistic leaders are
chosen to run the government. These leaders are often
paternalistic and have been repeatedly re-elected despite
obvious corruption.26
26 Lindel Smith, 1981. Caribbean Ouarterly. 27(1),
March, 1981. Smith discusses St. Kitts as being one of the
true plantation economies in the Eastern Caribbean, with a
socio-economic structure that lends itself to an extreme form
of paternalism. He mentions how low levels of political and
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The politics practiced in the Eastern Caribbean can be
termed "man-to-man politics" as virtually all decisions are
made verbally among a small group of political leaders and
their supporters. This concentration of power is magnified
by two factors. First, no public record exists of most
policy negotiations, including Cabinet meetings. This lack
of accountability reduces the chances that policies that are
adopted will be implemented. Second, politicians use civil
servants to carry out their political agendas, causing
public institutions to become heavily politicized.
Another reason that political power is so concentrated
is a phenomena that can be called "one person-many hats."
This describes how people, usually men, develop several
skills on an island. Typically a person will gain
acceptance by becoming proficient in many roles, usually
combining politics and business, allowing them to wield
political and economic influence. It is common to have
politicians and business leaders exert strong influence over
public policy because they wear many hats. This is part of
economic development in the region leads to a highly
personalistic form of government, with primary importance
placed on leaders, and that due to the small size of the
islands this is likely to continue for some time.
The observation about leaders being re-elected despite obvious
corruption is based in part on the re-election of Vere Bird
Sr., long time Prime Minister of Antigua, in 1987 even after
it was publicly revealed that a contract to pave the airport
had included large side-payments to his son, also a government
official, who then took on the nickname "Runway".
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the island culture.27
There are other cultural norms that shape how political
decisions are made in the Eastern Caribbean. One such norm
is the lack of public involvement in the political process.
This is due to a sense of alienation among the citizenry, a
lack of community organizations, and a fear among political
leaders that members of the Opposition will use publiu
forums to attack government policies."8 The result of this
closed system of decision making can be called the "culture
of decision making".
A handful of individuals control the national policy
making process. The societies in the region are small. It
is virtually impossible for anyone to disagree with the
political leadership without it becoming public knowledge.
This includes civil servants who are responsible for
implementing public policies. For example, St. Kitts, St.
27 The "one person many hats" phenomenon can be seen be
looking at the career of two individuals on St. Lucia. Clem
Bobb is an influential businessman who owns an insurance
company, a television station, is a former member of the
development control authority, is founder of the Soufriere
Development Committee, and is a member of the Tourist Board
and School Board. Gabriel Charles was the Chief Forester,
founder of the Environmental Commission. Chairman of the Parks
and Protected Areas program, Vice-Chairman of the Beaches and
Parks Commission, and on the governing board of the National
Trust.
28 Interviews with current and ex-officials in the region
revealed that public forums are not encouraged in general in
the Eastern Caribbean. Political leaders feel that
politically sensitive issues "could generate too much interest
among the public and stretch out the process too long" (SK 4).
Public forums can also be used by opposition groups to
undermine the government.
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Lucia and Barbados have radio call-in shows that allow
citizens to express their opinions on political issues.
Civil servants fear that their voices will be recognized, so
they don't call to express an opinion, although they may
know the most about an issue.
In these tightly controlled political systems, everyone
knows everyone else. Rumors spread like wildfire. If a
person disagrees with the government, they are seen as
directly challenging the authority of an individual in the
government, such as the Prime Minister. With the exception
of conflicts between the Majority and Opposition parties,
public disagreements are deemed unacceptable behavior. Even
when civil servants break from the political leadership due
to private disagreements, they generally remain silent
because they do not want to make enemies.29 This informal
code of silence quiets potential adversaries, due to a
desire to maintain personal relationships and long term
social stability in the community.
The countries of the Eastern Caribbean, in the
tradition of the English Commonwealth to which they belong,
use the British system of regulation. Under this system,
civil servants use their discretion to enforce government
regulations, such as pollution laws. But this approach
29 One former civil servant described this informal code
of silence as "not airing your dirty laundry in public" while
an official involved in the Pitons controversy alluded to it
when he said that civil servants can't get involved as they
fear for their families (SK 4).
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does not work for two reasons. First, the islands lack the
tradition of a highly trained and professional civil service
that is needed to effectively use the British system.
Second, government ministers oversee all actions of
individual civil servants, maintaining control over the
smallest policy decisions. Civil servants are not allowed
to use their discretion. For example, they know that they
will be overruled by a minister or permanent secretary if
they try to force industry to comply with environmental
laws, as the violator will appeal directly to an ally in the
political leadership for relief. The civil servant is then
rebuked and his or her decision overturned. Once this
happens there is a reluctance to repeat the experience, so
subsequent attempts to enforce the law are not as
enthusiastic. The result is that many laws remain
unenforced (SK 2).
Policy Implementation and the Courts
An important cultural norm that affects how policies
are implemented relates to the judicial system in the
Eastern Caribbean.30 In developed countries when a public
policy, such as a regulation to control water pollution, is
30 Barbados has its own judicial system, while St. Lucia
and St. Kitts are part of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States judicial system. Both systems are similar.
The first level of judicial review is the High Court followed
by the Court of Appeal. Decisions made by the Court of Appeal
may be appealed to the Privy Council in London.
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not enforced, an individual or civic organization can
usually sue to force the government to obey the law. The
situation in the Eastern Caribbean is very different, and is
related to the West Indian culture.
The societies in the Eastern Caribbean are not
traditionally legalistic (B 19). Personal relations are
very important, so disputes are settled informally rather
than using an adversarial legal approach that would damage
personal relationships. The chances are that a disputant
has a relative or friend in the Majority party, or in the
leadership of the Opposition. It is less expensive, takes
less time, and is probably more effective to use personal
influence to settle disputes, rather than using the courts.
This informal approach is used although it would seem to
lessen the formal, legal accountability of political leaders
and the government. The public also lacks confidence in the
courts due to past incidence of corruption, and most people
don't have the money to hire an attorney. There is no
tradition of legal assistance to provide poor people with
legal representation (B 14).
Informal dispute resolution is not used to enforce
environmental laws because "they are not catching
politically" (B 10). Few people are concerned about
environmental problems, certainly not enough to form a
national constituency. One reason there is so little public
support for more effective environmental laws are the
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cultural norms that relate to how people in the region feel
about the natural world.
Perceptions of the Environment
A few important themes describe how the people of the
Eastern Caribbean perceive the natural environment. These
themes are a plantation heritage, subsistence agriculture,
and natural disasters. All three themes collectively form
what can be termed a cultural attitude towards the
environment 31
The hallmark of the plantation era was the master-
slave relationship. The master used every means at his
disposal to force the maximum possible effort from the
slave, amid inhuman hot and humid conditions. As a
consequence, many people now have an aversion to manual
labor. People who perform manual labor, including resource
users such as fisherman and farmers, are looked down upon (B
3, SK 11, SL 14) 32 As a result, many people have a negative
perception of the natural landscape, associating it with the
31 See Yves Renard (ed.), 1979. Perceptions of the
Environment: A Selection of Interpretative Essays.
Bridgetown, Barbados, Caribbean Conservation Association.
This collection of articles focuses on different ways that
small communities of resource users use and think about the
environment.
32 When asked to explain this, a former Peace Corp
worker on St. Kitts who worked with fishermen for several
years said that they are generally described as "someone with
an empty stomach and a wet ass" (SK 19).
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plantation era.33 The idea of conserving the natural
landscape in its native state free of human impact is not a
part of the culture. There is no conservation tradition in
the region. Environmental issues have only garnered limited
public attention in the last few years.
Natural disasters also have influenced how the
environment is perceived. The islands are subjected to
frequent large scale natural disasters including incredibly
intense rain storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts, heat
waves and earthquakes that damage crops, buildings, and
literally wipe out entire communities.34 There are two
consequences for the environment. First, it is perceived as
hostile, which indeed it is. Second, limited human and
financial resources must be allocated to repair the damage
that results. This dilution of limited institutional
resources, combined with the cultural bias against long term
planning, prevents environmental management programs from
33 On St. Kitts, if a student does poorly on high school
placement tests, it is said that he or she is headed for "the
green college", a derisive name for the sugar cane fields (SK
19).
34 Hurricanes in 1979 and 1980 wiped out the banana crop
in St.Lucia, the largest earner of foreign exchange. In June,
1987 a rain storm caused widespread damage on Nevis and
knocked out a main power plan in St. Kitts. In 1989 Hurricane
Hugo destroyed or damaged half on the buildings on Nevis and
caused heavy damage on St. Kitts. Local residents say that
it takes months to recover from the psychological affects of
these disasters, and for life to resume a normal pattern due
to the severe disruption they cause.
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being implemented.35
Of course there are other factors that determine how
people perceive and value the environment, including
economics, social class, and educational background. But
culture is a dominant factor, and if not accounted for in
the public policy process, will hinder attempts to enforce
environmental policies.
Lessons from the Eastern Caribbean
St. Lucia
In St. Lucia, the culture of decision making played an
important role in the Pitons controversy. St. Lucia's
political leaders supported the development of a private
resort on the Jalousie Estate in 1981 by granting Sir Colin
Tennant an Alien Landholding License for the property. This
reversed an earlier Cabinet decision to purchase the Estate
as part of the proposed Pitons National Park.
Officials close to the project feel that Tennant's
reputation as the successful developer of the island of
Mustique in the Grenadines helped him garner support from
St. Lucia's politicians. The Prime Ministers of St. Lucia
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are cousins. This family
tie is thought to be a major reason why the license was
35 See Khan, Public Management: The Eastern Caribbean
Experience. This finding is consistent with Khan's research
which found that a belief in organized life and long term
planning is limited in the region.
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granted (SL 16). The support of the Prime Minister was
essential, as he has ruled the country for most of the post-
independence period, reflective of the regional tradition
for charismatic politicians to stay in power for long
periods of time. There are other ways that the importance
of family ties, combined with party loyalty, have affected
the Pitons controversy.
The St. Lucia National Trust, established in 1975, is
the main government agency responsible for natural resource
management, including the maintenance of several important
wildlife areas. The Trust was the first agency to document
the ecological importance of the Pitons, and recommended
that the Jalousie Estate be preserved in open space as early
as 1975.36 But the official voice of the Trust has been
silenced during the Pitons controversy because the chairman
of the Trust is also the leader of the Opposition. If the
Trust were to publicly oppose the resort project, it would
be branded as anti-government and a tool of the Opposition
(SL 13, 16). This would destroy the creditability of the
Trust within the government and hamper its other
conservation activities that require the support of the
political leadership. So, the Trust has remained silent.
Another potential supporter of the proposed park is the
St. Lucia Archaeological and Historical Society. The Prime
36 Robert Devaux, 1975. St. Lucia Historical Sites.
Castries, St. Lucia, the St. Lucia National Trust.
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Minister's wife is Vice-President of the Society. But, if
she were to support the park proposal, opposing the resort,
she would be publicly opposing her husband. She has
remained silent. Thus, family ties have also nullified the
Society as a source of support for the park. In both
instances, the Opposition's silence has supported the
government's position of promoting pro-development policies
that lead to environmental damage. And there is another way
the government silenced its opponents.
The government used the threat of alienation to attack
opponents of the resort. The Soufriere Development
Committee, made up of community leaders from Soufriere,
supported the proposed park and opposed the resort. They
ostensibly supported the park because of the economic
opportunities it would provide, although some observers felt
that their primary motive was to promote their own financial
interests. Nonetheless, the Committee supported
conservation of the Jalousie Estate (SL 6).
Members of the SDC were active in lobbying the
government to drop its support of the resort and support the
national park, individually and as members of the ad hoc
environmental group Concerned Persons on the Environment.
However, when one particularly influential member of the SDC
started publicly supporting the park, word swept the island
that he was "a rumored member of the Opposition" (SL 4).
This label was intended to alienate him from the community
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and the government, damaging his personal reputation as well
as his extensive private business interests. In all
probability this tactic discouraged him from further public
opposition to the resort (SL 12).
The citizens of Soufriere adhered to another norm of
the cultural of decision making by accepting how the
developer of the resort influenced the government to support
his project. When the owners and developers of the Jalousie
Estate gave a EC$100,000 donation to the Soufriere Hospital
Committee in February, 1989, residents of Soufriere saw the
eventual construction of the resort as "a done deal" (SL
20). At the time, the developer had not received permission
from the national planning authorities to build the project.
Nonetheless, once the people of Soufriere saw the money
change hands between the developer and the political
leadership, they saw the park as a lost cause.37
The Pitons are an essential part of St. Lucia's
culture. As one St. Lucian said: "They are seen as the
guardians of the island. They have entered the
psychological consciousness of the people, as shown by
stories told about them in wedding ceremonies that relate
37 This was reflected in comments made to me in the
streets of Soufriere by local residents during the annual
carnival, and in the words of the song "Jalousie's Wedding"
sung by the 1989 Calypso King, Alman. The lyrics of this
Calypso tune talk of the "wedding" between the developers of
the resort and politicians, that the Jalousie Estate has been
lost to outsiders, the people of Soufriere have nothing to say
about it, and will gain nothing from it.
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the importance of a strong, durable bond in marriage. The
Pitons are seen as symbols of the country. If they are
given away, anything in the country can be given away. They
are a focal point for all of our national concerns" (SL 7).
Another said: "The Jalousie Estate is the bosom of St.
Lucia. The people know this and have to be involved. The
resource users, like charcoal cutters, have to be trained as
resource managers" (SL 2).
If the planning team from the Organization of American
States, who prepared the proposal for the Pitons National
Park, could have tapped this popular sentiment to protect
the Pitons, it may have gained the national support needed
to be successful. There was a lack of grassroots
participation when the park was being planned. This
occurred in part because the government disapproves of
public meetings, but park proponents also seemed to
underestimate the importance of culture in the public policy
process (SL 8). As one official said: "The OAS park
proposal was prepared with the input of a small group of
technicians, not reflecting the people of Soufriere, but
their own views of the area" (SL 2). This had several
repercussions.
First, it prevented local people from becoming
politically organized to challenge the culture of decision
making that has kept this isolated part of the island
relatively powerless in national political affairs. Second,
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it prevented local people from becoming involved in
promoting the park as a way to provide development
opportunities consistent with the scale of the local
community, minimizing disruption to the culture, compared to
the large resort at the Jalousie Estate. Third, it
prevented people from being educated about what a
conservation-oriented national park is. As one observer
said; "To the average St. Lucian, a park is a soccer field;
the concept of setting aside a large area as a wildland,
without any obvious productive human use, is foreign (SL
6)". The park planning process could have been used as a
vehicle to increase local understanding of environmental
conservation, and to help make it an element of the national
culture. Finally, it would have allowed planning
technicians to create a park to meet the specific needs of
local people. This could have included enlisting the many
resource users in the area (small farmers, herders, charcoal
producers, fishermen) to become resource managers to protect
the local environment, also helping to create an
environmental tradition for the island.
St. Kitts
The culture of decision making that exists on St. Kitts
leads to a type of government similar to the plantocracy
that existed in the plantation era, with politicians
replacing foreign elites. This is due to the relatively low
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level of political and economic development on the island,
and the importance that Kittians place on electing strong
leaders.38 A very small group o politicians and party
loyalists control the public policy apparatus, supporting a
pro-development policy agenda which prevents environmental
policies from being implemented.
The planning process for the Southeast Peninsula
Development Project is controlled by a two key political
leaders, illustrating the premium given to individualistic
behavior by the island's culture. The Minister of
Development and the Attorney General have been the chief
negotiators for the government with USAID. The Minister has
a broad portfolio with jurisdiction over the peninsula
advisory board, the Central Planning Unit, and agencies
related to housing and agriculture. He exercises total
control over the peninsula's development, and fails to
enforce environmental policies in the rest of the country.
He epitomizes the culture of decision making that exists in
the country.
The Southeast Peninsula Development Project is simply
huge by island standards. Its 6.4 mile long road, costing
$17 million, runs over steep coastal hillsides while
38 See Lindel Smith, 1981. EslectLs and olitics I n-
the Eastern Caribbean. Caribbean Quarterly, 27(1), March,
1981. Smith hypothesizes that politics in St. Kitts are less
sophisticated than other countries in the region due to its
low level of political development, leading to a highly
personalized brand of public policy.
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skirting numerous beaches and bays. The road was built to
provide access to provide access to 4000 acres of
undeveloped land, and in this it has succeeded. But, the
project was designed and carried out with little thought
given to its cultural impact. The constraints that the
Kittian culture impose on the political system were ignored
by USAID when it designed a program to implement policies to
protect the abundant natural resources on the peninsula, and
this has led to severe problems.
USAID took several steps intended to protect the
natural resources of the southeast peninsula. It required
that politicians pass national conservation legislation,
hired consultants who cataloged natural resources and
recommended how to manage them, and prompted the government
to establish an advisory board to oversee the development of
the peninsula. USAID envisioned that these and other
policy-oriented elements of the project would be operational
by the time the road was completed. But, this has not
happened.
In St. Kitts, as in other Eastern Caribbean countries,
policy implementation is a long, slow process. It is based
on "man-to-man" communication and trust between individuals
that takes years to develop. It takes most outsiders
several years to be accepted by local people, such as
political leaders, and to be aware of the numerous
subtleties that are simply very difficult for outsiders to
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understand, such as classism, power relationships and the
way that the culture of decision making works.
Outsiders trying to promote policy reform, including
USAID, operate on a fixed, fast paced schedule, reflective
of continental lifestyles and institutional protocols. But
St. Kitts continues to have a pace of life reflective of the
tropical heat, humidity, and one-on-one relationships that
mirror the insularity and interdependence of island living.
As a result, many of the environmental policies designed by
USAID are taking years, rather than months, to be adopted.39
Another factor leading to the slow acceptance of new
policies is the desire to preserve harmony in the society.
When a new policy is introduced, it causes conflict with
traditional values. For example, the National Conservation
and Environment Protection Act contained a definition of
beach and foreshore that was disliked by land owners on the
peninsula as it could adversely affect property values.
Sensitive issues such as this are generally discussed bit by
bit over a long period of time. After the new idea has had
a chance to sink in, which may take a year or two, it may be
acted on. This pattern of gradual disclosure of new
39 When discussing how slow the public policy process
works in St. Kitts, one official paraphrased a top politician
who was protesting a policy change; "Man, you are laying too
much on the people" (SK 4). This response has been given to
efforts to preserve the natural resources on the peninsula,
which have been proceeding slowly. In the words of an
official close to the project, the country is learning very
slowly how to deal with the planning process for the peninsula
(SK 25).
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information is done out of a need to preserve harmony in the
society, and will not change due to pressure from
outsiders.4 0
A continental bias has underlain the entire
environmental planning process for the peninsula, designed
by outsiders who don't understand the scale of St. Kitts and
how its culture influences the political process (SK 4).
Barbados
Although it is more developed politically and
economically than St. Lucia or St. Kitts, Barbados possesses
some of the same cultural characteristics common to
countries in the Eastern Caribbean. It has a political
culture that favors strong individuals, a plantation
heritage that has alienated many people from direct
involvement in the public policy process, including the
advocacy of environmental issues, and a closed decision
40 As described by a former government official, the
slow process of policy implementation has several distinct
steps. Unlike the United States, there is a huge gap between
a law and the regulation to implement the law. Once a law is
adopted, discretionary guidelines are informally developed by
civil servants to carry out the law. As the voluntary
guidelines are used more and more, the government starts to
think about creating formal regulations. Politicians "test
the waters" with the guidelines to find out what kind of
regulation is politically feasible. Then a way has to be
found to present the proposed regulation in a simple and
concise manner. This process requires that civil servants
responsible for implementing new policies possess a lot of
political skill, are patient, can work effectively in an
informal manner behind the scenes, and do this all without
much in the way of financial and technical resources.
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making system that favors development over environmental
protection. Because the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor
originated in the political directorate of the national
government, the cross-cultural problems affecting policy
implementation in the Pitons controversy and the Southeast
Peninsula project did not exist. But, problems did arise
when the government chose a Canadian consultant to design
the harbor who was unfamiliar with conditions in the
tropics. This in turn raises a concern about the
suitability of sophisticated technologies used for the
harbor, which is also related to the island culture of
Barbados.
Several Barbadians familiar with the fishing harbor
were alarmed when the consultants designing it seemed to be
unfamiliar with the tropical conditions in which they were
working. Specific mistakes in the design included the ice
processing plant which was originally designed based on the
ambient temperature of sea water in the Atlantic Ocean
rather than the warmer Caribbean Sea, and the improper
placement of input pipes that caused the pumping system for
the ice plant to be destroyed, delaying the opening of the
harbor for several months. Civil servants who were
knowledgeable about the day-to-day operation of the Barbados
fishing fleet, and how the operation of the plant would be
constrained by the technological knowledge available in the
country, felt that the foreign consultants were not paying
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attention to these concerns. They found it very difficult
to influence the design of the facility. Finally, after
much conflict between the consultants, the Ministry of
Agriculture, who employed them, and the Fisheries Division,
the government designated a liaison between the consultant
and the government to address these concerns (B 13). Still,
many government officials close to the project, after seeing
the smaller fishing harbor at Ostins fail, feel that the
Bridgetown project will be a "white elephant" because it
depends heavily on sophisticated technology (B 22).
Cultural conditions could influence the technical
feasibility of the Bridgetown project in two ways. First,
political leaders operating within the culture of decision
making are likely to reward their political patrons with
jobs with in the new facility. This will place an emphasis
on filling jobs with local people who lack the management
skills to operate the harbor. Second, when any one of the
many pieces of machinery in the facility (pumps, motors,
scales, water and electrical lines, cranes, the ice plant,
etc.) breaks, as will inevitably happen in the harsh
tropical environment, it is doubtful if replacement parts
will be available on the island or in the region. The large
scale of the project, with its many complex inter-connected
components, appears to exceed the technological constraints
of the island. Although the project included some technical
training, Barbados does not have the trained personnel to
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operate it or the replacement parts o fix its equipment
when it breaks. The project was not adapted to the
technological and cultural limitations of the island.
Summary
Culture and political decision making in the Eastern
Caribbean are inseparable, and the link between them has to
be understood to find new ways to implement policies
intended to protect natural resources. When environmental
policies are adopted by developing countries in the region,
often as a requirement of development assistance, they are
based on models from the United States and Europe. In
almost every instance, these imported laws do not take
adequate account of local and national culture, and as a
result, fail.
The elements of a culture that must be taken into
account include: language, kinship, attitudes towards formal
authorities, attitudes towards outsiders, the importance
between informal and formal systems used to resolve
conflicts, and the role of non-verbal behavior cues in
communication. The different cultural perspectives of
people who are either polychronic or monochronic have to be
examined so that misunderstandings do not occur when public
policies are transferred from developed to developing
societies. It is crucial to understand the use of written
versus spoken language, especially in countries whose
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residents have a strong oral tradition, and to design a
specific strategy for policy implementation that respects
how people within a cultural group use language in their
everyday life.
Culture is interconnected with the political and
economic conditions in countries, especially in societies
that have been dependent on outsiders to meet their basic
human needs. Understanding how dependency has shaped a
society, and possibly undermined its self-determination, is
essential to designing public policies that work.
To implement environmental policies it is critical to
know how to account for the special characteristics that
make up a countries unique culture. In the Eastern
Caribbean, the plantation system that dominated the region
from the early 16th century until the mid-1800s formed the
basis for the Afro-Caribbean culture that is dominant today.
The premium on individualism, a distrust of outsiders, and
pervasive feelings of alienation and exile are the legacy of
the plantation era. These elements of culture, combined
with the small size of the societies, have had a pronounced
affect on the public policy process.
Outsiders often simply don't understand intensity of
politics in the Eastern Caribbean. Intense personal
communication is part of the culture. Public policy
decisions are controlled by the loyalty to people and
political parties among top political leaders. "Man-to-
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man" politics is dominant, reflecting the vitality of
personal relationships and need for trust.
The distrust of outsiders, a strong desire for self-
governance, the small size of public agencies and the
politicalization of civil servants make innovation and
creativity in policy making very difficult. People prefer
to settle disputes informally rather than to risk damaging
personal relationship by resorting to the courts. This lack
of legal leverage weakens pro-environmental interest groups
trying to strengthen environmental policies.
The way that people in the region perceive the natural
environment affects the way that natural resources are
managed. The plantation system's abuse of people through
manual slave labor has created a negative perception of the
landscape. There is no widespread conservation tradition in
the region. The concept of setting aside large areas for
wildlife and public use is not widely understood. Natural
disasters are a regular occurrence, and recovering from them
diverts limited technical and financial resources away from
long term efforts to improve natural resource management.
An overarching cultural theme that relates to the
efforts of outsiders trying to intervene in the regions
political systems is the vast difference between island and
continental cultures. It is simply very difficult for
people from large continental countries to fully appreciate
the huge differences between their cultures and those that
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exist on small and geographically isolated islands. The
linkages between culture and policy making in an island
environment, including the use of oral traditions to convey
information, social interdependencies, and the affect of a
tropical climate on the pace of business and life largely
define how these societies operate, and are often not
understood by people from continental cultures in the United
States and Europe.
In the three countries studied, St. Kitts, St. Lucia
and Barbados, among the elements of culture that cause
environmental concerns to be ignored are: concentrated
political power through individualism, family ties and party
loyalty; the risk of alienation to environmentalists; and
the citizens acceptance of a closed political system. The
elements of culture that cause international foreign
assistance agencies to fail in their attempts to implement
environmental policies are: use of massive projects that are
out of scale with the islands; not understanding how long it
takes for new policies to be accepted; the pervasive
distrust of outsiders in the region; and the use of
sophisticated technologies to convey information and operate
projects that are in conflict with the cultural norms in the
islands.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Relationship Between Economic Conditions and
Environmental Policy Implementation
In the Eastern Caribbean and developing countries in
general, the basic imperative for economic growth drives
development decisions. In the face of severe economic
pressures, governments favor large development projects that
are designed to provide major financial benefits. It is
these large projects that often cause the most environmental
damage. Environmental policies intended to protect the
environment are seen as obstacles to economic growth and are
often ignored.
Attempts to improve environmental policy implementation
cannot be separated from the economic realities that
political leaders face on a daily basis. These realities
include the history of dependency on the North Atlantic
states, problems with diversifying national economies, a
shortage of foreign exchange to finance imports, persistent
high unemployment, and the difficulty in achieving regional
integration. To help understand how these elements of the
regional economic system have evolved, and in turn how they
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relate to environmental policy implementation, I will first
briefly describe the economic history of the Eastern
Caribbean.
Economic History of the Region
The history of how the economies of the islands in the
Eastern Caribbean developed is tied to what happened in the
wider Caribbean region. When Christopher Columbus made the
first of three voyages to the region in the late 15th
century it marked the beginning of the colonial era which
did not end until the independence movement in the later
half of the 20th century. The hallmark of the colonial era,
which lasted more than 300 years, was the mercantile system
that controlled the economies of the island states.
The mercantile system was based on a triangular trading
pattern between Africa, the Caribbean and Europe. The
entire system was managed and capitalized by various
European powers in the metropolitan capitals, and exploited
the people and resources of their colonies in the Caribbean.
Slaves were brought from Africa to the islands, where sugar
and rum was picked up and brought to Europe. Finished
products were then taken back to the Caribbean to feed and
cloth the expanding population, completing the cycle. The
financial rewards were great. By the end of the 18th
century one third of England's trade was taken up by the
sugar industry. Profits from the slave trade were also
immense. The sovereigns of Spain, the Netherlands and
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England granted licenses to allow traders to buy and sell
slaves, and received large fees in return.l
Several economic patterns that were established in the
plantation era persist today. Because virtually all fertile
soil was planted in sugar, no land was left to grow crops.
As a result food had to be imported, creating a dependency
that has grown in recent years as the population of the
islands has increased.2 Food and consumer durables that
must be imported continue to drain national treasuries of
highly prized foreign exchange. A common expression in the
region is that "The islands consume what they don't produce,
and produce what they don't consume".
The geographical isolation of the islands and their
small size made them ideal candidates for colonialism and
external dependency. Although the plantation economy has
changed to some extent, most island economies in the Eastern
Caribbean, especially the smaller islands such as St. Kitts,
are still struggling to escape from their multiple burdens.
Most of these economies are still underdeveloped and
dependent on external decisions.3 This is due in large part
1 For a description of the sugar and slave trades, see
A Short History of the West Indies, by J. H. Parry and Philip
Sherlock, 1971. London, Macmillian Caribbean.
2 See Jamal Khan, 1987. Public Management: The Eastern
Caribbean Experience. Dordrecht, Holland, Foris Publications.
3 Dr. Colin Clarke, 1988. Sovereignty, Dependency and
Social Chanqe in the Caribbean. In South America, Central
America and the Caribbean, London, Europa Publications.
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to the general neglect given the West Indies by its
colonizers after the sugar economy declined in the 19th
century. The reasons for this neglect are important
elements of the modern economic problems in the region; the
economies are small, the expense of communicating and
transporting supplies over the long distances between
islands and the continents is great, and the relatively
small population base means a small political constituency
to voice its demands to the international community.4
Current Economic Realities
A common characteristic of all island economies in the
region is their vulnerability to external circumstances.
This partly reflects the cycle of low domestic savings and
low investment that existed for many years. In the 1960s
foreign investors became interested in the region, spending
foreign exchange to build hotels and resorts, refurbish
sugar plantations and develop mines. As a result, the
region has experienced positive economic growth over the
last several years, but at a slower rate than was
4 Gordon K. Lewis, 1968. The Growth of the Modern
Indies. New York, Monthly Review Press. Lewis describes why
political and economic reform was so late in coming to the
West Indies, and how England in particular contributed to this
retardation of development. Reforms leading to independence
were slow and piecemeal, and it was not until the end of
colonial era in the 1960s that West Indians were appointed to
important administrative posts, in lieu of the British who
had historically been assigned to important positions in the
region.
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anticipated in the 1970s.
The flow of foreign capital, a necessary component for
development because of the lack of domestic savings in the
region, slowed when initial investment opportunities were
exhausted.5 The decline of the global economy in the 1980s
brought disruptions to the island economies due to declining
commodity prices, unstable currencies (especially the fall
of the US dollar), and wide variations in export prices.
Nonetheless, a moderate rate of overall growth has lifted
most Eastern Caribbean countries to an intermediate position
between industrialized nations and the rest of the
developing world.6 This has been due in part to large
grants and low interest loans made to countries by
development assistance agencies that have funded a wide
variety of projects. This new source of capital has made up
for the decline in private foreign investment and
contributed to the positive growth rate of the last few
years.
In general, economic growth has been based on the
diversification of exports, but has been unsteady and highly
reactive to fluctuations in the world economy. The region
5 Richard Fletcher, 1984. Resources nd Expectations
in the English-Speaking Caribbean. In The English-Speaking
Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for U.S.
Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.,
1975.
6 Robin Chapman, 1988. Latin America and the
Caribbean:Economic Problems. In South America, Central
America and the Caribbean. 1988. London, Europa Publications.
157
I -
is oriented heavily toward international trade, and there is
no reason to believe this will change.7 The economies of
the islands are unstable because they are typically
dominated by one sector, and if adverse conditions affect
that sector, the whole economy suffers. One obvious example
was the affect of hurricanes in 1979 and 1980 that destroyed
most of St. Lucia's banana crop which accounts for about 50%
of its total exports.
Because the countries in the region must import large
amounts of food and consumer products their external debt is
increasing, requiring large payments to service it. Growth
in the economy depends on an increase in the value of
exports that earn foreign exchange. As debt payments
increase so must export earnings if the economy is to grow.
All of the islands have large trade deficits, but they
are partly or wholly offset by increased earnings from
tourism, remittances from citizens working abroad, and
grants. Although their debt to service ratios have steadily
increased, reflecting the rise in debt and decline in export
earnings, compared to other developing countries the overall
performance of the island economies has been good.
The region's overall terms of trade improved in the
7 See DeLisle Worrell and Compton Bourne (eds),, 1989.
Economic Adiustment Policies for Small Nations: Theory and
Experience in the English-Speaking Caribbean. New York,
Praeger. This book discusses macro-economic conditions and
trends in the region, including the important role of trade,
capital movements, fiscal and credit policies.
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late 1980s due to an expansion of tourism and a decline in
international interest rates.8 As a comparison, the debt to
service ratio for larger countries in Latin America has
grown much faster, requiring massive structural adjustments
to enable external debt obligations to be met, reversing
much of the economic progress made since the 1960s.9
Although it is difficult to document precisely due to
poor record keeping, language differences, and the existence
of a vibrant informal economy, high rates of unemployment
have been a persistent problem in the Caribbean. Every
country has seen a mass migration of its workers that have
moved to another country to find work and send remittances
back home. Remittances are a major source of foreign
exchange for all of the islands and without them the
expanding foreign debt could n be paid off.
Unemployment has several root causes. The most obvious
is the underdevelopment that plagues the region and the
inability to provide investment capital, through domestic
savings or foreign investment, to diversify national
S World Bank, 1988. Caribbean Countries: Economic
Situation, Regional Issues and Capital Flows. A World Bank
Country Study, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
9 Wendell A. Samuel, 1988. Foreign Assistance in the
Caribbean: Another View. Samuel proposes that even though
the debt service ration of Eastern Caribbean countries is
fairly low, their lack of resiliency to variations in the
world economy makes them particularly vulnerable. Evidence
of this is that most of the foreign debt of the islands is
owed to international aid organizations because they lack the
economic stability to attract commercial loans.
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economies fast enough to provide jobs for the expanding
population. Unemployment rates of 20% to 30% in the
agricultural, industrial and service sectors are not
uncommon. Industrialization has not occurred fast enough to
employ workers who have left the agricultural jobs, creating
a major labor surplus.10 The persistence of both
unemployment and underemployment mean a loss of
productivity for the island economies of the region, and
perpetuates a cycle of poverty, poor health and frustration
that prevents people from enjoying productive lives.11
The Multi-Sectoral Economy
The economy of the Caribbean, including the islands of
the Eastern Caribbean, is still dependent on the interest
and activity of major investment centers outside of the
region, mainly in the United States, Canada, and Europe.
The island economies are based on a narrow range of domestic
products that are increasingly subject to competitive
pressure from the global marketplace and instability due to
10 Ransford W. Palmer, 1984. Problems of Development
in Beautiful Countries: Perspectives on the Caribbean.
Lanham, Maryland, North-South Publishing Company. Palmer
describes the reasons for underdevelopment relating to small
resource-poor islands in the region, and why early strategies
to reduce unemployment through industrialization have failed
to live up to their expectations.
11 Kempe Ronald Hope, 1986. Economic Development in
the Caribbean. New York, Praeger. Hope describes the effect
of unemployment and underemployment on the economies of the
region, and the relation to a fast growing population.
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scarcities of foreign exchange, technical expertise and raw
materials. 12 Economic conditions in the region can best be
described by briefly reviewing the status of agriculture,
manufacturing and tourism.
Agriculture: Boom or ust
The agricultural sector has historically been based on
the production of single commodity export crops that garner
large amounts of foreign exchange, such as sugar on St.
Kitts and bananas on St. Lucia. Problems caused by
depending too heavily on export crops, including regular
natural disasters, labor unrest, and oscillation in world
prices for agricultural commodities, has caused an increased
emphasis on diversifying national economies to prevent them
from being subject to these uncertainties.
The problems of depending too heavily on export crops
is illustrated by the situation in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and
Barbados. In St. Kitts, the sugar industry, which was
nationalized in 1975 so the government could centralize its
management and production, accounts for about 60% of
domestic exports and employs 25% of the working population.
The industry has been in decline since the 1960s.13 In 1986
the United States imported 12,500 tons of sugar from St.
12 Hope, 1986.
13 South America, Central America and the Caribbean,
1988. London, Europa Publications.
161

Kitts, but this declined to 8,000 tons in 1988 and 1989 due
to a U.S. sugar import quota. The amount of sugar harvested
in 1989 was substantially less than 1988, a drop from about
25,000 tons compared to 18,000, due to Hurricane Hugo and a
shortage of cane cutters on the island.14
In St. Lucia the banana crop has been the mainstay of
the economy. The government initiated a costly program in
the early 1980s to reorganize the industry and increase its
efficiency. Foreign earnings from this single crop have
increased more than fivefold since 1983. Despite a slow
recovery from damage incurred during hurricanes in 1979 and
1980, the largest earner of foreign currency brought in a
record $65 million in 1989.15 But by world standards St.
Lucia's bananas are expensive. Most of the annual crop is
purchased by the United Kingdom which pays more than the
world price to be helpful to its former colony. St. Lucia
benefits from the Lome' Convention under which its bananas
have first preference in the United Kingdom market, but this
may not continue after the European Community consolidates
in 1992. The new unified European market could produce
bananas cheaper than St. Lucia, substantially reducing the
14 The figures on the tonnage of sugar produced in 1988
and 1989 are from Caribbean Insight, 13(3), London, West
Indian Committee, March, 1990. A shortage of cane cutters was
noted in field interviews with sugar estate managers in 1989,
who have to use imported labor to supplement local workers.
15 Taken from a report on St. Lucia in the Latin
American Monitor: the Caribbean. 6 (10), December 1989,
London, Latin American Monitor Ltd.
162
- ~ ~ ~
value of its crop and the foreign exchange it earns.16
In Barbados the importance of sugar has declined
steadily since the early 1960s but still accounts for about
5% of the gross domestic product. Stagnating production in
the mid 1980s contributed to a general slowdown in the
economy, and efforts are underway to diversify into non-
sugar agriculture and related agro-industries. Production
has continue to be hampered by poor operating efficiencies
and low crop yields. The government initiated a program of
price supports in 1983 to support the industry, but the low
price of sugar on the world market, in part due to the
weakness of the US dollar, has contributed to the general
sluggishness of the economy.17
Efforts are underway throughout the Eastern Caribbean
to diversify agricultural production, shifting emphasis from
sugar and bananas to small plot row and fruit crops, to
provide local foodstuffs and decrease the amount of foreign
exchange spent on food imports. The failure to expand local
food supplies impedes economic development in general
because it uses limited resources that cannot be utilized by
other sectors of the economy as it expands. Problems with
securing title to arable land and being able to pay for
16 Taken from Guyana, Barbados, Windward and Leeward
Islands, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, and A Survey
of the Caribbean in the Economist, August 6, 1988.
17 World Bank, 1984. Barbados Economic Memorandum.
Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, the World Bank,
Washington, D.C., the World Bank, 1988; and Thorndike, 1988.
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expensive agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and
irrigation systems are barriers to diversification.
The pattern of allocating limited land, human and
financial resources to continue producing large scale export
crops has been hard to change. To deal with these problems,
governments are being urged by the World Bank and other
donor agencies to review Misting economic incentives,
support services and public policies that are hindering
diversification.18 However, given the politically sensitive
nature of making changes to the economic and political
status quo, such as large scale land reform, it is doubtful
that the changes needed to alter the pattern of agricultural
production will occur as long as tourism and foreign
remittances continue to compensate for expenditures spend on
importing food.
The problems of depending on agricultural export crops
that are shared by these Eastern Caribbean countries has
motivated them all to increase their reliance on
international tourism to contribute to their economic
stability.
The Emergence of Tourism
The rapid growth of tourism in the 1980s catalyzed the
economic growth among the islands of the Eastern Caribbean
18 World Bank, 1988. Caribbean Countries: Economic
Situation. Regional Issues and Capital Flows.
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with few exceptions. Countries have pursued aggressive
strategies for promoting tourism because of its multiplier
effect in the economy. Tourism increases local incomes,
stimulates investment and employment and raises foreign
exchange earnings.19 It also benefits other sectors of the
economy, especially agriculture which in many islands is
capable of providing increased quantities of fruits,
vegetables and meat to meet the needs of tourists. The
manufacturing sector also benefits as the demand increases
for tourist-related products.20
In the mid 1980s countries in the region initiated
efforts to formally integrate tourism into national economic
planning. The relatively young industry started to
aggressively promote its benefits. The result has been an
emphasis on improving the public infrastructure, such as
airports, roads, public utilities, waterfront areas and duty
free concessions to serve new resorts and cruise ships.
This trend can be seen by reviewing the experience with
tourism in Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Kitts.
Barbados aggressively promoted tourism in the 1970s.
Several major resorts were built on the south and west
coasts and daily chartered air flights were started to bring
Americans, British and Canadians to the island. A new
19 Hope, 1986.
20 Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre,
1988. The Contribution of Tourism to Economic Growth and
Development in the Caribbean. CTRC, St, Michael, Barbados.
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airport was built with the financial assistance of the
Canadian government in the early 1980s and several other
government sponsored programs started to improve the quality
of the tourism experience. But by the mid-1980s the revenue
from tourists started to drop as other destinations in the
Caribbean and South America provided better facilities and
benefited from more favorable exchange rates. Real wages
have fallen in the industry in recent years.21
St. Lucia promoted tourism later than Barbados but is
emerging as a major visitor destination. The St. Lucia
National Development Plan promotes development of the
tourist industry as a major part of the island economy.
Hotel rooms on the island have grown from 700 in 1973 to
2500 in 1989 and several projects have been recently
completed or are underway. The Caribbean Development Bank
estimates that 2000 new rooms are needed to accommodate an
expected increase in visitors from Europe. The governments
commitment to the industry is reflected by its plans to
rebuild the west coast road and construct a dam to supply
additional water. A major new power station is under
construction and a duty free shopping area was recently
added to the harbor in Castries to accommodate cruise ship
21 The World Bank, 1984. Barbados Economic Memorandum.
Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, the World Bank,
Washington, D.C.; The World Bank, 1988. Caribbean Countries:
Economic Situation, Regional Issues and Capital Flows.
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passengers.2 These projects are consistent with the
recommendation of the World Bank that hotel capacity should
be expanded by strengthening the national Tourist Board,
increasing promotional efforts and improving
infrastructure.23
As the least developed of the three islands, St. Kitts
has only recently started to develop its tourist industry,
but it has adopted a very aggressive posture to promote it.
The government has a program to grant incentives to develop
the Frigate Bay area and the USAID funded Southeast
Peninsula Development project recently provided access to
4000 acres of land for resorts, condominiums, a marina,
cruise ship facilities, duty free shops and houses. Cruise
ship stop-overs increased in the mid 1980s but decreased in
1989, apparently due to a lack of tourist facilities on the
island. With the decline in the sugar industry and its
uncertain future, St. Kitts is banking heavily on tourism to
provide the impetus for economic growth well into the 21st
century.
Tourism is viewed by the island governments as the
savior of their unstable and marginal economies. Although
tourism provides many economic benefits, it does have
drawbacks. The demand for tropical tourism varies with the
22 Taken from the Latin American Monitor-The Caribbean.
6(10), December, 1989, London, Latin American Monitor Ltd.
23 The World Bank, 1988.
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health of the international economy. As a luxury product,
tourism responds to the ebb and flow of the national
economies in the countries where tourists originate. For
example, tourist arrivals in the region declined in the
periods 1973-75 and 1981-83, corresponding with a drop in
income in the U.S.24 In addition, a large portion of the
earnings from tourism go towards financing imported goods to
supply the industry and do not enter the local economy.25
In the region there has been a trend of building all-
inclusive resorts, such as Club-Med and Couples, where
visitors do not have to ever leave the confines of the hotel
complex during their stay. Many of the hotel rooms in St.
Lucia are of this type. This prevents lower income people,
who tend to be self-employed vendors and craftsmen located
in urban areas far from the resorts, from sharing in the
economic benefits of tourism.
In some communities in the region, such as Bridgetown,
Barbados, public officials are expressing concern that the
demands of increased tourism will exceed the carrying
capacity of the island. The tourist-related building boom
in Barbados has caused widespread coastal erosion, increased
the runoff of raw sewage into the ocean killing large
portions of the reef system, placed stress on fresh water
supplies during the December-April dry season and
24 Worrell, 1987.
25 Palmer, 1984.
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contributed to increased overcrowding in the downtown (B
30,33).
Manufaotering: Mixed Results
The islands have had mixed results from attempts to
expand their manufacturing sectors, despite substantial
financial incentives offered to entice international
companies to locate in the region. A shortage of raw
materials and spare parts are a major limiting factor to the
growth of this sector. The electronics industry, which
assembles completed components from parts made abroad,
showed an increase of 26% in 1984, but declined in 1986 due
to a deterioration in the U.S. market and competition from
Asia. There are several businesses specializing in the
production of food, beverages, tobacco, clothing and
chemicals. The sizable garment industry has been hurt by
trade barriers in Trinidad and Tobago. In the last five
years several international companies have registered in
Barbados to benefit from a tax agreement with the U.S., but
in general Barbados is not competitive due to its limited
marketing capabilities and the high cost of living.26
The small size of St. Kitts and St. Lucia has made it
difficult for them to develop sizable manufacturing sectors.
In St. Kitts the government has tried to encourage
manufacturing by promoting electronics, clothing and shoes.
26 Thorndike, 1988; and the World Bank, 1988.
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Several garment operations have closed due to trade
restrictions imposed by the CARICOM market.27 These
restrictions require St. Kitts, as a CARICOM member, to
impose tariffs on goods imported from outside of the CARICOM
area.28 This has served to protect some infant industries
in the region while causing others to close or curtail
operations. The recent increase in local wages has also
made this sector less competitive.
In St. Lucia the manufacturing sector accounts for only
about 10% of the gross domestic product. The island
supports a wide variety of small scale industries producing
for local and international consumers including beverages,
food, wood and paper products and textiles. St. Lucia is
one of the most industrialized of the small islands in the
Eastern Caribbean due to the quality of ts infrastructure.
The Hess Oil Corporation built a major oil storage area at
Cul de Sac Bay in 1983 but it has not had the anticipated
spin-off effects for the local industrial economy.2 9 A
27 Europa Publications, 1988. CARICOM stands for the
Caribbean Community. It as founded in 1973 for the purpose
of promoting economic integration through a common market.
Headquartered in Guyana, CARICOM brings together Caribbean
heads of state to foster regional cooperation in economic,
health, educational, communication and industrial relations.
Description taken from: Island Resources Institute, 1989.
Organizational Profiles: A Guide to Donor Orqanizations and
Technical Assistance Aencies.
28 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 1989-
90. London, the Economist.
29 World Bank, 1985. St. Lucia: Economic Performance
and Prospects. A World Bank Country Study, Washington, D.C.
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refinery to accompany the oil terminal was never built due
to the worldwide decline of the oil industry in the 1980s.
The government has provided a Customs Free Zone to attract
international firms but this has had mixed success.
The same themes appear repeatedly when experts discuss
the problems that impede improvements in the economic
climate of the region. These themes include the lack of
political will among governments to aggressively pursue
regional integration, the desperate need to diversify island
economies, the instability of depending on mono crop exports
for foreign exchange, growing trade deficits, uneven
production in the agricultural sector, and continued
dependence on the North Atlantic states, especially the
United States, for outside capital and technology needed to
fuel growth. To understand the economic ramifications of
the relationship between the Eastern Caribbean and the North
Atlantic states, I will describe how this situation has
developed.
The Eastern Caribbean and the North Atlantic States
Patterson describes how the increasing close
relationship between the United States and the Caribbean is
causing more direct and immediate economic influence by the
former over the later. This is characterized by the flow of
investments, loans and remittances from the U.S. and
profits, flight capital and illegal capital (ie. drug money)
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to the U.S.30
The islands were colonies dependent on the United
Kingdom until the independence movement started in the
1960s. St. Kitts was the last country to gain full
independence, in late 1983. The economic dominance of
Britain ended with the independence movement and was quickly
replaced by the United States, but this did not immediately
translate into closer political ties between the U.S. and
the Caribbean.31
After the independence movement created several new
sovereign states in the Eastern Caribbean, the United States
did not step in to fill the vacuum left by the British. The
attention of the U.S. government in the region was on Latin
America, and the people of the West Indies continued to look
to the British for support and guidance. However, the
British did not offer much in the way of support in the
post-independence era, probably reflective of a desire to
30 Orlando Patterson, 1987. The Emerging West Atlantic
System: Migration, Culture, and Underdevelopment in the United
States and the Circum-Caribbean Region. In Population in an
Interacting World, William Alonso, ed. Cambridge, Harvard
Press.
31 Neville C. Duncan, 1986. External Development Aid:
New Policy Considerations. University of the West Indies,
Cave Hill Campus, Barbados. Duncan mentions that the islands
in the Eastern Caribbean were eager to accept foreign aid from
the United States in light of the relatively small
contributions the British made to the region after
independence. He mentions the "paltry independence assistance
to each of the EC states as a grant and another 5 million
pounds sterling as aid".
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rid themselves of their island dependencies.32
After it became clear that Castro was going to remain
in power in Cuba, foreign policy analysts in the U.S.
government realized that persistent underdevelopment in the
region could lead to political instability, and this in turn
could impinge upon the security of the United States.33 The
involvement of Cuban technicians in Grenada, and the bloody
revolution there in 1983 solidified the belief of the U.S.
government that it should take a greater interest in the
region.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative took effect in 1984. It
is an attempt by the United States to promote economic
progress in the region, and to strengthen its financial ties
to the islands. The Initiative has three central
components. It allows duty-free access to the U.S. market
for most goods, provides emergency economic and military
funding, and creates tax incentives for U.S. investors in
the island economies.34 The CBI also established the CBI
Center which in cooperation with USAID provides information
about opportunities for investment and export in the region,
32 Clarke, 1988.
33 Richard Brown, 1984. U.S. Relations with the
Commonwealth Caribbean. In The English-Speaking Caribbean:
Current Conditions and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy.
Congressional Research Service, 1985.
34 Kenneth I. Boodhoo, 1984. Economic Dimension of U.S.
Caribbean Policy. In The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in
a Volatile Region.
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and promotes joint U.S.-Caribbean ownership of industry
which could reduce the regions economic dependency. 3s,36
While the CBI has promoted some direct investment in
the region, including the islands of the Eastern Caribbean,
it has not been as effective as it could be in providing
economic security. Key exports such as textiles and leather
goods are excluded, and many goods that were entering the
U.S. were already benefiting from lower tariff levels
through the Generalized System of Preferences.37 Despite
the existence of the CBI, exports from the region have grown
at a slower rate than other developing countries as a
whole.38 This indicates that the economic problems of the
region are due to structural problems that are difficult to
resolve.
Another standard used to measure the success of the CBI
is the extent to which it encourages indigenous growth in
the region. The quest for economic self-reliance has
spawned several attempts at regional cooperation within the
Caribbean community.
35 Caribbean Basin Information Center and USAID, CBI
Business Bulletin, 7(2), February, 1989.
36 William Demas, 1975. Situation and Change. In
Caribbean Economy, G. Beckford (ed).
37 Congressional Research Service, 1985. The English-
Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions nd Implications for
U.S. Policy.
38 World Bank, 1988.
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Regional Qooperation and Integration
The crucial need for increased cooperation among the
newly independent and widely scattered islands of the
Eastern Caribbean has been a clarion call in the region for
decades. This is because there is a direct relationship
between the size of a country and its economic efficiency.
A cooperative institutional arrangement between countries
could compensate for the small size of the island economies.
Such an arrangement could standardize taxes, tariffs,
currency and the flow of workers. Trade and monetary
agreements are the basic reason for integration. These
could provide economies of scale for production, marketing
and investing, benefiting each individual country and the
region as a whole.39 While virtually all of the political
leaders in the region agree that regional integration is
essential for the modern development of the islands, it has
not been achieved, and political and economic fragmentation
continues to haunt them.
For a variety of reasons repeated attempts to formalize
an institutional arrangement to foster regional cooperation,
or regional integration as it is sometimes called, have
failed to achieve expectations. The history of the short-
lived West Indies Federation illustrates some of the most
obvious problems that are obstacles to achieving egional
integration.
39 DeLisle Worrell, 1987.
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The West Indies Federation came into being in 1958
after many years of negotiation. Its purpose was to create
a single economic and political entity from the many
English-speaking islands, including the entire Eastern
Caribbean. This was before any of the islands became
independent; they were still British colonies. If the
Federation had lasted until 1962 it would achieved
independent as a "super-colony".40
This attempt to create a central federal government was
short-lived, and some historians believe was destined to
fail. Jamaica was the most economically powerful country in
the Federation and despite its early leadership to form a
cooperative union, pulled out after a voter referendum
supported this move in 1961. The people of Jamaica
apparently believed, with justification, that it would more
advantageous to pursue independence on their own, rather
than diverting resources to support the smaller, poorer
islands in the Eastern Caribbean. Shortly after Jamaica
withdrew from the Federation, Trinidad did the same, causing
the union to fall apart.
The most obvious reason for the failure of the
Federation was the uneven economic power of the islands.
Jamaica and Trinidad had the most to lose and least to gain
so they opted for independence as separate entities. The
smaller islands were left to fend for themselves. This
176
40 Clarke, 1988.
disparity in economic power still exists today, but it is
only one reason why the attempt to form a central, federal
union failed.
The Federation was designed by the British, and
reflected their perspective of the region. Its political
arm would been made up of what Lewis termed an indigestible
plethora of politicians" including a Governor-General, five
Governors, a minimum of five Commissioners and about fifty-
five ministers without portfolio.41 The size and complexity
of this political body, and the constant calculation its
members would have to make of the local and regional payoffs
of their actions, makes it doubtful that it would have been
able to operate effectively.
Every potential member of a cooperative movement
calculates if they will be better or worse off if they join.
Political leaders have to convince their constituencies in
each country that they will be better off economically if
they cooperate, while at the same time at the regional level
arguing that they are worse off than other islands, so they
can claim more gains from the cooperative venture to justify
their participation at home. Since the governments have to
pay attention to the demands of each islands leaders to
justify integration, democratic political systems probably
41 Gordon Lewis, 1968. The Growth of the Modern West
Indies. New York, Monthly Review Press.
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pose an obstacle to the integration process.42 In addition,
the insularity, geographical isolation and independent path
that each island pursued in its political and economic
development also contributed to the collapse of the
Federation.43
In the region, each island has developed independently
based on its own set of cultural, political and economic
conditions. Any institutional program to foster cooperation
between the islands has to account for these factors. This
is very difficult to accomplish given the diversity in the
region, and the desire of national political leaders to
maintain the sovereignty of countries they govern. There
are several efforts currently underway to promote regional
integration. They are less ambitious than the Federation,
and are forming the basis for the cooperation needed to
jointly address the economic problems of the region.44
42 W. Andrew Axline, 1979. Caribbean Integration: The
Politics of Regionalism. New York, Nichols Publishing.
Axline describes how the special characteristics of the
political systems in the Caribbean Make regional integration
difficult. He discusses the pattern of regional negotiations
and how coalitions shift in the midst of a multi-national
dialogue.
43 Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies.
44 In 1987 several political leaders in the Eastern
Caribbean initiated a movement to create a political and
economic federation by strengthening the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States. But, in response other leaders said
that a new unitary state was a kind of colonialism, and would
promote the influence of foreign powers. These differences
are typical of the current obstacles to regional integration.
See Gary Brana-Shute and Rosemary Brana-Shute, 1989. The
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Reaional Economic Programs
There are several programs and institutional
arrangements to improve regional economic integration. The
Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), the Caribbean
Development Bank (CDB), the East Caribbean Common Market
(ECCM) illustrate the dominant strategies being used to
promote economic integration.
The Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) was founded
in 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas whose goals were the
coordination of economic policies, regional institutions to
improve credit and finance, regional trade and the
investment capital. The one area where CARICOM has been
successful is its initiation of free trade between member
nations, but problems even in this area reflect the
difficulty facing any attempts at improving regional
cooperation.
In 1977 Guyana and Jamaica, both members of CARICOM,
were forced by their own desperate economic condition to
violate the communities free trade agreement by restricting
imports from fellow member states. Both countries later
reinstated CARICOM imports, but their temporary cessation
that a new unitary state was a kind of colonialism, and would
promote the influence of foreign powers. These differences
are typical of the current obstacles to regional integration.
See Gary Brana-Shute and Rosemary Brana-Shute, 1989. The
Anglophone Eastern Caribbean and British Dependencies. In
Latin America and the Caribbean Record, New York, Holmes and
Meier.
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showed the fragility of the community.45 The economic
integration sought by the CARICOM initiative has also been
hampered by different exchange rate policies among its
members. Because countries receive no compensation for
sudden changes in exchange rates, several responded in the
mid 1980s by placing restrictions on regional trade,
nullifying the communities trade agreement. 46
The invasion of Grenada deepened the divisions already
caused by the many devaluations and trade restrictions
implemented by individual countries. Regional trade
restarted in the late 1980s, and in 1989 the community
initiated work on harmonizing structural adjustment, credit
and exchange rate policies.4 7
The Caribbean Development Bank was established in 1969
as the first regional lending agency in the Eastern
Caribbean. All seventeen English-speaking countries are
members. The chief purpose of the Bank is to raise funds
from several sources; the main trading partners of the
region (U.S., United Kingdom, and Canada), the European
Community, Latin American nations and other international
lending agencies ( World Bank and Inter-American Development
Bank). The main benefit of the Bank is its ability to raise
45 Payne, 1981.
46 Worrell, 1987.
World Bank, 1988; The Economist Intelligence Unit,
1989.
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capital from outside of the region, and to provide these
funds to member countries with concessions such as low
interest rates.
The Bank has initiated several projects aimed at
improving regional economic integration, focusing on
agricultural, fisheries, and food supply, in addition to
regional transportation facilities. It also coordinates
national and regional economic development programs with
CARICOM, and has improved the institutional capacity in the
region by assisting several, such as the Caribbean
Agricultural Research and Development Institute, the
Caribbean Tourism Organization, and the Caribbean
Association of Industry and Commerce.
The Eastern Caribbean Common Market is made up of the
island countries of the Eastern Caribbean, who are also
members of CARICOM. Its purpose is to coordinate the
positions of members on CARICOM related issues, and to
aggregate their efforts to compensate for the differences in
size and level of development between the mini-states and
larger CARICOM members such as Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago.
The ECCM also serves as a clearinghouse that its members can
use to gain access to technical expertise from a variety of
economic sectors, such as agriculture, tourism and
manufacturing.48
The existence of the ECCM reflects the separate
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identity and economic problems of the mini-states in the
Eastern Caribbean, due to their limited economic, technical
and human resources. Integration in the context of the
Eastern Caribbean means cooperation on three levels; between
the island mini-states on an area basis; between the mini-
states and larger countries in the Caribbean, including
mainland nations in Latin America on a regional basis; and
between all Caribbean countries, both island and mainland
nations, and their trading partners in the North Atlantic
region, Europe, and the rest of the world.
There are many other organizations working to improve
regional cooperation and integration, too many to list here,
such as the family of the United Nations. These
organizations are working to plan, coordinate and implement
a wide range of economic development activities, ranging
from cooperative training in different industries to
financing and building new roads, airports, electric plants,
and water supply facilities, in addition to providing
emergency relief for natural disasters.
Institutional Linkages for Economic-Environmental Concerns
In recent years, several organizations whose primary
responsibility has been economic development have initiated
programs in environmental resource management, in response
to the growing deterioration of natural resources in the
Eastern and wider Caribbean. This reflects a growing
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realization by economic planners that sustainable economic
growth is dependent on prudent management of limited and
often fragile natural resources.
The Caribbean Development Bank issued a directive in
early 1989 requiring that the environmental impact of all of
its projects be evaluated prior to loan commitments. The
Bank also sponsored a regional conference in environmental
issues to advise members how to improve project design to
mitigate environmental damage. However, even though the
Bank theoretically has the leverage to enforce environmental
protection through loan conditionality, it has not created
any mechanism to require that countries implement these new
policies. By the time projects are selected for funding,
the pressure to complete them makes enforcement of
environmental standards very difficult (B 3).
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) is primarily responsible for promoting
regional cooperation for economic development, but has
recently become interested in a wide variety of
environmental policy issues. It has sponsored a project on
the effects of tourism in the wider Caribbean with case
studies on several islands, and has examined the socio-
economic impact of climate change in the region.4 9
CARICOM held its first conference o environmental
49 Island Resources Foundation, 1989. Organizational
Profiles: A Guide to Donor Orqanizations and Technical
Assistance Aencies. Washington, D.C., IRF.
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issues in mid 1989. It was attended by ministers, top civil
servants, educators and professionals and resulted in the
"Port-of-Spain Accord on the Management and Conservation on
the Environment". The Accord prioritizes environmental
issues shared by all countries in the region, including;
local management of toxic and hazardous materials, and the
dumping of toxic materials that originate outside of the
region; coastal protection and marine pollution; solid and
liquid waste management; forest and watershed management;
housing and human settlements, and several others.
The Accord contains several general recommendations for
addressing these environmental problems, such as preparation
of national environmental plans and policies, but lacks
specific measures to enforce them. However, it does
strongly recommend that CARICOM countries establish
institutional arrangements to enhance the integration of
environmental management at "the political, technical and
administrative levels. That the Accord even mentions the
political process is an encouraging sign.
There are several regional environmental programs
working to strengthen the linkage between economic and
environmental issues to improve natural resource management
among the islands. The Natural Resource Management Project
of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States,
headquartered in St. Lucia, has sponsored several country
studies examining the adequacy of environmental policies,
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and the relationship between community development programs
and environmental management. The Department of Regional
Development of the Organization of American States, with
headquarters in Washington, D.C. and field offices
throughout the region, has assisted several countries in
preparing economic development plans. These have included
projects in integrated development, tourism, agriculture,
and downtown revi.alization. Both OAS and OECS-NRMP only
provide assistance when a government has requested it.
The United Nations Environment Programme sponsors the
Caribbean Action Plan, administering it from its office in
Kingston, Jamaica. UNEP convened governments from
throughout the region for its first meeting in Cartagena de
Indias in 1983 which resulted in two agreements; the
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region; and the Protocol
Concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider
Caribbean Region.50 Subsequently in 1987 at its fourth
intergovernmental meeting in Guadeloupe, additional
protocols were added to support specially protected areas
and wildlife. These protocols include provisions for
establishing protected areas to preserve marine and
terrestrial resources for recreational, educational and
50 Lynton Keith Caldwell, 1984. International
Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. Durham, North
Carolina, Duke University Press.
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scientific use.51
Working with ECLAC, regional environmental
organizations and country governments, UNEP is facilitating
the integration of economic development and natural resource
management by creating agreements designed to carry out its
protocols. However, the procedure for implementing the
protocols is limited to language requiring the parties
"...take all appropriate measures to protect, preserve and
manage..." affected resources. The agreements lack legal
provisions binding the signatories, so they are not
enforced.
There are many smaller non-governmental organizations
working to integrate economic and environmental linkages in
regional and local development strategies. These include
the Caribbean Conservation Association (Barbados), the
Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (St. Lucia), the
Eastern Caribbean Natural Area Management Program (U.S.
Virgin Islands), the Centre for Environmental Studies and
Natural Resource Management, University of the West Indies
(Barbados), and the Island Resources Foundation (U.S. Virgin
Islands). These organizations are involved in a wide
variety of projects throughout the Eastern Caribbean,
including training conservation technicians, preparing
51 United Nations Environment Programme, 1988. Report
of the Meeting of Experts for the Development of a Protocol
Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife in the Wider
Caribbean, held in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, October 24-
26, 1988.
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National Conservation Strategies, analyzing the specific
environmental costs of different agricultural, tourist and
industrial projects, and providing governments with
objective criteria to make environmental policy decisions.
The outheast Coast Project
A project undertaken by the Caribbean Natural Resource
Institute (CANRI,formerly ECNAMP) on St. Lucia illustrates
how a small organization can effectively use economic
incentives to promote environmental protection. The
southeast coast of St. Lucia was facing severe environmental
problems. Fishermen dynamited reefs to collect lobsters,
sea urchins were over-harvested, nesting bird colonies were
destroyed by people taking eggs, charcoal producers stripped
hillsides bare, sand mining was rampant on beaches, and raw
sewage flowed into prime fishing and beach areas.52
To resolve these major environmental problems, CANRI
focused on solutions that would raise the personal income of
people causing the damage. This created a link between the
equity needs of the poor and environmental management. A
multi-year public participation program resulted in the
establishment of the Maria Islands Nature Center, funded by
the World Wildlife Fund and administered by the St. Lucia
52 Details of the case are taken from interviews with
Yves Renard, coordinator of the Southeast Coast Project and
co-founder of the Caribbean Natural Resource Institute, and
the World Wildlife Fund Letter, Conservation and Development
in St. Lucia, No. 3, 1988.
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National Trust. Its purpose is to manage the wildlife on
the island and to coordinate an environmental program for
local residents.
A key part of the project focused on the problems of
the local fishing community, which was marginal due to its
lack of organization. After working extensively with many
fishermen, CANRI received permission from the government to
build a facility to store and market fish at Palmis. In
addition, fishermen were trained in more effective fishing
techniques, as they had been resorting to dynamiting reefs
and over-harvesting local species. This program addressed
the problems of the fishing community by creating economic
incentives, consisting of better marketing and more
efficient fishing practices, that also protected limited
fisheries resources. The project also created sea moss
farms to produce a material used in beverages used to
promote good health, a fuel wood plantation to provide
charcoal producers with trees and a solid waste management
program. The success of the CANRI project reflects the need
to integrate economic and environmental concerns on the
community level to protect limited natural resources.
The Case Studies
In St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Barbados there are no
economic incentives to promote environmental protection. On
the contrary, the short term economic gains derived from
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large development projects is a disincentive to protecting
natural resources. Environmental standards are typically
perceived as obstacles to development. The following case
studies show how this occurs.
When the St. Lucia Cabinet granted permission for the
M-Group to purchase the Jalousie Estate it granted several
financial incentives to the developer. These incentives
promoted the resort at the expense of the national park
which would have protected the site's fragile natural
resources. Incentives granted to the developer included
repatriation of profits, waiver of duties on construction
materials and supplies for the resort, and a multi-year tax
holiday (SL 15). In addition, the government took the
unusual step of granting a direct subvention to the resort,
agreeing to construct the major access road to the Jalousie
Estate with public funds.
The park project, although supported by previous
governments who had voted to purchase the Jalousie Estate as
public open space, has not been officially supported by the
government. Although it would require a modest capital
outlay estimated at $1.63 million for acquisition of the
estate and surrounding lands, the government has not
indicated it is willing to provide the necessary funds.
Given the $57 millon that is budgeted for capital
improvements in St. Lucia in 1990, it appears that the
government could afford to fund the initial costs of the
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park if it so desired.
In St. Kitts the 4000 southeast peninsula was owned by
less that thirty parties, most of whom owned large parcels
measuring 200-900 acres each. The peninsula is the only
area in the country with large parcels in private ownership,
as all land in sugar production on the main part of the
island was nationalized in 1975. The installation of the
road caused land values to increase dramatically in a short
period of time, providing a direct incentive to develop the
peninsula as rapidly as possible, before environmental
policies intended to protect its abundant natural resources
were operational.
It was estimated that the owners of the peninsula paid
about $8.5 million in 1985 dollars for it, equal to $2500
per acre. In 1990 large parcels in prime locations were
selling for about $50,000 per acre, an increase of 2000%.53
Several purchasers were foreign investors buying large
parcels, reflecting the strong demand for resort sites in
the region.
As a condition of approval for the USAID funded
project, St. Kitts was supposed to take several steps to
protect the environment on the peninsula. A National
Conservation Commission was to be operational, and a new
53 Data on 1985 land values taken from a report titled
Potential for Recovery of Public Investments and Costs:
Southeast Peninsula, St. Kitts. Robert R. Nathan Associates,
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1986. Data on 1990 land sales from
personal interviews conducted in St. Kitts.
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Environmental Unit created in the national planning office
to help implement laws and regulations to protect the marine
and terrestrial resources on the peninsula. These steps
were not taken by the time the road was complete, and the
first development proposals submitted to the government.
It is apparent that the tremendous increase in the value
of the peninsula, coupled with the governments strong desire
to strengthen the tourism economy, created major financial
incentives to develop the peninsula as rapidly as possible,
without the possible delays that environmental policies
would cause. In turn, there were no incentives to protect
the peninsula's natural resources.
The economic development process in both St. Lucia and
St. Kitts is geared to attract private projects that are
given financial incentives to attract foreign exchange.
This system of incentives is contrary to national policies
intended to protect the environment. As long as this
conflict exists, public policy decisions will continue to be
made that favor economic growth while causing fragile
natural resources to be destroyed.
In Barbados, the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor was build
without any precautions to mitigate against environmental
damage. Even though civil servants in the Coastal Project
Planning Unit warned of possible problems with coastal
hydrology, sedimentation, water pollution and the
sustainability of the fishery, the Ministry of Agriculture
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ignored these concerns.
The basic economic incentive for building the harbor
was immense, as a large part of Barbados' trade imbalance
occurs because the island has to import food. The project
was proposed in several National Development Plans as part
of the solution to the islands economic problems. The
harbor will theoretically improve the efficiency of the
fishing industry and reduce the expenditure of scarce
foreign exchange for imported protein. Of course, this will
only happen if the fish population in the region is
sustainable, which is highly suspect after a 40% drop in the
fish catch during the 1989 fishing season.
The environmental concerns of civil servants were
ignored because of the perceived importance of the project
to the national economy. Conducting the necessary field
research to evaluate the full extent of the project's impact
on the environment would have been time consuming,
compounding the uncertainty as to whether it would proceed.
The project's feasibility was already uncertain due to its
razor-thin rate of return, estimated at 12.1%, compared to
the IDB's minimum requirement of 12% (B 42).
As a result, the government now has a harbor which may
contribute to the national debt. The harbor already depends
on a government subsidy to operate (B 26). If the regional
fish catch continues to decline, it will reduce the revenue
to the harbor, requiring the government to increase the
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amount of its subsidy. This will subject the operation of
the harbor to the general instability that exists in the
island economy. In addition, if the environmental problems
that were forecast occur, such as sedimentation of the river
mouth, the government will have to pay to fix them, causing
a further drain on the treasury. This was allowed to happen
because the potential environmental costs of the project
were treated as external costs not associated with the
project.
Lack of Long Term Economic Planning
The government of St. Lucia favors the resort at the
Jalousie Estate because the national economic planning
process favors short term solutions. The short term
economic benefit of the resort is mainly derived from the
creation of a few dozen jobs, mostly for unskilled labor,
and income from a 12.5% hotel room tax (SL 13). Although
the developer publicly said in early 1989 that the resort
would create several hundred construction jobs to benefit
locally unemployed people, these benefits were reduced when
he chose a Brazilian company to build the resort, despite
the existence of qualified companies in the region.54 It
does not appear that the resort will result in any
substantial economic benefit to the island other than a
54 Weekend Voice, February 18, 1988; and Caribbean
Insight, 13(3), March, 1990. London, the West Indian
Committee.
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modest contribution to the treasury from the room tax, and
whatever money tourists spend when they leave the confines
of the resort. But the trickle-down or spin-off effects are
expected to be minimal as the project will be an exclusive
destination resort, with its health club and convention
facilities designed to keep visitors on the site.
The Pitons National Park would provide far more
economic benefit to the local community. It would generate
about 500 jobs by the third year of operation, growing to
nearly 1200 by the year 2000.55 The governments push to
replace the banana crop, which accounts for over 60% of its
foreign exchange earnings, is causing it to focus on short
term solutions, although the park could become operational
by 1991-92, about the same time as the resort.
The government has made a policy decision that hotels
are the answer to its economic problems. It has geared the
national budget and capital improvement program to promote
the tourist sector, creating a bias against other
development alternatives that require a longer planning
horizon to implement.
As described in Chapter Three, the cultural tradition
55 Organization of American States, 1989. Proposal for
the Development of the Pitons National Park. The Department
of Regional Development, OAS, Washington, D.C. The operating
income for the park needed to create the 500-1200 jobs would
be derived from admission fees and proceeds from it's
concessions (restaurant, bar, botanic garden, fruit and spice
plantation, mini-zoo and glass bottom boat) and the sale of
tourist souvenirs.
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of the islands creates an aversion to risks, and the small
size of public institutions make it difficult for them to
undertake innovations in public policies. These factors,
when combined with the long term economic risk that the park
represents, causes governments to favor solutions that are
perceived as being more certain.56
The economic development strategy of St. Lucia's
government is to aggressively pursue international investors
to build new tourist projects. Once it provides the basic
infrastructure and permission to build the hotels, the
government does not have to incur any additional risk to
collect revenue from the projects. It does not have to make
the many day-to-day decisions that the hotel owners will be
required to make, or risk additional public funds to
generate revenue.
The proposed Pitons National Park is a public project.
To plan, design and implement the parks Master Plan would
require the government to continuously allocate limited
financial and technical resources in perpetuity. Just to
get it off the ground would require a complex series of
government actions that are difficult to make given the
limited technical resources in the country SL 6, 12). To
56 Ibid. To build the park the government would risk at
least EC$4,500,000 for initial expenses, and probably much
more as the owners of the Jalousie Estate would not be willing
sellers, plus an estimated EC$700,000 a year for operating
expenses. The return on this substantial public investment
depends on the continued strength of the world tourism market.
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keep it operating and generating revenue would compel the
ongoing commitment of several new civil servants, as
existing government employees are stretched to their
capacity (SL 5). St. Lucia does not have the institutional
capacity to carry out large public projects such as the
park, which require substantial inputs for design,
construction and operation.57
The similar situation exists with the Southeast
Development Project on St. Kitts. The Land Use Management
Plan for the project recommended that large portions of the
peninsula with outstanding wildlife and open space values
remain undeveloped. The natural resources in these areas
are supposed to be protected by implementing a conservation
program, but the government has not been willing to make the
financial commitment to support it.
By using the financial and technical resources of the
tourist industry, the governments are avoiding the risk
associated with using their own limited resources. This is
an important factor that limits the ability of governments
in the region to undertake development projects that
preserve the environment, such as the Pitons National Park
and the southeast peninsula, which both represented
opportunities to create large tourist projects while leaving
57 Fernaldo Soler, 1988. Development Control and
Physical Planningcr: The Case of St. Lucia. OAS and OECS.
Soler evaluates the capacity of the government to support
projects that require long range planning, and finds that it
lacks the institutional capacity to do so.
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the natural environment intact. This could have been done
by leaving the sites in their natural state, installing
minimum improvements, and catering to the growing
international clientele for "nature tourism". This approach
would have required far less capital, but would be somewhat
less certain than the tradition approach to tourism of
building resorts on every beach and a cabana under every
palm tree.
Summary
In the countries of the Eastern Caribbean economic
uncertainties cause governments to choose large development
projects that damage fragile natural resources. Among the
economic realities these countries face are dependency on
the North Atlantic States, a lack of diversification,
persistent high unemployment, and a shortage of foreign
exchange to pay for imported food and consumer durables.
Although their recent economic performance has been better
than developing countries in general, vulnerability to price
shocks for exported agricultural commodities make the
regional economies unstable.
There have been several attempts to integrate the
economies of the islands by promoting regional cooperation.
Regional economic integration could compensate for the small
size of the islands by providing for economies of scale for
production, marketing and investing. But problems rooted in
197
__
the different cultures and political systems of the islands
have prevented integration from taking place. Nonetheless,
there are several efforts underway to improve regional
cooperation, such as CARICOM and the Caribbean Development
Bank, helping to build the tradition of cooperation needed
if integration is to work in the long run.
Because domestic savings are too low to finance
development, the islands must look outside of the region for
investment capital. The best investment opportunities were
exhausted in the 1970s, so the island economies are
increasingly dependent on international development
assistance agencies, such as USAID and the Inter-American
Development Bank, to provide capital. These agencies have
been funding large projects intended to diversify island
economies, with a heavy emphasis on tourism and agriculture.
Regional Organizations such as CARICOM, the CDB and
UNEP are working to promote more effective linkages between
economic development and environmental preservation. The
results have been mixed. Regional environmental agreements,
such as the UNEP protocols for protection of wildlife areas,
lack enforcement mechanisms that bind governments. Several
NGOs are integrating economic and environmental planning,
with the Southeast Coast Project on St. Lucia managed by the
Caribbean Natural Resource Institute being the most notable
example.
The government of St. Lucia chose to support a private
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resort on the Jalousie Estate rather than the Pitons
National Park because it is promoting growth of the
traditional tourist industry to alleviate its economic
problems. The government of St. Kitts chose to develop the
4000 acre Southeast Peninsula for the same reason, but has
instituted only a few of several recommended measures to
protect its natural resources, deemed to be among the most
abundant in the Eastern Caribbean. In Barbados, the
government built the largest and most technically complex
fishing harbor in the region, but failed to evaluate the
environmental impact it could cause.
In all three instances, economic incentives favored
large development projects and undercut environmental
protection policies. There are no economic incentives for
preserving natural resources. In addition, the uncertainty
of depending on long range economic planning using public
funds prompted both St. Kitts and St. Lucia to pursue
traditional, capital intensive tourist projects rather than
developing nature tourism that would both earn foreign
exchange and preserve the natural resources of the islands.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Development Assistance Agencies and Environmental Policy
Implementation
International development assistance agencies, such as
the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International
Development, have been under increasing political pressure
to implement environmental policies. Yet, conditions within
these agencies have prevented many of these policies from
being enforced. The lack of enforcement within the agencies
reinforces the behavior of political leaders in developing
countries who also fail to protect the environmental by
implementing their own national policies. The result is the
continued destruction of limited natural resources.
As the three case studies will show, efforts to improve
the environmental accountability of the donor agencies are
in conflict with many elements of the development process.
The goals of donor agencies involve several competing
objectives, including economic growth, good foreign
relations and in recent years, conservation of natural
resources. Many developing countries depend on the foreign
investments created by donor-sponsored projects. These
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factors create a tension between environment and development
that makes it difficult for donor agencies to implement
their own environmental policies.
The Necessity for Development Assistance
Theories of what development is, and how it can best
be achieved, have undergone constant revision in the last
thirty years. Early theories perceived economic growth as
consisting of a series of linear stages through which all
national economies have to proceed. With adequate domestic
savings, foreign aid and investment, all developing
countries could theoretically create their own independent,
industrialized economies. The linear stages model was
succeeded by the neoclassical structural change model and
international dependence paradigm, the later an attempt to
reflect the importance of political relations and equity in
development planning.1
More recent theories of development have focused on how
countries can achieve long term self reliance. As a result,
development assistance has shifted to include the needs of
rural communities by integrating the agricultural sector
into growth strategies that have focused on industry as the
engine of the economy. Integrated development strategies
have now become quite sophisticated. As a result,
1 For a complete discussion of the different theories
and models of development see Michael P. Todaro, 1985.
Economic Development in the Third World. New York, Longman.
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development assistance in the Eastern Caribbean includes a
wide range of urban and rural projects designed to diversify
the traditional plantation economies of the islands. But,
as discussed in Chapter Four, the island economies have a
whole set of problems, including geographical isolation,
small size, the high cost of doing business over great
distances; and difficulties of achieving regional economic
integration that have prevented them from becoming more
fully developed.2
The islands are heavily dependent on foreign investment
because they lack sufficient domestic savings to provide the
capital needed to fund development of the manufacturing,
agricultural and tourist projects needed to diversify their
economies.3 To stimulate private investment in what are
considered to be marginal economies, they are heavily
2 Ransford Palmer, 1984. Problems of Development in
Beautiful Countries: Perspectives on the Caribbean. Lanham,
Maryland, North-South Publishing Co. Palmer describes the
problems of peripheral development shared by the island
economies of the Caribbean. The historical dependence on
metropolitan centers in the plantation era is being succeeded
by a continued dependence on foreign investors and donor
agencies because the region lacks the domestic resources to
develop on its own. But, it is my observation that integrated
development strategies are showing positive results in
lessening dependency somewhat. Whether this continues to
happen will depend on the strength of the tourist economy and
what happens to preferential import quotas for agricultural
crops in the U.S. and the European Community in the 1990s.
3 For a discussion of the need for outside investment
and how it relates to national growth strategies in the
Eastern Caribbean, see; Ransford Palmer, 1984. The
Commonwealth Caribbean: Crisis of Adjustment. In The English
Speaking Caribbean: Current Conditions and Implications for
U.S. Foreign Policy, Congressional Research Service, 1985.
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reliant on donor agencies. The donors provide the money and
technical assistance needed to build infrastructure, such as
roads, utilities and major public facilities, creating a
financial climate that is more conducive to private
investment. Donor agencies use several types of development
assistance to funnel aid to the Caribbean.
Development Assistance Programs
There are basically two kind of development assistance
agencies, multi-lateral and bi-lateral. Aid given from one
government to another is considered bi-lateral assistance,
while multi-lateral assistance is from agencies that give
aid on behalf of several governments, such as the multi-
lateral development banks (MDBs). Grants and low interest
loans, known as concessional financing, fund a wide variety
of projects. In the Eastern Caribbean, capital from donor
agencies has made up for the decline in private foreign
investment, and has been largely responsible for the
continued rate of positive growth in the 1980s.
There are several bi-lateral and multi-lateral
organizations that provide financial and technical
assistance in the' region. The World Bank is the largest
multi-lateral lender in the world, providing aid through its
three institutions, the International Bank for
Reconstruction, the International Development Association
and the International Finance Committee. As with all MDBs,
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the Bank uses capital contributed from its members to raise
additional funds in international money markets. It then
finances projects by giving loans to recipients at lower
interest rates than are available from commercial banks.
Funds raised from its members also allow the Bank, and other
MDBs, to provide soft loans to lesser developed countries
and projects that have a low rate of return.
The Bank funds some projects in the Caribbean through
its regional division for Latin America and the Caribbean,
and provides funding for the IDB and Caribbean Development
Bank so they can conduct their own development programs.
The Caribbean Development Bank is the smallest of the
regional MDBs. Founded in 1970, its members include all of
the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean, three Latin
American states, and five non-regional members from Europe
and Canada. Several countries, including the United States,
make substantial contributions to the Bank by contributing
to its Special Development Fund. As its charter requires
the CBD to promote economic cooperation and integration
among its members, it focuses on promoting projects that
meet this objective. Most projects funded have been in the
agricultural, transportation and industrial sectors. In
1987 the Bank made its first loan to assist a structural
adjustment program in a member country, made in association
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with the World Bank.4 The European Development Fund, the
development agency of the European Community, the Canadian
International Development Agency and the United Nations
Development Program also provide substantial assistance to
the region.
The largest regional bank in the world, the Inter-
American Development Bank, funds several projects in the
Eastern Caribbean. The IDB was organized in 1959 and is
owned by forty-four countries, including twenty-seven from
North and South America and sixteen from outside of the
region that were admitted in 1976. The focus of the Bank's
aid programs are the developing countries in South American
and the Caribbean.5 The Bank was set up so its members can
have greater participation in adopting lending policies that
meet the needs of the region, and pursue regional economic
integration as a part of the Inter-American system.6
The headquarters of the IDB is in Washington, D.C. It
also has regional offices in many countries. It is managed
by a Board of Governors, with one Governor and an Alternate
Governor appointed by each member. The voting power of each
4 Caribbean Development Bank, 1988. Basic Information.
CDB, Bridgetown, Barbados.
5 General information on the operation and organization
of the IDB is derived from Eurofi, Ltd., 1988. Development
Aid: A Guide to National and International Aencies; London,
Butterworths.
6 R. Peter DeWitt, Jr., 1977. The Inter-American
Development Bank and Political Influence. New York, Praeger.
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member is linked to its share of the Bank's capital stock.
Latin American members have the most votes, followed by the
United States. Canada and other non-regional members hold
small percentages of capital stock.
Projects that are proposed by developing countries in
the region are presented to the Bank for funding at an
annual Donor's Conference in Washington, D.C. All countries
seeking aid and all donors providing it attend this
conference, where projects are tentatively selected by
agencies who tend to specialize in certain types of
development assistance (ie. providing infrastructure,
agricultural technology, support for manufacturing, tourism,
etc.). Over the past several years the IDB has lent between
$ 2.3 and 3.0 billion each year. This includes projects in
the Eastern Caribbean such a new highway system, sewage
project, and fishing harbor in Barbados.
The IDB uses a system for evaluating and implementing
projects that is common to most donors. Once a project is
tentatively selected by the Bank it goes through a standard
project cycle that takes 12-24 months to complete. A
Country Programming Paper puts a project in the pipeline,
followed by an Orientation Mission in the field to help the
borrower prepare the loan application. Next, the Bank forms
a Project Committee, and dispatches an Analysis Mission to
prepare a Project Report. The Report includes information
on the national economy, the experience of the Bank in the
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type of project to be funded, how the objectives of the
project will be carried out, and the steps needed to execute
it. A Loan Proposal is then prepared and submitted for
approval to the Bank's Board of Directors, who delegates
authority for project implementation to a field office.
Department of Regional Development of the OAS
The Organization of American States is a regional body
that provides technical assistance to its members, but is
similar to a multi-lateral development agency. The charter
for the OAS was created in 1948 and gave a new name to the
structure of the inter-American system. Its broad purpose
is to promote economic, social and culture progress in the
America's. The policy of the OAS is set by its General
Assembly which has an elaborate system of special
committees, conferences, commissions, institutes and boards
specializing in a wide range of issues.7 The General
Secretariat is controlled by the Cabinet and Secretary
General, assisted by an Advisory Groups, and in turn by a
tier of Executive Secretariats and Secretariats, each
specializing in a different topic.8
7 M. Margaret Ball, 1968. The OAS in Transition.
Durham, Duke University Press. Ball discusses the
organization and functioning of the OAS, including how its
numerous specialized agencies work.
8 o. Carlos Stoetzer, 1965. The Organization of
American States - An Introduction. New York, Praeger; and
The Annual Report of the Secretary General, 1987-88, General
Secretariat of the OAS.
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The Department of Regional Development of the Executive
Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs was created in
1963 as the Natural Resources Unit. It provides technical
advice to design development projects that are based on the
sustainable use of natural resources. In the Eastern
Caribbean the Department coordinates with the IDB and the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to evaluate the
feasibility of development projects and to increase the
institutional capacity of island governments to carry out
environmental planning.9
The Department is staffed by specialists in natural
resources, economics, regional developing planning and
related areas, and currently is sponsoring several technical
cooperation projects in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Its staff was substantially reduced in 1989 when plans were
announced by the General Secretariat to shift organizational
resources into other areas of the OAS, but it continues to
operate in several countries.
U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID is the main development assistance of the United
States government, carrying out bilateral economic
assistance through several programs and organizations. The
Administrator, assisted by a Deputy Administrator, oversees
9 Taken in part from a Summary of Services Provided by
the Department of Reqional Development, General Secretariat
of the OAS. 1989-90, OAS, Washington, D.C.
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the actions of the agency, and is responsible to the
Secretary of State on matters of policy and budget, while
retaining authority for administration and operations. The
Agency is part of the Executive Branch of the U.S.
government, so the President has the power to fill many
senior offices with political appointees.
USAID works closely with the departments of State and
Treasury to coordinate its program so that it is consistent
with the direction of the governments foreign policy and
budget priorities. Several committees and subcommittees of
the Senate and House of Representatives oversee its policies
and projects.10 USAID uses a method of analyzing and
designing projects similar to other donors. It generally
requires that goods and services purchased by recipients be
provided by American suppliers and consultants.11
To coordinate its projects in the Eastern Caribbean
USAID has an regional development office in Bridgetown,
10 John Horberry, 1984. Development Assistance and the
Environment: A Question of Accountability. Doctoral
dissertation in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
11 Wendell A. Samuel, 1984. Foreign Assistance in the
Caribbean: Another View. University of the West Indies,
Barbados. USAID uses "double-tiered" aid; it requires the
recipient to use development funds to buy exports from the
United States, including equipment, professional services and
raw materials originating. This requirement helps insure that
funds are used for the purpose they are intended, but can
prevent recipients from using them to achieve development
objectives that they prefer. However, recipients need hard
currency so accept these terms in project agreements, as the
alternative may be no project at all.
209
Barbados, which has a Director and Deputy Director who are
responsible for policy decisions. Projects in the region
are targeted in three key sectors, agriculture, light
manufacturing and tourism, and stress linkages to the
private sector and providing improved public facilities to
support economic growth. Between 1982 and 1987 the regional
office sponsored a wide variety of aid projects for the
islands including several in renada after the U.S.
intervention in late 1983, roads and power plants in St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica, water supply in Antigua and
the Southeast Development Project in St. Kitts. Expenditures
during this period were about $110 million, not including a
region-wide program to improve agricultural production and
management known as HIAMP.12
In addition to its large presence in the Eastern
Caribbean, USAID is sponsoring other programs in the
Caribbean/Latin America region to promote unity with the
United States. The Central American Initiative is currently
providing about $8 billion in economic assistance; in El
Salvador USAID projects involve public works, health care
and repair of facilities damaged by that country's war.13
USAID and other donors active in the Caribbean have
12 USAID Regional Development Office for the Caribbean,
1988.
13 For a full description of USAID's programs, funding
procedures and scope of activities, see Eurofi, Ltd. 1988.
Development Aid: A Guide to National and International
Agencies; London, Butterworths.
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showed an increasing interest in incorporating environmental
safeguards in their projects, and undertaking major policy
initiatives to include these concerns in their long range
planning. A series of events that started in the 1980s has
caused USAID and other donors to take environmental concerns
more seriously.
Environmental Reform in the Donor Agencies
Since the early 1980s donors have come under increasing
pressure, mainly from U.S. environmental groups, to consider
the effects on the environment when they fund development
projects. This concern arose from a basic belief that the
health of the natural environment is integrally linked to
the social and economic well being of people in a society,
especially in countries with marginal natural resources.
The political movement to improve the environmental policies
of the donors also reflects the difficulty of implementing
new policies in these large and complex institutions.
There are several reasons why donors have been slow to
adopt more effective environmental policies. Such policies
represent a major change in the direction of development
assistance. The established interdependencies, decision
making mechanisms and centers of power makes it very
difficult to implement new policies in large institutions.14
14 Eugene Bardach, 1977. The Implementation Game: What
Happens When a Bill Becomes a Law. Cambridge, MIT Press.
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Entrenched bureaucrats who are threatened by new policies
form coalitions that promote their self-interest, short-
sightedness and resistance to change.15 The resistance to
change that individuals often bring to a policy dialogue is
compounded by the inherent difficulty of integrating
environmental factors into the complexities of evaluating
and designing large development projects.
Hirschman stresses how complex the development process
is, especially when projects are enmeshed with natural
resources. He proposes that a "long voyage of discovery"
is needed to properly integrate the two. His "hiding hand
principle" holds that development planners underestimate the
effort it takes to implement a project, and overestimate
their ability to solve difficulties that arise.16 Sachs
mentions how development is defined very narrowly, often
ignoring local conditions, including the natural
environment. 17 International donors have difficulty
implementing new environmental policies for several reasons,
including rapid staff turnover in field offices that are
is Deborah Stone, 1988. Policy Paradoxes and Political
Reason. Boston; Scott, Foresman and Co. Stone describes how
personal qualities such as emotion, passion, irrationality,
self-interest, short-sightedness and raw power motivate
people, such as entrenched bureaucrats, during their
involvement in the policy making process.
16 Albert . Hirschman, 1967. Development Projects
Observed. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute.
17 Ignacy Sachs, 1987. Development and Planning. New
York, Cambridge University Press.
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responsible for project implementation, a lack of field
personnel trained in natural resource management,
miscommunication between field offices and headquarters, and
the lack of an environmental tradition among development
planners.
Sparked by international concern over the severe
environmental damage being caused by large donor-funded
projects, such as the Polonoroeste Project in Brazil, the
Narmada Valley Dam in India, and transmigration in
Indonesia, U.S. environmental groups have worked to reform
MDB lending policies.18 Because the United States Treasury
contributes millions of dollars to various donors, including
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and of
course, USAID, environmentalists focus on the Congressional
budget process to voice their concerns. As a result,
several donor agencies have instituted procedures to protect
natural resources.
The Working Group for Multilateral Assistance is made
up of several agencies, including USAID and the U.S.
Treasury, and helps review about 500 MDB projects a year.
The USAID Early Warning Project Notification process was
initiated in 1982 to identify environmental problems of MDB
projects early in the planning process. The 1987 and 1988
Appropriation Acts required the U.S. Treasury to instruct
18 Sierra Club, 1986. Bankrolling Disasters:
International Development Banks and the Global Environment.
San Francisco, Sierra Club Books.
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U.S. executive directors of MDBs to promote new
environmental review processes.19 Most importantly, in 1987
the Congress passed legislation as part of the Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs Act requiring that specific
actions be taken to integrate more effective environmental
protection policies into the operations of MDBs. In 1988 a
second Congressional mandate was passed making the previous
years requirement a permanent part of the authorizing
legislation for MDB funding.
The 1987 and 1988 legal reforms were major steps
forward in promoting donor accountability for environmental
reforms. Treasury Department must now present detailed
progress reports each year to Congress that document how
each donor is implementing the Act. The progress reports
evaluate the environmental programs of the donors in several
areas including the adequacy of their environmental staff,
whether bank presidents have appointed environmental
advisors, provision of career incentives for environmental
staff, protection of indigenous people and consultations
with NGOs in the field.20 Thus far the progress of the MDBs
19 Statement of R. Augustus Edwards III, Deputy
Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, Environmental
Protection Agency in a Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Hazardous Wastes andsToxic Substances of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, June 16, 1988.
20 Statement of James A. Baker III, Secretary of the
Treasury, and Progress Report in Implementation of
Environmental Reform in Multilateral Development Banks,
presented during hearings before a Subcommittee of
Appropriates, United States Senate, March 30, 1988.
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has been mixed.
One reason that the MDBs have been slow to adopt
reforms is a conflict with their primary mission, which is
to move funds as efficiently as possible. Environmental
requirements take time to meet, and often slow down
projects. Professionals within the banks do not like to see
projects delayed. 21 Environmental reforms have occurred on
paper, but actual implementation in developing countries is
proving to be much more difficult.
Inter-American Development Bank
The IDB was under heavy pressure from the Congress for
several years before it started to initiate policy reforms
in the mid 1980s. The Bank established an Environmental
Management Committee in 1984, ostensibly to evaluate the
adverse environmental effects of its projects. However, the
Committee consisted of existing in-house profes tonal staff,
the managers of key Bank divisions, that had a stake it
promoting projects. The committee was widely perceived as
a political committee of insiders. Its members had no
expertise in environmental management. In early 1988 a
Congressional oversight committee called the Bank's
performance in implementing environment reforms the worst
21 See John Horberry, 1985. The Accountability of
Development Assistance Agencies: The Case of Environmental
Policy. Ecology Law Quarterly, 12 (4), Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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In mid 1988 testimony by U.S.
environmental groups characterized the Bank's inaction as
moving "...from a posture of recalcitrance and foot-dragging
on the environment to one of outright resistance.. . 23
There were two main reasons why the IDB was lagging behind
other MDBs in instituting environmental reforms, aside from
internal resistance from Bank professionals.
First, there was resistance from two influential Bank
members, Brazil and Venezuela, who felt that environmental
policies should not be imposed that could hamper project
funding (B 44).24 Second, the United States was sencing a
message to the Bank that it supported reform in general, but
objected to specific measures needed to implement stronger
22 Taken from a comment made by Senator Kasten to Mr.
Malpass, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations,
Department of the Treasury during a hearing before the
Subcommittee on of the Committee on Appropriations, United
States Senate, March 30, 1988.
23 Statement of Stephan Schwartzman before a hearing of
the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and
Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, House of Representatives, June, 1988.
24 The opposition of Bank members to environmental
reforms is related to the larger North-South debate over
environmental reform. Many developing countries believe that
they should not have to sacrifice economic growth if they
agree to protect natural resources. Developing nations have
formed the "Group of 77" to negotiate as a block with
developed nations on global environmental issues. For
example, several rapidly industrializing nations, such as
Brazil, India and Mexico, believe that restrictions on
hydrocarbon emissions to mitigate the Greenhouse effect will
constrain their use of energy and slowing industrialization.
They are seeking compensation in exchange for pollution
controls. See United Nations Environment Programme's North
America News, 5(1-2), February, 1990.
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environmental standards in the MDBs. This occurred because
the U.S. Treasury was lukewarm to the idea of environmental
reform, despite pressure from the Congress, as it could
interfere with its ability to contribute to U.S. foreign
policy. Treasury officials expressed this concern when they
opposed a requirement that MDBs prepare environmental
assessments for their projects as it: "...would paralyze our
ability to act cooperatively and constructively with other
member countries".25 Treasury was sending a message to the
Bank and Congress that it only supported environmental
reform up to a point.
The Bank started making reforms in 1987 when a Senior
Environmental Specialist was hired to advise its
Environmental Management Committee, but this was only one
staff position among the Bank's 2400, a very small
commitment. During the same year the Bank held a
environmental training seminar for its staff, and in 1987
invited South American environmental organizations to attend
a meeting with finance ministers on natural resource issues.
But there was no follow-up and business continued as usual.
25 Statement of David Malpass before the Subcommittee
on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, June 16,
1988. This statement reflected the resistance of Treasury to
a suggestion that the MDBs be required to conduct detailed
environmental impact assessments on their projects. Treasury
apparently felt that this would give environmental concerns
a higher priority than economic factors, which are a key
element of U.S. foreign policy. As a result, foreign policy
initiatives based on economic cooperation could be
compromised.
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The Congress strengthened its support for MDB reform
in 1988 by amending the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). The amendment requires that environmental impact
assessments be prepared for all MDB projects starting in
January, 1991, to allow Bank officers to evaluate the
environmental effects of projects. If this information is
not provided at least 120 days prior to the presentation of
a project to a banks Board of Directors, the U.S.
representative has to vote against it. This change in the
law requires that environmental concerns be addressed as
part of all project evaluations by the MDBs.26 It is
expected that the MDBs will conform to this requirement to
avoid forcing the United States to oppose their projects (B
44). As a result the IDB accelerated its effort to reform.27
In early 1989 the Bank created a new Environmental Unit
with a staff of fifteen in its Project Analysis Department.
The Unit is responsible for reviewing all projects and
operations of the Bank, and for designing a program for
integrating environmental management into its technical
26 An Amendment Extending the Requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act to Recommendations for the
United States Vote in International Financial Institutions.
U.S. Senate Calendar No. 918, 100th Congress, 2nd Session,
Report 100-498.
27 The IDB does fund some environmental improvement
projects such as reforestation in Haiti, coastal conservation
in Barbados, soil conservation in Jamaica, and an integrated
natural resource management program in Paraguay. These
projects make up a very small part of the IDBs overall budget.
Inter-American Development Bank, 1988. The IDB and the
Environment, Washington, D.C.
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cooperation and sector lending programs. It is also
attempting to formalize environmental impact assessment
(EIA) procedures. But, under the IDBs current proposal, the
responsibility for implementing the results of EIAs will be
with borrowing countries, which will make implementation
subject to the political pressures within national
governments.
U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID started to adopt environmental reforms in
response to a law suit filed against it in 1975 by several
U.S. environmental organizations. The suit contended that
as an agency of the U.S. government USAID was required by
the National Environmental Policy Act to systematically
document the adverse environmental effects of its projects.
USAID immediately moved to settle the suit and initiated
negotiations with environmental groups and the Council on
Environmental Quality. As a result, USAID issued an
Environmental Policy Determination requiring that it
initiate a process to evaluate the environmental
consequences of its projects, mitigate any related impact,
and assist countries to improve their capability to
integrate impact assessment into development projects.28
Since the settlement of the NEPA suit the Agency has
instituted several reforms to integrate environmental
28 Horberry, 1985.
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protection in its developing planning activities. It has
appointed Environmental Officers to its regional mission
offices, and allocates a substantial portion of its budget
for environmental activities such as preparing national
environmental profiles, training to improve the
institutional capability of borrowers, the DESFIL project
(Development Strategies for Fragile Lands), and major
programs to promote biological diversity, conserve forests
and regulate pesticides.29
Although much progress has occurred to include
environmental factors in its overall mission, USAID has had
problems implementing some policies. Urged by Congress, the
Agency initiated an Early Warning System in the early 1980s
to evaluate the environmental effects of projects proposed
by other donors. The purpose of this program is to advise
U.S. Executive Directors of the MDBs if bank projects will
damage the environment, and to have USAID share this
information with other donors. However, this project never
was fully implemented, requiring the amendment to NEPA
requiring that environmental information be developed prior
to votes on bank projects.30
29 USAID, 1988. AID Policy Paper: Environment and
Natural Resources. Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination, USAID, Washington, D.C.
30 During testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and the
Environment in mid 1988, the National Resources Defense
Council reported that only one of eight projects rejected by
U.S. MDB Directors appeared on an AID list, and that the
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USAID is currently proposing to sponsor a multi-year
regional environmental plan for the Caribbean, a project
initiated in the Regional Development Office in Barbados.
This project reflects USAID's interest in promoting
environmental conservation practices in the region, and
would build on its program to prepare national environmental
profiles for several islands. Funding is uncertain with
President Bush's recently announced plans to increase
foreign aid to new governments in Nicaragua and Panama,
which may force the Agency to cut the budget of the regional
office and the regional environmental plan.
Organization of American States
The Department of Regional Development of the
Organization of American States has always based its
technical assistance program on the efficient use of natural
resources. A major objective of the department has been to
improve the linkage between natural resources, social and
economic development. It has sponsored projects to promote
development of renewable energy resources, and to reduce the
hazards from natural hazards. In the Caribbean the
department's recent and current projects include a natural
resource assessment for agricultural development in Antigua,
information used did not influence non-U.S. Directors, who
approved the projects despite being aware that they would
cause environmental damage. Taken from a letter from David
A. Wirth, NRDC, to Senator Terry Sanford, Chairman of the
Subcommittee.
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training assistance for small hotels in Barbados, an
integrated development project in Grenada, design of a
national park system in Trinidad and Tobago, a natural
resource data base in St. Lucia, and tourism projects for
several islands.31
The OAS responded to budget crisis amid shifting
priorities in 1989 and cut several staff positions in DRD by
offering employees early retirement. As a result, its
activities in the region have been substantially reduced,
and some projects in the planning stage have not been
implemented, such as the Pitons National Park in St. Lucia.
All of the donor agencies have encountered difficulties
when attempting to implement policies intended to protect
the environment. This failure has been most apparent when
large development projects are involved. The history of
projects in St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados shows why this
has happened.
The Case Studies
How Politics Affect the Performance of Donor Agencies
It had been a "long dream of national politicians and
landowners to open up the valuable assets" of the 4000 acre
southeast peninsula of St. Kitts (SK 5). The undeveloped
31 Organization of American States, Department of
Regional Development, 1989. Summary of Services Provided by
the Department of Regional Development.
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beaches and protected bays on the peninsula, a part of St.
Kitts that few citizens had ever visited, presented some of
the most mouth-watering investment opportunities in the
Eastern Caribbean. It presented a chance for huge financial
returns to the peninsula's thirty or so landowners, and a
chance to diversify the sugar-based economy.
Except for a few scattered homes and a small hotel, the
peninsula and its abundant natural resources were untouched.
In 1980, prior to independence, the government asked the
British Development Division of the Overseas Development
Administration, part of the European Economic Community, to
conduct a feasibility study for a new road to connect the
peninsula to the main part of the island. Consultants
prepared a preliminary road design and completed the
feasibility study. The study concluded that a six mile long
road would pay for itself if accompanied by a diversified
development program including farming, salt mining, tourism,
and freight hauling across a narrow channel to the sister
island of Nevis. However, the BDD believed that the study's
economic projections were unrealistic, and that the project
was not feasible, so it dropped it. This decision was based
on a road that would cost about $3 million to build (SK 1).
After the British refused to build the road, the
government of St. Kitts turned to the United States for
assistance. In early 1984, shortly after St. Kitts gained
independence, its political leaders approached the USAID for
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support. The U.S. invasion of Grenada, about 350 miles to
the south of St. Kitts, had occurred a few months earlier.
The invasion was an indication of the United State's renewed
interest in the Caribbean.32
Shortly after representatives from St. Kitts met with
USAID officials in Washington, D.C., the Agency's Deputy
Administrator, its second most powerful official, directed
the Regional Development Office in Barbados to "get a
project going in the next 30 days" (SK 12). This directive
put the project at the top of the Agency's agenda, and sent
a clear signal to the Barbados office the project was to
proceed without delay. The strong political support that
the project got from the leadership of USAID later undercut
efforts to protect the fragile natural resources on the
peninsula.
Following its Congressional mandate to protect the
environment, USAID sponsored the completion of numerous,
32 The United States has expressed a strong interest in
supporting the tradition of parliamentary democracies that
exists in the Eastern Caribbean. Its invasion of Grenada in
1983, after ultra-leftist Leninists massacred 100 innocent
people, including Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, reflected a
statement by Sally Shelton, a former Ambassador to the Eastern
Caribbean, in 1980 and repeated on several occasions: "(the)
U.S. will support progressive forces...who are committed to
economic and social development and who respect democratic
processes". See Anthony Payne, 1981. Change in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. London, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs. After Bishop had taken office by a
bloodless coup in 1979, he suspended the constitution and
cancelled elections, to the consternation of the U.S.
government. See Wendell Bell, 1986. The Invasion of Grenada:
A Note of False Prophecy. The Yale Review, 1986.
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detailed studies that cataloged the natural resources of the
peninsula, and recommended how to protect them. The studies
included an Environmental Impact Assessment, a Land Use
Management Plan, and a Developer's Handbook.
Yet, when consultants for USAID were preparing
environmental reports for the project in 1989, the
Environmental Officer in the Caribbean office was not
allowed to even review them. This was because the
Washington, D.C. office had sent word to the regional office
"not to make waves on the environmental aspects of the
project" (SK 11). Clearly, the timely completion of the
project was a priority of USAID officials in Washington,
D.C., who are political appointees. The Administrator of
the Agency reports to the Secretary of State on matters of
policy. It appears that U.S. foreign policy interests in
the region, in the wake of the Grenada invasion, were served
by funding a large, high-profile project in St. Kitts. This
foreign policy interest, and a desire to promote U.S.
business interests during construction of the road and
subsequent tourist facilities, pressured USAID regional
staff into finishing the project as soon as possible, before
the environmental policies it had recommended, such as a
National Conservation Commission and a new Environmental
33~~~~3Unit, were in place.33 As a result, the natural resources
33 USAID has played a major role in promoting U.S.
business interests in St. Kitts, both during planning and
construction of the road, and facilitating investment
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of St. Kitts are now at great risk, as the government lacks
the institutional capacity to protect them.
Officials of the Inter-American Development Bank have
said that the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor pre-dated the
"environmental period" of the Bank (B 34). Given the
resistance of the Bank to instituting environmental reforms,
which it started in earnest in 1990, this may be true, but
it does not tell the whole story.
The Barbados government asked the Bank to fund the
harbor in 1982. The Project Agreement was not executed
until November, 1984. In the same year the Bank established
an Environmental Management Committee EMC). The EMC, a
political body whose members were also the heads of the
Bank's main departments, could have required that the
environmental impact of the project be evaluated, but it did
not, despite the fact that important natural resources were
at stake. There are several possible reasons why the Bank
did not conduct an environmental analysis of this large
project.
First, the Bank did not have formal environmental
review guidelines. As a result, environmental review
opportunities in tourist projects that will follow the road.
In May, 1986 the Agency organized a hotel investment mission"
in St. Kitts. Attending were top corporate officers from the
hotel industry including Hilton Inns, Club Med, Divi Hotels,
Ramada International, Resorts International and several real
estate companies. The contractor for the road was from Puerto
Rico, a U.S. territory, the engineer was from a U.S. company,
and over $1 million was spend on U.S. environmental
consultants.
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procedures for projects were applied unevenly, with no
objective criteria to guide Bank staff. It was up to the
discretion of the staff, overseen by the EMC, to decide how
and if an environmental analysis should be performed. The
lack of formal environmental procedures reflected a general
reluctance by the Bank to be held accountable for the
environmental consequences of its projects.34 The historical
resistance of key Bank members, such as Brazil and Venezuela
helped create this situation. In addition, political
differences between the Bank's Washington, D.C. headquarters
and the Barbados field office also weakened its capacity for
environmental protection.
In 1986 when the Barbados government proposed extending
the large breakwater for the harbor, the Bank's technical
staff in the Barbados office was opposed. They felt that
extending the breakwater could cause sedimentation of the
harbor and adjacent river mouth, significantly increasing
the long term cost of the project. The staff also
questioned the use of the sophisticated technology used for
the harbor, since a much smaller pilot fisheries project at
Ostins on the south coast was "a disaster", with the ice
plant inoperable most of the time (B 17).
34 In mid 1990, the Bank's new Environmental Protection
Division issued new procedures for carrying out an
Environmental Impact Assessment process. The Division now
employs several experts in various aspects of environmental
management. It is still overseen by the EMC.
227
__
Bank staff in the Barbados office used the opportunity
presented by the redesign of the breakwater to try and
address the environmental impact of the project. It
requested the government to consult the national Coastal
Conservation Project Unit, which is funded by the Balnk, when
the Barbados Ministry of Agriculture, as the sponsor of the
harbor, was seeking a permit for it from national planning
authorities. The CCPU recommended that additional studies
be done to assess the environmental impact of the project,
including the affect of increased fishing pressure on the
fish population, and possible problems related to
sedimentation, water quality, and coastal hydrology.
However, the Bank's staff in Washington, D.C., apparently
did not support this request, which was also opposed by the
Barbados government, so the project proceeded without any
environmental evaluation.
The history of both the Southeast Peninsula Development
Project and the Bridgetown Fishing Harbor showed a
resistance among senior officials in USAID and the IDB to
including environmental concerns in large projects. There
also seems to be a conflict between politically appointed
professionals whose main goal is to facilitate projects, and
technical staff who are concerned with carrying out
environmental policies. The influence of the professionals
is stronger than the technicians, so policies to protect the
environment are not carried out. One reason for this is the
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lack of career incentives within the donor agencies.
Lack of Environmental Incentives
The professionals within the donor agencies who are in
charge of key departments and offices resL'onsible for
choosing and approving projects do not have any career
incentives to implement environmental policies. When the
job performance of career professionals employed within the
donors are evaluated, o of the most important criteria is
related to how many projects they successfully complete.
As a result, upper level professional staff members
aggressively promote projects. Since environmental concerns
can interrupt projects and hamper the flow of funding from
the donor to the borrower, they are not given a priority as
part of the project cycle.
In the case of USAID, Mission Director's are given job
performance ratings based on how efficiently they spend
money. With large projects like the Southeast Peninsula
Development Project, which cost nearly $17 million, job
advancement depends on project completion. The St. Kitts
project was the last major project completed by the Mission
Director for the Caribbean office, who left the region
shortly after the road was completed. Clearly, he too
wanted the road built without delay.
The Inter-American Development Bank has instituted
some career incentives for its technical staff who carry out
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environmental surveys and assessments, but it does not offer
any such incentives for professionals in charge of project
design, approval or execution. Since the Bank does not
reward professionals for integrating environmental concerns
into development projects, but does reward them for
promoting the flow of project funds, it is unlikely that
policies intended to protect natural resources will be
implemented. This problem is exacerbated because donors
focus on large projects that are planned and implemented
using a fixed cycle.
Problems with the Single-Project Cycle
The donors all use a similar process, based on a
established cycle, to organize and process projects.3 4
Policy-based environmental reforms require the strengthening
of public institutions in borrowing countries. It is very
difficult to strengthen institutions within the constraints
of the project cycle. This is a major reason why
environmental policies that accompany large projects are not
implemented. The project cycle serves as a bias against
policy reforms that cannot be easily accomplished as part of
34 The basic steps in the project cycle are: 1.
designing the project concept, 2. examining and helping refine
a national growth strategy, 3. creating a financial package
that is feasible, 4. analyzing and documenting technical
issues, including environmental concerns, 5. approving the
financial package, usually a loan and smaller grant, and 6.
building the project. Inter-American Development Bank, 1983.
The Programming, Processing and Aproval of IDB Loans. IDB,
Washington, D.C.
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its established sequence of events.
In St. Kitts, USAID required that the government adopt
a series of environmental policies to protect the natural
resources on the undeveloped southeast peninsula. The
intent of the Agency was to have these policies in place and
working by the time the project was completed. But, in the
words of an official familiar with the project, USAID "did
not see that the environmental planning process established
a presence in government, before building the road" (SK 17).
One of the conditions that USAID imposed on the St.
Kitts government was that it adopt a new comprehensive
national environmental law. The intent of the National
Conservation and Environment Protection Act was to replace
fragmented, outmoded legislation, and to create a National
Conservation Commission to oversee its implementation. A
U.S.-based attorney specializing in conservation law visited
St. Kitts and drafted a preliminary law. The purpose of the
preliminary draft was to obtain comments from the St. Kitts
government. But, the government was under pressure to adopt
a national environmental policy to avoid a delay in the
project. As a result, the government adopted the law
without giving the attorney the chance to modify it to fit
local political and cultural conditions, which would have
increased the possibility that it would be implemented (SK
22). The result was a law that does not work. It does not
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focus on the practical problems of implementation
encountered in the St. Kitts government. The government has
yet to enforce any of its provisions. The National
Conservation Commission has not been appointed, despite
numerous promises of the Attorney General to do so. Once it
signed the project agreeement with St. Kitts, USAID lost any
leverage it could use to urge the government to enact
environmental reforms, as the funding for the project was
guaranteed (SK 12).
Once construction of the road to the peninsula was
started, Kittians and USAID environmental staff were shocked
at the damage it caused. The original road design, prepared
years earlier by a British consultant for the British
Development Division, had been replaced by a computer-
generated design requiring 50-110 meter vertical cuts and
fills exposing over eight acres of earth and bisecting the
crown of Timothy Hill.35 The scarring of the hill, and
subsequent risk to nearby coral reefs and mangroves due to
sedimentation, was contrary to USAID's entire effort to
promote the environmentally sensitive development of the
peninsula.36 What was originally supposed to be a small, two
35 USAID, 1988. Amendment to the Environmental
Assessment Report for the St. Kitts Southeast Peninsula
Development Project.
36 Joshua C. Dickenson, 1989. Environmental Impact
Assessment. An informal paper presented to USAID and the
DESFIL planning team. Dr. Dickenson is President of Tropical
Research and Development, Inc., a major participant in the
environmental planning process for the peninsula. His brief
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lane road now resembled a highway, out of scale with the
island environment, and symbolic of what had gone wrong with
the project. USAID simply tried to accomplish too much in
too short a time.
Another problem with adhering to the project cycle was
the handling of the environmental experts for the project.
Originally, the contract for the DESFIL team, responsible
for drafting planning guidelines and staffing the government
board that review development applications, was to expire in
July, 1989. The road was not even physically completed.
The government still lacked a counterpart for the USAID
environmental team, as its Central Planning Unit had
basically dissolved the year before (SK 12). The DESFIL
contract was extended a few months, and the Chief of Party
retained as an independent consultant, but the discontinuity
that resulted would not have been necessary if the
institution-building aspect of the project, essential to
implementing the environmental policies accompanying the
project, had been initiated earlier and continued after the
road was constructed. A similar situation occurred when the
Inter-American Development Bank sponsored the Bridgetown
Fishing Harbor in Barbados.
The Bridgetown Fishing Harbor followed the standard
project cycle. The dominance of the single-project model
paper summarizes some of the difficulties of implementing
environmental reform in developing countries, and integrating
them into USAID projects.
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of development was a major reason environmental concerns
were ignored, and also poses problems for the current
environmental reforms underway at the Bank.
It is clear that the professional and technical staff
of the Bank was under tremendous pressure to complete the
harbor. They did not want to tolerate the delay that would
occur if the environmental concerns voiced by the regional
staff and the Barbados Coastal Conservation Project Unit
were examined in detail. There are several reasons why the
Bank felt pressured to ignore environmental concerns and
maintain the pre-determined project schedule.
The Bridgetown project was the first major fisheries
project undertaken by the Bank (B 17, 31). It wanted to
complete it as soon as possible to establish an successful
track record for projects of this type. The Bank also did
not want to deviate from the project cycle because delays
could increase the cost of the harbor. Increased costs
could not be tolerated because the rate of return for the
harbor was estimated at 12.1%, characterized by IDB
officials as "razor thin" because it barely met the
acceptable rate of return of 12% established by the Bank (B
42). It would take valuable time, not accounted for in the
project cycle, to determine if the project would negatively
impact the environment. As a result, environmental studies
were not done. The Bank's use of the project cycle causes
other problems that are obstacles to environmental reform.
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When the Bank reviews the environmental aspects of a
project, it is done in the analysis portion of the project
cycle. The analysis is done by Bank staff in the
Washington, D.C. headquarters. This reflects the Bank's
focus on analysis at the front end of a project, resulting
in less institutional resources being available for project
implementation (35, 42). It is the Bank's field offices
that are responsible for project implementation, including
monitoring and enforcing any environmental requirements
handed down by Washington. It is here that the
environmental performance of the Bank drops off sharply.
Even though the field offices are responsible for
implementing projects, including enforcing conditions to
protect natural resources, they do not have technical staff
trained in environmental planning. Personnel in the field
offices are chosen for other skills, such as engineering,
economics or project management. The result is that staff
in the field offices are generally unaware of the Bank's
environmental policies, and are not trained to enforce them
(B 42). This has caused a real weakness in the ability of
the Bank to implement environmental reforms in the field.
This problem will still exist, and may get worse, if
proposed environmental reforms take place as planned.
As part of the effort to make the Bank more accountable
to environment concerns, it has created a new Environmental
Unit. This is a very positive step. The Bank is
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instituting new Environmental Impact Assessment standards.
The current proposal is to formalize these standards for all
projects, and to have borrowing countries carry out the
actual environmental analysis (B 44). But given the
tremendous emphasis that political leaders in developing
countries place on promoting economic growth, and the
control they exert over civil servants, it is very unlikely
that the Bank's strategy of delegating authority to the
borrower will succeed.
The Bank is proposing to provide technical assistance
to civil servants in its client countries to teach them how
to do environmental analysis in the hope they will implement
its new environmental policies. However, as my case studies
in the Eastern Caribbean show, the missing ingredient in
borrowing countries is not technical expertise, but
political will and economic incentives that promote
conservation, and the Bank's proposed policy provides
neither.
Problems with Large ~ale Development Projects
Donors use large scale projects because they provide
the greatest economic impact. While large projects can
provide the best opportunity for improving economic
conditions, they present their own kind of difficulties.
Large projects are complex, often requiring several mid
course corrections before they are successfully completed.
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Large projects also require that the borrowing country has
the institutional capacity to implement them. When
institutional capacity is limited, new aspects of the
development process, such as environmental policies, do not
receive adequate attention.
The proposed Pitons National Park on St. Lucia was a
large project that encountered these problems. The
objective of the Organization of American States in
proposing the park was to use promote economic growth while
protecting natural resources. This is a very positive goal,
and to support it OAS staff prepared an elaborate
feasibility study enumerating the benefits of the park. The
study showed that the Park would generate far greater
economic benefit that the private tourist resort which the
government has favored on the same site.37 But, the OAS
linked the proposed park to a large, complex plan to
redevelop the entire waterfront area of Soufriere, the
nearby town.
When the OAS presented the park proposal to the
government, the Soufriere Development Committee (SDC)
unveiled its Master Plan for Soufriere. The SDC is a group
of influential businessmen and community leaders whose goal
is to promote economic growth in this remote park of St.
Lucia. The centerpiece of the Master Plan is the proposed
37 Organization of American States, 1989. Proposal for
the Development of the Pitons National Park. Chapter 4.0,
Financial and Economic Assessment.
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Pitons National Park.
The Master Plan is a multi-faceted program to redevelop
and revitalize Soufriere. The components of the Plan
include the National Park, cruise ship facilities,
condominiums, a marina, shops, restaurants, bars, offices,
several small hotels, and dozens of tourist-related retail
businesses, such a travel agency, SCUBA shop, bicycle
rentals, etc. The Plan also envisions new parks, a health
spa and a new road through town to serve the projects. 38
This ambitious plan would involve a complete redevelopment
of the waterfront, requiring the relocation of a garbage
dump, oil storage facility, sewage outfall and senior
citizens home.
When the OAS and the SDC linked their projects
together, they created what would likely be the largest
project ever undertaken in St. Lucia. Implementation of
this combined project, or the park by itself, requires a
long term planning program. But, it has been documented
that St. Lucia does not have the institutional capacity for
long term planning.39 Project implementation would also
38 Nick Peter Troobitscoff and Frank Alfred Hamilton,
1988. Master Plan for Soufriere Regional Tourism Maximization
Strategy, commissioned by the Soufriere Development Program.
39 Fernando Soler, 1988. Development Control and
Physical Planning: The Case of St. Lucia. Sponsored by OAS,
Department of Regional Development, and the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States Natural Resource Management Program,
Economic Base Resource Management Plurinational Project. Soler
points out that "...when forward planning is done it reaches
a plateau and never goes further ahead. What's more, whatever
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require a complex series of political decisions and
government actions that are difficult to obtain given
pressing day-to-day problems in the country, and the limited
technical and financial resources within the government (SL
6, 12).
The goal of promoting economic growth while preserving
limited natural resources is a good one, and consistence
with the projects that the Department of Regional
Development sponsors. But the massive size of the project,
especially when linked with the Soufriere Master Plan, is
well beyond the capability of the government. The same is
true of environmental components of the Southeast Peninsula
Project in St. Kitts. In both instances, the donors adopted
environmentally-sound policies but could not get them
implemented. But the lack of local institutional capacity
to implement such massive policy initiatives should not have
been a surprise to the donors.
Consultants for the Organization of American States and
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States have analyzed
the institutional capability for natural resource planning
in these countries.40 They have found that public
forward planning is done is strongly oriented to urban design
or to critical issues which are already in themselves a
problem" (pg. 29).
40 Fernaldo Soler analyzed the planning capability of
St. Kitts and St. Lucia in 1988 for OAS and OECS. The Natural
Resource Management Project of OECS has documented the
inability of both countries to implement environmental laws
in its series of reports on Harmonization of Environmental
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institutions have significant problems implementing existing
laws, and have little capacity for long term planning and
public management. As an official familiar with efforts to
increase the institutional capacity of the St. Kitts
government said: "The country is learning very slowly how to
deal with the planning process; this kind of change takes a
long time here" (SK 25). If the donors had targeted
additional resources for institution building, and designed
smaller scale projects that were easier to implement, it
would have helped these small countries to pursue
environmentally-sound development projects.
Summary
International development assistance agencies have been
under increasing political pressure, mainly from U.S.-based
environmental groups and the Congress, to institute
environmental reforms. There are several competing
objectives that are part of the development process,
including the need for economic growth and the use of
development assistance to carry out foreign aid policies,
that have slowed environmental reform. In particular, the
dependence of many countries on donor agencies for foreign
investment has made it especially difficult to implement
environmental reforms because of their desperate need for
investment capital.
Legislation issued in 1986.
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Since the early 1980s when the United States passed the
Caribbean Basin Initiative and invaded Grenada to oust a
pro-Leninist government, it has reasserted its foreign
policy interest in the region. As a result, the amount of
development assistance from the U.S. has greatly increased.
Two agencies that the United States uses to promote
development and continue its program of unification with the
Caribbean and Latin America are the Inter-Americar.
Development Bank and the U.S. Agency for International
Development. These agencies spend millions of dollars each
year in the Eastern Caribbean. Both agencies are attempting
to implement environmental reforms required by the Congress,
but have had mixed results.
USAID has effectively integrated environmental concerns
into a wide range of activities, but has trouble carrying
out reforms in the field because of overarching political
interests that control the Agency. In the case of USAID and
its Southeast Peninsula Development Project on St. Kitts, a
1984 directive from the Agency's Deputy Director to "get a
project going in the next 30 days" sent a clear signal to
the Caribbean Regional Development Office to complete the
project without delay. The project was accompanied by
several new environmental policies, included in the project
by the regional staff, that have been only partially
implemented, placing the abundant natural-resources of the
peninsula at great risk. The Agency did not allocate
241
sufficient resources to provide the institutional capacity
for environmental reform in the government prior to building
the project. USAID also failed to plan "beyond the road",
and underestimated the time and money it would take to enact
change in the government.
In 1984 when the IDB undertook the Bridgetown Fishing
Harbor it totally neglected the possible environmental
impact of the project. The 12.1% rate of return for the
harbor barely met the 12% minimum required by the Bank, so0
delays to conduct environmental research were not tolerated.
Recent reforms within the Bank may improve its environmental
accountability, but the current plan to delegate
responsibility to recipient countries to carry out their own
environmental assessments in not likely to succeed. The
political pressures in developing countries is too great to
carry out objective, complete and accurate environmental
studies, and national governments lack the resources to
implement any policies that result.
Other major problems that prevent donor agencies from
implementing their own environmental policies include an
excessive dependence on large-scale projects that overwhelm
the institutional capacity of governments, a lack of career
incentives within the agencies for professionals that
promote environmental policies, and constraints of the
standard project-cycle that prevent them from carrying out
long term programs to protect natural resources.
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Chapter Six
An Open Decision Making Process to Improve Environmental Policy
Implementation
We have seen how environmental policies fail because they
do not adequately account for political, cultural and economic
conditions. Environmental concerns are treated as tangents
to the development process, as policies, laws and regulations
intended to preserve limited natural resources are treated
as "add ons" to it. Policies intended to protect natural
resources are seriously constrained by the temporal
limitations of the standard project cycle, and the lack of
political will within donor institutions and countries to
embrace procedural reforms that threaten the way they do
business.
Environmental policies and the natural ecosystems they
are supposed to protect do not fit neatly into existing
institutional niches. There is a limit to the responsiveness
of policies that are imported, ignore local culture and
exclude key stakeholders. I hypothesize that all of the major
stakeholders need to participate in a policy making process
that is more open. An open process it needed to design
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strategies for environmental policy implementation that
integrate politics, economics and culture, transcending the
barriers erected by the traditional approach to development
which treats them as separate, unrelated components. An open
process needs to account for the interests of all of the
stakeholders affected by developing, including donor agencies,
national politicians, resource users and environmental NGOs.
If any one of the stakeholding groups is left out, it will
leave a gap the others will use to pursue their own policies,
counteracting the best efforts to strengthen and promote
environmental reform.
Programs to improve environmental policy implementation
must account for four key factors: politics within national
governments, politics within donor agencies, the role of
national culture, and a near total reliance on short-term
economic development strategies. Any attempt to improve the
way that environmental policies are implemented has to
systemically account for these factors on an country-by-
country basis. Efforts to improve environmental policies have
to originate in three key groups; donor agencies, national
governments in developing countries and non-governmental
agencies specializing in environmental policy.
The Closed Dysfunctional Approach
Environmental policies, especially those that are
required by donor agencies as a condition of development
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projects, are created by a decision making process that is
basically closed. This process reflects the priorities
within donor agencies and borrowing countries that promote
development without seriously considering the environmental
damage that will result.
THE CLOSED DYSFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING
Figure 6. 1
Existing Conditions that Maintain a Closed Dysfunctional Approach
* Need of Donor Agencies to Maintain an Uninterrpted
Flow of Development Funds
* Desire of National Political Leaders to Stay in Power
* Perceived Necessity to Attract Foreign Investment
* Donor's Preference to Maintain Centralied Control of
Development Process
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This process is dysfunctional because it excludes key
stakeholders and ignores several vital elements of policy
making, such as the culture of decision making in developing
countries and the behavior of donor agencies. Top policy
makers in donor agencies and borrowing countries are motivated
to promote development that causes environmental damage
because of four main factors; the need to maintain the flow
of development funds, the desire to stay in power, a
preference to keep centralized control of the development
process and a perceived necessity to attract foreign
investment. The result is a closed, dysfunctional approach
to development decisions that promotes the degradation of
limited natural resources.
This closed approach promotes environmental degradation
in several ways. When civil servants within government
agencies that are responsible for natural resource management
(ie. forestry, agricultural, fisheries, etc.) are excluded
from development decisions, so are resource users whose
livelihoods depend on the health of the environment.
Information about the environment, such as the stability of
a local fishery or the productivity of agricultural land that
may be impaired by a development, is not considered by
decision makers. Environmental NGOs, which have the expertise
to promote economic stability by training resource users how
to produce more efficiently while protecting the natural
resources they depend on, are also excluded. The exclusion
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of these two groups increases the likelihood that fragile
natural resources will be damaged.
Perhaps the most important element of this closed
approach is how it reflects the behavior of the key decision
makers who are involved. National political leaders know that
the primary interest of political appointees and professionals
in the donor agencies is to keep projects moving so they are
completed as quickly as possible. Political appointees and
professionals in the donor agencies know that political
leaders in the countries control the political process, and
that their highest priority is to attract foreign investment
by approving projects that they favor.
The behavior of policy makers in the countries and donor
agencies is mutually reinforcing. Both groups realize that
if environmental policies are enforced, projects will probably
be delayed. Decisions to ignore or downplay environmental
concerns set precedents that influence civil servants and
environmental technicians, who know that their superiors will
not look favorably on their efforts to enforce policies
intended to protect natural resources.
The mutually reinforcing behavior of policy makers within
donor agencies and developing countries is exacerbated by the
procedural constraints of a centralized development process.
The steps in the development process are predetermined. There
is not enough flexibility within the project cycle to
accommodate major new policy initiatives such as environmental
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laws and regulations. Environmental reforms are usually
included in the development process by slightly modifying the
existing project cycle, rather than instituting new procedures
that are tailored to the special characteristics of
environmental problems. It can take several years to
implement new environmental policies, especially when they
represent a major shift in the way that a country makes
decisions. Public institutions need to be reformed, personnel
hired and trained, and funds provided to pay for them. It
is difficult to complete these tasks within the temporal and
financial constraints of the standard project cycle.
For example, environmental impact assessments are now
being done by several donors in an attempt to protect natural
resources, but they have limited influence on how projects
are actually implemented. By the time that a project is
identified, a tentative financing package assembled, and a
funding commitment obtained, the momentum that has been
created prevents the recommendations in an environmental
analysis from being enforced. This happened with the
Southeast Peninsula Project on St. Kitts. Despite a long,
complex program funded by the project sponsor, USAID, to
promote environmental reforms in the country, most are not
implemented due of the tremendous economic and political
pressure to approve projects. In the case of the Bridgetown
Fisheries Harbor in Barbados, environmental concerns were
ignored entirely because of the political pressure to build
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the project as quickly as possible. These cases appear to
support the proposition that environmental reforms cannot be
fit into the straitjacket of the project cycle.
The existing closed development process is also unable
to account for the importance of the culture of decision
making in developing countries. Even if legitimate
environmental investigations are prepared for projects,
subsequent recommendations to protect natural resources are
not implemented because they do not conform to local cultural
norms. The public policy process in developing countries is
based on personal relationships, family ties and party
loyalty. Political leaders lack the necessary political
will to carry out environmental reforms. The project cycle
does not allow for allocating sufficient time or financial
resources to design and carry out a multi-year program of
environmental policy implementation to address these issues.
Even though donor agencies are subject to varying degrees
of government oversight, their decision making process is
heavily weighed towards promoting development and maintaining
a flow of projects. This philosophy is consistent with recent
budget increases in the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank, which are intended to provide funding for
an increasing number of development projects each year. While
the Banks are under pressure from'U.S. environmental groups
and the Congress to accelerate environmental reforms, they
are simultaneously funding more and more projects. These two
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objectives are in conflict, which has motivated the Banks to
adopt environmental reforms in a way that causes the least
disruption to the projec. cycle and subsequent flow of funds.
Thus far, countries and donor agencies have attempted
to adopt policies using a fragmented approach that reflects
their own short term economic and political interests. In
addition, the nature of most large scale environmental
problems that are occurring in developing countries, such as
depletion of fisheries, forests, and agricultural soil, water
pollution and widespread health problems, require long term
solutions. Environmental damage shows up years after projects
have been approved and built. There is no accountability for
environmental damage in less developed countries that are
dominated by short term political and economic interests.1
The combination of economic, political and cultural
factors that prevent environmental policies from being
effectively implemented can be accounted for in a more open
approach to development and policy making.
An Open Functional Approach
In order for environmental policies to be effectively
implemented, I believe that the public policy process needs
to open up, to become more accessible. To do this, a new
model of decision making needs to be implemented that
1 John L. Seitz, 1988. The Politics of Development: An
Introduction to Global Issues, page 143. New York, Basil
Blackwell.
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integrates the essential elements of the implementation
process and involves all of the affected stakeholders.
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THE OPEN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING
Figure 6.2
Preconditions for Achieving an Open Functional Approach
* Resolve Conflicting Behavior within Donor Agencies
Between Political Appointees and Environmental Professionals
* Determine How Economic Pressures Constrain New Policies
* Account for National Politics in Borrowing Country that
will Hinder Implementation Strategies
* Examine how Culture of Decision Making, the Interrelationship
Between National Politics and Culture, will Affect
Implementation Process
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This more open approach to policy implementation, which
integrates environmental protection with the development
process, cannot be accommodated within the constraints of the
existing development paradigm. One way to implement a more
open policy making process is to have the stakeholders
participate in a collaborative dialogue that uses a
negotiation process.
A Negotiated Partnership for Sustainable Development
The parties involved in international development can
improve environmental policy implementation by participating
in a collaborative negotiation process. A negotiation model
needs to be created to reflect the specific needs of the
development process, to fit within a framework that is
acceptable to the participants, while improving the
effectiveness of environmental policies on the national and
international levels.
The model would be based on similar cooperative efforts
that have been undertaken to protect the environment.
Different negotiations that have addressed international
environmental concerns include the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, the Montreal Protocols for
reducing chlorofluorocarbon emissions, the Treaty for the
Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, and recent
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agreements to swap debt for nature in South America.2
These agreements were reached using the single-text model
of negotiating. The parties reached a consensus by slowly
modifying a single text that was ultimately transformed into
a final agreement. This approach was used because the purpose
of the negotiations was for the parties to reach an overall
agreement on one basic issue, although several sub-issues
existed which made the negotiations very complex. The model
I am proposing must create a negotiation process that will
be continually repeated with each project, compared to a
negotiation that deals with one monolithic issue one time.
Several pre-conditions have to be met to establish a
creditable negotiation process designed to integrate
environmental policy implementation into the development
process.
Preconditions Themes of the Negotiation Process
Several preconditions need to be met before a negotiation
process can commence. These preconditions are similar for
any negotiation that involves many parties and several issues,
but in this instance, need to account for the complexities
of the international development process, and the political
2 Lynton Keith Caldwell, 1984. International
Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. Durham, North
Carolina, Duke University Press. Caldwell discusses
conventions, treaties and regional agreements that were reached
by negotiation.
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and cultural conditions that are found in most developing
countries. The first precondition relates to who will
participate in the negotiation process.
Participation
It is essential to establish who will take part in
the negotiation process, as a stable result requires that
all of the parties who are affected by it have a voice at
the bargaining table. A negotiation can only be successful
if it involves all of the stakeholders who have an interest
in the outcome. In the context of environmental disputes
in developing countries, the issue of participation is
complicated by the high stakes generated by large donor-
funded development projects.
Each of the stakeholders has a different motivation to
participate in this open decision making process. Donor
agencies will benefit from a development process that accounts
for environmental factors as it helps create a more certain
investment climate, promoting long term economic growth that
is environmentally sustainable. Donors are also motivated
by the need to implement their own environmental policies,
as mandated by the U.S. Congress and their own governing
boards. By taking part in a more open approach to policy
making, donors will-: fulfill their mandate to promote
development that meets basic human needs and promotes long
term self-reliance.
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National political leaders also are motivated by several
factors to participate in a more open development process.
International pressure on the donor agencies will eventually
force them to stop funding projects that cause environmental
problems. Unless political leaders encourage changes in the
development process that lead to better protection for natural
resources, at some point they may not be eligible to receive
development assistance. This in turn will create serious
political problems at home for national leaders.
In addition, by preventing key stakeholders from
participating in the public policy process, politicians have
generated resentment that will cause long term political
instability, contrary to their own primary self-interest which
is to stay in power. National politicians need to create a
greater degree of political stability in their governments,
by increasing the institutional capacity to implement public
policies, which will enhance their self-reliance and reduce
political and economic dependency on outside parties.
In many instances, civil servants in borrowing countries
have taken the initiative to take a more active role in
development decisions, but have been stopped by political
leaders who exert near total control over the political
process. Civil servants who are responsible for natural
resource management (ie. forestry, fisheries, agriculture,
land use planning, etc.) have often invested in a specialized
college education to train them for their work, and have made
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a personal and professional commitment to express their
environmental values when participating in the public policy
process. The positive motivation of civil servants is also
shown by their involvement in political reform movements,
attempts to open up the policy dialogue in countries where
political leaders place strict limits on who can participate
in decision making. Two examples of reform movements are
the participation of civil servants in environmental interest
groups in St. Lucia and Barbados that are attempting to
influence political leaders.
Environmental technicians in the donor agencies are
motivated to take part in a negotiation process by the same
basic reasons as civil servants; a desire to place
environmental concerns higher on the agenda of the policy
process, to convince administrators to allocate additional
institutional resources to environmental reform. Being able
to participate in a negotiated dialogue that places
environmental concerns higher on the policy agenda, in essence
creating a "level playing field" for the stakeholders, is a
major motivation for both civil servants and environmental
technicians to take part in a more open process.
Local resource users, such as farmers, fisherman and
charcoal producers, are motivated to take part in a
negotiation process as it will give them access to the
political system that they haven't had. In addition, it is
a way of tapping their specialized knowledge of the local
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natural environment. If this special knowledge is included
in the design and implementation of development projects,
it has the potential to reduce environmental damage. In turn,
this will keep the local resource base intact, enabling
resource users to continue their livelihoods.
International and local environmental NGOs are motivated
as they will gain political influence by being brought into
the mainstream of the public policy process. It will allow
international NGOs to efficiently target where their limited
resources can best be used, in countries where environmental
policies are integrated into the development process. Local
NGOs will be able to form coalitions with international NGOs,
to receive financial and technical assistance, while providing
crucial insights about the operation of national political
systems. Local NGOs will become stronger as they use the
framework of a formal negotiation process to work more closely
with resource users, increasing the political influence of
both groups.
Participation also involves how the right stakeholders
will be chosen to take part in the negotiation process. It
is important that all parties that have a legitimate interest
in the outcome of a project be included, in order for the
outcome to be stable. One way to identify the parties to
be involved is to perform a stakeholder analysis at the onset
of the negotiation. Because the public policy process in
many developing countries has been closed, and due to the
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close relationship between local culture and politics that
is difficult for outsiders to understand, the analysis should
be termed a "culturally-based stakeholder analysis." The
following section on Steps in the Negotiation Process explains
how to conduct such an analysis.
Representation and Assistance for Weak Parties
After the stakeholders have been chosen, the negotiation
process has be designed to make sure they are adequately
represented. This is necessary because of the severe power
imbalances between key stakeholders within the closed policy
making process. Civil servants are routinely overruled by
political leaders. Resources users are oftc; poor and
uneducated. They lack access to political leaders and do
not know how to participate in the public policy process.
In donor agencies, environmental technicians are often
overruled by professionals or political appointees. If these
parties attempt to participate in a new, more open policy
dialogue, they are subject to political retribution and
personal persecution by more powerful stakeholders.
To ensure a successful negotiation, guarantees have to
be made to protect stakeholders that are politically and
financially weak. Civil servants who fear political
retribution may require legal guarantees to protect their
jobs, careers and families. Resource users are usually poorly
organized and may not be comfortable with the formal
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atmosphere surroundings in which negotiations usually take
place. Resource users and other stakeholders may need
technical and financial assistance as they are at a
disadvantage because they lack scientific resources, are
illiterate or are simply not willing to attend public
negotiating sessions. For example, resource users often
depend on each days catch or harvest to feed their families,
and may need to be paid compensation to attend negotiation
sessions.
The party that convenes the negotiation should be
responsible for initially determining what type of assistance
each stakeholder will need to take part. In turn, this
implies that a successful negotiation may depend on long-
term institution building to improve the capacity of weak
parties to take part in a public policy dialogue. Efforts
to increase the institutional capacity of NGOs and resource
users may have to be undertaken before these parties can take
part in the negotiation process. Institution building can
include training in basic administrative skills, (ie.
bookkeeping, fundraising, use of the media), policy analysis
and conflict resolution. Once the institutional capacity
of the weak parties is improved, subsequent negotiations can
be initiated more easily.3
3 See Janet M. Chernela, 1989. The Role of Indigenous
Organizations in International Policy Development: the Case
of an Awa Biosphere Reserve in Colombia and Ecuador. Florida
International University, the State University at Miami.
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Guarantees that give legal protection to weak
stakeholders, provide compensation for lost wages and or
establish a program for institution building can be part of
a pre-negotiation agreement between all of the parties.
Even if the weak stakeholders are guaranteed that
they will be legally protected, they may be unwilling to
openly participate in the negotiation. Fear of retribution
can be quite strong, especially in countries where
environmental advocates have been labeled as anti-government,
imprisoned or publicly denounced. Such actions often silence
the most ardent critic of government policy. If parties are
unwilling to participate even with guarantees, it is the
responsibility of the convener and the neutral party that
organizes and manages the negotiation process to ensure that
the interests of parties who are not physically present will
be adequately represented. The party that convenes the
negotiation has other responsibilities as well.
Legitimacy, Sponsorship and the Neutral
The issue of legitimacy is particularly important in
the context of political systems that are not highly
developed, and when the public policy process lacks a
Chernela mentions that international funding agencies attached
conditions that required the government in Ecuador to include
an NGO representing an indigenous tribal group, which
strengthened the bargaining positions of both indigenous and
environmental groups in the negotiations for a new biosphere
reserve.
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tradition of public participation. The participants in a
negotiation have to believe that the process they are engaged
in is valid and genuine. If the stakeholders do not believe
in the legitimacy of the negotiation process, or that it
should be used to resolve a specific conflict, a formal
negotiation will probably not work. To give the required
sense of legitimacy to a negotiation process, it needs to
be convened by a legitimate party.
A negotiation process should include several key elements
to gain legitimacy from its participants. First, a successful
negotiation has to account for the attitudes and perceptions
of the stakeholders.4 Second, the negotiation process has
to represent the interests of all of the key stakeholders.
Third, the stakeholders have to be shown how they can gain
from participating in the negotiation process. In developing
countries, this is particularly important given the
anticipated skepticism of weak parties who have historically
been excluded from the public policy process or strong parties
who are afraid that they will lose power if they participate.
All of the stakeholders are responsible for creating
legitimacy in the negotiation process. Donor agencies have
the financial resources that give them the leverage that may
Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987.
Breakinq the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public
Disputes. New York, Basic Books. See pages 25, 101-103 for
a discussion of stakeholder attitudes and perceptions, and the
need to include all stakeholders in a negotiation.
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be needed to convince other stakeholders to participate.
The capital that donors bring to the development process may
be needed to convince national politicians that a
participatory approach to development is needed to protect
natural resources. Conversely, borrowing countries may want
to initiate a negotiation so they can convince donors to fund
projects that meet local needs. NGOs can lend legitimacy
to a negotiation by agreeing to provide technical support
and scientific information about natural resources to be
affected by a particular project. By showing a willingness
to initiate or participate in a negotiation, all of the
stakeholders can help legitimatize the process.
There are several ways that a negotiation can be
convened. Any stakeholder that has the institutional capacity
and motivation to improve environmental policies can act as
the convener. This can include a donor agency, a government
ministry or a local NGO. Donor agencies have the financial
and technical resources that a negotiation requires, and are
motivated by a need to promote environmental reforms as part
of the development process. This makes them a likely
candidate to act as the convener for a negotiation process.
National governments can also convene a negotiation.
They possess the political leverage to convince other
stakeholders to come to the bargaining table, and can benefit
from institution building programs that accompany the
negotiation process. Local NGOs have several advantages that
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enable them to act as conveners. They are familiar with the
national public policy process, possess knowledge about
natural resources and often have existing relationships with
donor agencies that sponsor projects.
To be legitimate, a negotiation process also has to
account for the cultural differences of the parties involved.
Negotiations about development projects will usually involve
parties from different cultures. Representatives from a donor
agency are often from the United States or Europe, and may
be relatively new on the job due to the job rotation most
agencies use. Representatives from international NGOs
probably have a similar background, while those from the
national government, local NGOs and resource users in the
country are from the local culture. To account for cultural
differences, the convener can use an elicitive feedback
process which is described in Step 4 of the negotiation
process in the following section.
A legitimate negotiation process should also include
initial ground rules to protect stakeholders who are
politically weak. Ground rules can include commitments to
protect weaker parties from political retribution, an
agreement to de-personalize the debate so parties can focus
on their real interests, and the responsibilities of the
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chairperson.5 These provisions also relate to the
accountability of the stakeholders, and their ability to keep
commitments made during the negotiation.
The parties may also benefit from a pre-negotiation
condition that governs how they will communicate with the
media. The parties can designate a media subcommittee and
establish written guidelines describing who, how and when
the media will be informed of the progress or results of the
negotiation. Establishing media guidelines as a pre-
condition of negotiation can also help prevent the negotiation
process from being used by the opposition to attack the
majority party. This step may be needed to convince the
majority party to approve the government's participation in
the negotiation process. Allowing a member of the opposition
party, especially one who is knowledgeable about environmental
issues, to take part in the negotiation will often be
necessary to create a negotiated outcome that is politically
stable.
To to be legitimate a negotiation should be assisted
by a neutral helper. Different negotiations usually require
different types of help. There are several different methods
of dispute resolution that can be used. The two types that
are appropriate for negotiations involving environmental
Susan Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, 1988. Managing
Public Disputes. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. See pages 118-
124.
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policies in developing countries are facilitation and
mediation.
A facilitator is a neutral person whose primary role
is to organize the negotiation, to make sure that it gets
started, and to help participants understand the process they
are engaged in. The facilitator is concerned more with the
procedural aspects of the negotiation than its substance.
A mediator is also an outside neutral party, but takes a more
active role in the negotiation process than a facilitator.
The mediator is skilled in identifying areas of potential
agreement, helps the participants discuss the substance of
their differences, and assists them in creating a packaged
agreement that advances the interests of all of the parties.6
The convener, whether it is a donor agency, the
government or an NGO, needs to examine the needs of the
negotiating partners and determine whether a facilitator or
a mediator is needed. Because of the complex nature of
environmental disputes, it may be desirable to chose a neutral
who is qualified to serve as both a facilitator and a
mediator. Negotiations that initially need process-oriented
help often need substantive assistance as they progress. A
facilitator should be capable of making the transition to a
6 The roles of the facilitator and mediator are derived
from a summary of Dispute Resolution Methods, National Institute
for Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C. Also see Susskind
and Cruikshank, 1987, who differentiate between assisted and
unassisted forms of negotiation, and describe what each entails.
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mediator during a negotiation, as he or she gains trust from
the stakeholders.
It is crucial that the helper be perceived as neutral
by all of the parties. Even if the convener perceives itself
as being neutral, if other stakeholders perceive it as having
a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation, it needs
to bring in an outside party to act as a neutral helper,
rather than supplying the helper from its own staff. There
are several professional organizations that specialize in
negotiation who can advise the convener how to find a suitable
helper.
The qualifications of the neutral helper are very
important. The credibility of the entire negotiation program
depends on the sensitivity they exhibit when choosing a
neutral that meets the needs of the stakeholders, and who
is someone that they trust. I believe that a mediator in
this context has to possess two major qualities.7 First, the
mediator needs have substantial expertise in issues related
to environment/development conflicts, in addition to expertise
in the procedural aspects of a negotiation process. Second,
the mediator has to have experience in cross-cultural
negotiations, and be able to design a negotiation strategy
7 There are other qualities that any good mediator should
possess, such as good communication skills, the ability to
analyze a conflict, design a strategy for dealing with it, and
managing a process filled with conflicting personalities and
large amounts of data. See Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988, pages
191-193.
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that reflects the cultural norms of the stakeholders.
Once a mediator has been chosen who possesses the
necessary qualifications, it usually will be necessary to
find a co-mediator from the borrowing country who is an expert
in the local culture, including the indigenous language, and
the culture of decision making within the political system.
A multi-cultural mediation team will give a negotiation the
credibility and substantive expertise that it needs to deal
effectively with the complexities of environment/development
disputes and their underlying cultural component.
Accountability
In societies where key stakeholders have been uniformly
excluded from the public policy process, the negotiation
process has to include provisions to assure the accountability
of the participants. Accountability relates to the capability
and willingness of the participants to be held answerable
for their actions, during and after the negotiations. To
address these concerns in the negotiation process, the
convener should help the participants understand their duties
and responsibilities to the process, and each other. This
is especially important in situations when stakeholders have
not had the benefit of legal protection.
An example of how the lack of legal protection can
inhibit stakeholders from participating in a policy dialogue
is the case of planning legislation in the many developing
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countries. The duties and jurisdiction of planning
authorities are ambiguous. Planning legislation is unclear,
and lacks precise language that would empower civil servants
to carry out planning laws. Permit systems are typically
full of loopholes and inconsistencies. Civil servants are
hesitant to promote environmental reforms within this
uncertain framework, as the legal system does not afford them
legal protection from political retribution. The convener
can help the parties devise ground rules or legal protection
in the pre-negotiation stage.
The concept of accountability also includes the need
to use objective criteria in a negotiation process. In
developing countries, policy decisions are often made without
fully considering how development will impact the environment.
The environmental impact process is an attempt to remedy this
shortcoming. However, an environmental analysis is only
effective if it is translated into a binding commitment.
Guarantees that borrowing countries will implement the
findings of environmental assessments need to be linked to
conditions contained in their lending agreements with donor
agencies. A negotiation process that accompanies each project
can provide the framework for establishing agreements that
improve the accountability of the environmental assessment
process, and its use of objective criteria.
The convener should consider who can best represent
the stakeholding groups during the negotiation. This relates
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to the ability of the representatives to make binding
commitments on behalf of their constituencies. Deciding who
the representatives will be is of particular importance in
developing countries because of the intensely personal nature
of the political process, and the difficulty that may be
encountered by outside parties, such as donor agencies, when
they try to convince governments to enforce the specific
elements of an agreement, such as new environmental policies.
For a negotiation to be successful, the agreement that
comes out of it has to be implemented. The ability of the
parties involved to follow through on commitments they make
on behalf of the organizations they represent, such as
politicians who represent the government, is crucial. If
agreements are not kept, trust between the parties can be
severely damaged. It is particularly important that this
be guarded against when parties are involved in a formal
negotiation process for the first time.
The convener, with the advice of the neutral, can
identify individuals from each stakeholder group that have
the authority to speak for the organization they represent.
From the donor agency, this should include representatives
from the headquarters who are responsible for project design
and finance, and staff from its field office who are
responsible for project implementation and environmental
protection. It is important that both groups participate
on behalf of the donor.
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For the government, representatives should include
senior civil servants from key ministries, such as finance
and planning, that have close personal relationships to
political leaders and are aware of the institutional capacity
within the government to implement different aspects of the
negotiated agreement. Whenever possible, permanent
secretaries should be selected. Officials from ministries
that are responsible for implementing environmental policies
should also be present. The possibility that governments
will change after national elections has to be accounted
for, so that new political leaders are bound by agreements
made by a previous administration. Representatives from the
NGOs and resource users will probably be evident as these
groups are small and don't have many members to serve as
negotiators.
If the resource users or other stakeholders are not
sufficiently comfortable to be physically present at the
negotiating sessions, the neutral needs to determine how their
interests can be represented at the bargaining table in their
absence. Their interests can be represented by a coalition
partner who shares the same interests and is willing to speak
for them during the negotiations. The neutral can represent
a party who is not present by reminding the other stakeholders
of the importance of considering the interests of all parties
to create an outcome that is durable and stable. The convener
should start to think about which strategy is appropriate
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before the negotiations start.
After the pre-conditions for a successful open policy
dialogue are met, the actual negotiation process can start.
The negotiation process can be organized by using a series
of steps.
Important Steps to Make an Open Decision Making ystem Work
To strengthen and promote environmental reform, several
steps can be included as part of a negotiation process. They
are offered .here as one way to address the constraints to
environmental policy implementation that exist in borrowing
countries and donor agencies. The steps do not have to be
followed exactly. There are many ways to strengthen
environmental policy implementation. The following steps
are one way.
The steps can be initiated at many places in the project
cycle, depending on when the stakeholders decide that a
negotiation process is needed. If the objective of the
stakeholders is to develop a coordinated strategy to implement
environment policies that accompany a development project,
they may want to initiate negotiations at the beginning of
the project cycle when a project is still in the conceptual
stage, before the parties have developed firm ideas about
it that can hinder the implementation process.
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Steps in the Open Decision Making System
1. Evaluate institutional capability of borrower
2. Conduct cultural stakeholder analysis
3. Choose facilitator or mediator
4. Design elicitive model for negotiation process
5. Initiate negotiations for implementation strategy
6. Create performance standards to link implementation
plan with project agreement
7. Agree on time frame and procedure for post-project
evaluation of implementation plan
1. Evaluate Institutional Capacity of the Borrower
Evaluating the institutional capacity of the borrower
is necessary to determine the likelihood that environmental
policies accompanying projects will be implemented. This
can be done by a donor, an NGO or the country itself. To
evaluate institutional capacity several tasks need to be
carried out. As with the other steps in this process, these
tasks can be undertaken by any qualified analyst, usually
working for the convener or neutral. Throughout the following
discussion of the steps, I will use the word analyst to
describe the person who carries them out.
First, the analyst should conduct interviews with civil
272
servants in the borrowing country and with environmental NGOs
in the region to determine if existing environmental laws
and regulations are being implemented. If a preliminary
analysis shows that these policies are unenforced, the analyst
should identify where the bottlenecks are in the local
political process. Bottlenecks typically include a closed
public policy process, lack of public participation, political
limitations placed on national planning agencies, unclear
and conflicting environmental statutes, and laws that lack
administrative guidelines to implement them. Once bottlenecks
are identified, the stakeholders can start to develop linkages
between the project and an institution-building program to
improve the chances that project-specific environmental
protection measures will be carried out.
An important goal of this initial step is for the
stakeholders to start to understand how the national culture
of decision making affects the public policy process of the
borrower. This includes the pivotal role that political
leaders play in policy implementation, how they depend on
man-to-man communication to change policy, and the sustained
effort the donor must make to build the personal relationships
with national leaders that are needed to effectively promote
environmental reform.
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2. Conduct Cultural Stakeholder Analysis
Conducting a cultural stakeholder analysis involves
identifying all of the parties that will be affected by the
proposed project. It provides a detailed road map of how
the political system includes and excludes parties affected
by development projects. This analysis requires formal
consultations with NGOs that are familiar with the political
system and culture of decision making in the borrowing
country. Many stakeholders, especially resource users who
are typically excluded from the public policy process, are
hard to find. They may be politically or socially alienated,
and unwilling to participate. But, they possess valuable
information about fragile natural resources that project
planners need.
As part of the cultural stakeholder analysis, the analyst
should identify who the stakeholders are, their interests
in the project, who represents their interests and how their
interests are in conflict. This will show who makes policy
decisions, and whose interests they represent. By identifying
the most powerful stakeholders, it will become clear what
parties have to take part in the negotiation to secure a
binding commitment for the negotiated agreement.
The stakeholder analysis will also show who is excluded
from the decision making process. Often the interests of
unorganized stakeholders, such as resource users who provide
274
__ 
__
vital services for the society, are not represented by the
political system. The analyst can use this information to
design a process for including stakeholders that have not
been part of the public policy dialogue, which is also needed
to reach an agreement that is enforceable.
3. Choose facilitator or mediator
The convener, in consultation with the stakeholders,
should choose an outside party to serve as the neutral.
Having assessed the institutional capacity of the borrower
and identified the interests of the stakeholders, the convener
can now assess, in cooperation with the neutral, whether
facilitation or mediation is needed.8
Given the complexity of environmental disputes, and the
widely varying interests of the stakeholders, the neutral
should be capable of acting as a facilitator or a ore active
mediator. To maintain the accountability of the negotiation,
the neutral should be approved by all of the parties who are
taking part. The donor agency should have a list of qualified
neutrals that can be circulated to the parties, so that one
person can be chosen by consensus. If the mediator is not
from the local culture, he or she should select, in
8 See Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987. In chapters 4 and
5 the authors discuss under what circumstances facilitation
and mediation should be used.
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consultation with the stakeholders, a co-mediator.
At this point the convener and mediator will normally
design a strategy to motivate the stakeholders to take part
in the actual negotiation.9 The convener may have to provide
incentives to the stakeholders to get them to participate
in the negotiation. The neutral can help with this step by
identifying the benefits that each party is likely to derive
from the negotiation process, such as providing increased
institutional capacity for the government or giving the donor
a method of implementing mandated environmental policies.
It is likely that environmental NGOs will want to participate,
as this may be the first time they have a voice in
strengthening environmental policies.
4. Design an "elicitive model" for the negotiation process
The negotiation model most often used in the United
. .
States depends heavily on a "top-down" approach which can
bias the proceedings to favor the convener or the parties
with the most sophisticated communication skills. To account
for this, the convener should incorporate an elicitive
9 Susskind and Cruikshank discuss the typical tasks that
a mediator will carry out when assisting the negotiating
parties. These tasks include helping to set the agenda for
the negotiating sessions, to help the parties summarize the
issues they are most concerned with, and to structure the
discussion so that all of the parties are given a voice in the
proceedings. See pages 142-143 of Breaking the Impasse for
a description of other responsibilities of the mediator.
276
----
feedback process into the negotiation model. To use this
approach, the convener elicits from the participants how they
deal with conflict, acting as a catalyst rather than a
negotiation expert, to frame the process within the setting
of the local culture.10 The mediator elicits stories from
the stakeholders about what has happened to past environmental
policies, whether they succeeded or failed, and why. This
work can be started in the pre-negotiation stage before formal
negotiations commence, and continued in the actual negotiation
sessions.
The elicitive approach should recognize the difference
between formal and informal authorities, and how they need
to be included in an implementation process that reflects
local cultural norms. For example, informal authorities,
such as church leaders and village elders, may be able to
exert social pressure to encourage compliance with
environmental protection policies more effectively than
government officials who are limited by a lack of trained
personnel and a flawed regulatory system.11
The benefit of this approach is that it elicits the
experiences of the participants to identify bottlenecks in
the policy implementation process, in the context of the local
10 John Paul Lederach, 1988. Summaries of The Transfer
Model and the Elicitive/Catalyst Model. Mennonite Conciliation
Service, Akron, Penn., USA.
11 Lederach, 1988.
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culture of decision making. It will allow the implementation
plan for environmental policies that results from the
negotiation to be based on local conditions, opportunities
and constraints. To properly use an elicitive approach, the
mediator may need to have a co-mediator from the local
culture, especially if the stakeholders include indigenous
people or residents from a rural community.
5. Initiate negotiations to design implementation strategy
The convener, with the assistance of the mediation team,
initiates the actual negotiations to design an implementation
strategy for environmental policies. Negotiations can take
place in any location agreed to by the stakeholders, but in
general it is desireable to hold them in the country where
the project is located. The first step in the actual
negotiations are for the neutral to explain the protocols,
also called ground rules, that govern the proceedings. The
protocols should be agreed to by all of the participants to
establish a procedural context for the discussions.12 The
mediator should tell the parties in clear terminology what
the purpose and expected outcome of the negotiations are,
namely, to reach a binding agreement linking development and
12 See Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, and Carpenter and
Kennedy, 1988, for a discussion of what type of protocols and
ground rules should be established.
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the protection of natural resources.
Two important elements of the negotiation process that
should be given special consideration relate to the culture
of decision making. First, all of the stakeholders should
participate in the negotiation sessions, and be able to
represent their constituencies. This could cause a problem
for national political leaders, who may want to send civil
servants to represent their interests, and then be able to
change the position of the government without being
accountable to the rest of the stakeholders.
The second element of the negotiation process that
deserves special attention is how to account for the
importance of informal and formal authorities in policy
making. Typically, negotiation sessions take place in the
setting of a modern office. If the culture has an indigenous
population, who are often among the resource users who have
special knowledge about natural resources, they may wish to
conduct discussions among their constituents in a traditional
setting. For example, in New Zealand when the indigenous
Maori engage in negotiations with the politically dominant
European culture, they take part in the primary negotiation
sessions with other stakeholders, but also sponsor their own
informal negotiations on the marae, their traditional meeting
place, to gain consensus among members of the local community.
If indigenous people are among thc stakeholders, the
negotiation process should make allowances for them to conduct
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discussions in their own community throughout the
negotiations. The mediator should pay special attention to
these informal proceedings, as they may show how informal
authority figures in the society can help implement the final
negotiated agreement.
6. Create performance standards to link implementation plan
with project agreement
Once the stakeholders have agreed how to design and
enforce environmental policies, they need to negotiate
performance standards. Performance standards are a tool that
allows the parties to objectively evaluate the success of
the final negotiated agreement, and provide guidelines for
enforcing it. The final agreement typically consists of a
series of actions to be taken by each of the parties to
strengthen environmental policies. Each action that is agreed
to should be accompanied by an objective standard that can
be reviewed to determine if a specific party is implementing
it.
For example, the government may be required to establish
a procedure for civil servants to review permit applications
by developers, so they can prepare an objective analysis
for the cabinet before it approves a project. The
accompanying performance criteria could specific a date by
which the cabinet will start using the objective analyzes,
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and require the government to show the donor each year how
development decisions have been affected by the new procedure.
Or, the donor may require the government to include
unorganized resource users as participants in development
decisions. Such a requirement could be monitored by a NGO
that prepares a required annual report, based on interviews
with fishermen, farmers and other individuals, documenting
if and how they were contacted by the government when projects
were being reviewed, and if any mitigation measures resulted
in actions that actually protected natural resources.
Additional elements of an agreement might require the
donor to provide funds to increase the institutional capacity
of local environmental NGOs or ministries responsible for
natural resource management prior to a project being built,
while the government would agree to let these organizations
take part in the planning process as projects are reviewed.
Again, annual reports prepared by a neutral party can
accompany each action that is agreed to.
It is crucial that the performance standards be
realistic, and conform to the cultural norms of the borrower.
It is common for the parties, even those from the country,
to be think that they can increase institutional capacity
in a year or two. Performance standards should account for
the tendency to make unrealistic time estimates by using a
multi-year schedule that lasts three to five years.
The final agreement will be stronger if it is linked
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to the project agreement between the borrower and donor.
The parties may choose to include provisions that tie
fulfillment of the agreement to a phased payment schedule.
When specific actions are taken as specified in the agreement,
funds are then released for the development project. This
will create direct financial incentives for the parties to
carry out their responsibilities under the agreement.
7. Time frame and procedure for post-project evaluation of
implementation plan
The final agreement should include clear language that
describes how the parties have agreed on a time frame and
procedure for post-project evaluation of the implementation
plan. This is essentially a summary of the performance
criteria that accompany each action agreed to by the parties.
To avoid miscommunication between the parties, and to make
sure that each one knows what is expected of it, the final
agreement should include a separate section summarizing the
actions and performance standards agreed to by each party,
and the penalties to be assessed if they fail to live up to
the agreement.
To design an effective model for protecting natural
resources in developing countries, the agenda's for the
stakeholders have to integrate four major elements of public
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policy implementation; national politics, the culture of
decision making, economic conditions and the behavior of
donor agencies. It is the connections between these four
elements of policy implementation, and the involvement of
the major stakeholders, that will enable a collaborative
negotiation process to succeed.
A integrated system to implement environmental policies
is bsed on the active participation of four main parties;
donor agencies, national politicians, resource users and
environmental NGOs. By following the steps to open up the
decision process, the stakeholders can work cooperatively
to help resolve several of the problems that prevent
environmental policies from being implemented. The open
system of decision making will have a better chance to succeed
if the major parties take the following actions.
Advice to the Major Parties
Donor Agencies
First I will offer advice to donor agencies. There are
several actions that donors can take during the negotiation
process to help make it work, to help ensure that a more open
system of decision making is put into place that will help
preserve natural resources. The first action relates to
starting the negotiation process.
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Providing Start-un Resources
Donor agencies possess financial and technical resources
that they can bring to the negotiating table. In many
instances, the other stakeholders will need these resources
to be able to take part in a negotiation process, due to the
general shortage of manpower and money in developing
countries. If these resources are made available to other
stakeholders, in return for agreements to participate in a
collaborative negotiation, they can be used as incentives
to open up the environmental policy process. Donors may find
that this is more effective and less risky than making massive
one-time policy interventions which often overwhelm the
institutional capacity of the borrower.
Creating Linkages to Build Institutional Capacity
Donor agencies can help to support a more open decision
making process by allocating more esc irces to increase the
institutional capacity within countries and their own
agencies. Countries need to improve their performance in
three areas; policy analysis, natural resource management
and long term planning. Institution building for countries
is needed on both the local and national levels as well as
regionally. Regional organizations, such as NGOs, quasi-
governmental organizations and regional coordinating bodies,
such as common economic markets, can serve as conduits to
increase international learning between countries. Donors
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should target regional organizations as well as national
governments and local NGOs for institutional support. Donors
can help an open policy making process work by providing
support to stakeholders through regional organizations when
governments resist making changes on the national level.
This can include funding regional training centers that
specialize in teaching skills such as conflict resolution,
environmental leadership and project management.
To support the negotiation process, donors should make
sure that the borrower has sufficient institutional capacity
to provide a trained counterpart during the actual
negotiations, someone who will available to help implement
the final agreement. This is crucial given the shortage of
trained personnel in many countries. In most instances, this
counterpart will be from a ministry dealing with planning,
land use or economic development.
Donor agencies also need to build their own capacity
for environmental planning. In many instances, field offices
that are responsible for getting projects built do not have
staff trained in natural resource management. As a result,
it is almost impossible to enforce policies, or a negotiated
agreement, intended to protect the environment. In addition
to hiring properly trained personnel in field offices, donors
should pay special attention to who they assign as their
representatives to a negotiation. It is important that they
include field staff who are responsible for project
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implementation. It is critical that the negotiation process
be linked with the implementation process of both the donor
and country.
The donor should be aware that a negotiation for
implementing environmental policies linked to a single project
may need to be tied to a multi-year program to build the
institutional capacity in the borrowing country. It may take
two or three years to increase the institutional capacity
of local environmental NGOs and selected ministries within
the borrowing country before a negotiation can be successfully
carried out. If a country is hesitant or unwilling to be
involved in a negotiation, out of fear that it will cause
unwanted political change or upset the status quo, the donor
may be able to overcome this resistance by offering long term
assistance to build up its institutional capacity for policy
analysis and development planning, which will increase the
self reliance of the borrower.
Adopt Career Incentives
Donors can help motivate their employees to initiate a
negotiation process to implement environmental policies by
offering them career incentives. When donors evaluate the
job performance of their employees, they do not include
criteria to rate how effectively they have included
environmental policies in individual projects. This is in
contrast with the criteria that donors currently use, which
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rewards employees for completing projects and moving funds
as efficiently as possible, which acts as a disincentive for
implementing new environmental policies.
Policy-based career incentives could be added to promote
the acceptance of environmental reforms. This may include
evaluating how effectively employees incorporate environmental
reforms into projects using the collaborative negotiation
process. If the negotiation model is incorporated into the
project cycle as a way to improve cooperation between the
stakeholders, and strengthen environmental policy
implementation, employees should be financially rewarded.
This is part of the institution building that donors need
to undergo to increase their own capability to protect limited
natural resources affected by development projects.
Invent Economic Incentives
In most instances, environmental policies will remain
unenforced unless they tied to economic incentives. The most
direct way that donors can link economic and environmental
policies is to make the negotiation process part of the
project cycle. If this is done, direct economic incentives
can then be created to tie implementation of negotiated
agreements to project cost/benefit. One approach would be
to estimate the cost of carrying out all of the actions agreed
to during the negotiation process, and add it to the overall
project budget. This is essentially a way of accounting for
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the environmental cost of a project. If the project is not
profitable enough to pay for the environmental policy
implementation package, it should not be funded. This will
provide a direct economic incentive to protect natural
resources.
The donor can use contingent agreements as part of the
negotiation process to link a comprehensive institution-
building program to one project or a series of individual
projects it sponsors, as it is common for a donor to fund
multiple projects in the same country. A contingent agreement
could use performance standards to link the successful
completion of a series of several finite steps in an
institution-building program for the funding of individual
projects. As the government completes each step of the
program, the donor then funds another project. This could
provide the capital the borrower needs, which provides the
economic incentive to carry out long term environmental
reforms.
Incorporate Cultural Constraints into Implementation Plans
A combination of cultural constraints make it very
difficult for donors to implement environmental policies in
developing countries. The negotiation process needs to take
cultural conditions into account, or despite everyone's best
efforts, environmental policies will remain largely
unenforced. There are several kinds of cultural constraints
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that require the special attention of the donors agencies.
In general, policy changes occur slowly in developing
countries, especially by the continental standards used by
donor agencies and their consultants. For example, the
transition from environmental laws to guidelines is very
important. This transition represents the progression of
an abstract concept into public policies that affect peoples
lives. In less developed societies people notice this kind
of change, and take a long time to accept it. Political
leaders, who control every aspect of the policy-making
apparatus, reflect the hesitancy of the culture to change.
Personal relationships have to be developed between political
leaders and those advocating change for it to actually take
place. Often there is no institutional memory left in the
countries when expatriate experts are in charge. Time is
not spent in the field soliciting the participation of local
and regional environmental NGOs.
When involved in a negotiation process to implement
environmental policies, donors, as well as other stakeholders,
can account for cultural factors by addressing the following
questions.
1. How will the slow rate of change in the borrowing
country, where new policies may take several years to take
effect, be accounted for in the implementation strategy and
conditions for a project?
2. How will the implementation program will be designed
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on a small scale so it can be understood by political leaders?
3. How will the agencies representatives create the
personal trust with senior civil servants and political
leaders to built the man-to-man relationships needed to
influence the political process?
4. How will the agencies representatives overcome the
tendency of the borrower to treat them as outsiders? This
may require building long term relationships with regional
NGOs who can advise donors how to design an implementation
strategy that is compatible with the culture of decision
making in the country.
5. How will policy reforms be translated into a form of
the local written and spoken languages that political leaders
can easily understand, instead of relying solely on "planning
techo-speak". Local experts can be hired to perform the
translation, so that recommendations are presented one small
step at a time, consistent with local cultural norms.
6. What needs to be done as part of the negotiation process
to overcome the fears of local stakeholders, including
alienation and exile from the political process and a general
distrust of risk-taking and innovation?
National Political Leaders
National political leaders are faced with tough choices.
If they promote economic development in a manner that excludes
efforts to preserve natural resources, such as fresh water,
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fisheries, forests, agricultural soils and forests, large
scale environmental degradation will continue, and their
economic and political dependency on western industrialized
nations will grow. If they promote environmental reforms too
aggressively, they may scare off foreign investors, which can
lead to a slower rate of economic growth.
It is important that national political leaders take part
in the negotiations to design an effective strategy to
implement environmental policies. The largest donor agencies,
including the World Bank, U.S. AID and the Inter-American
Development Bank, are under immense pressure from
environmental groups and the U.S. Congress to stop funding
programs that damage natural resources. If countries continue
to propose projects that cause environmental damage, donors
may have no choice but to reduce or eliminate their level of
funding, resulting in substantially less direct foreign aid.
To avoid this situation, political leaders can support a
series of steps that are needed to increase the institutional
capacity of their governments to promote development projects
that are both profitable and environmentally sustainable.
Allow Stakeholders to Participate
First, to send a clear message to the donors that they
support projects that are environmentally sound, political
leaders should empower their governments to fully participate
in the negotiation process. This will accomplish several
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objectives. It will build local institutional capacity for
policy analysis and long term development planning, maintain
the flow of money from the donors for future development, and
protect the natural resources that are needed to support it.
By participating in a collaborative policy dialogue, and
giving legal protections to local stakeholders, politicians
will in turn gain the leverage to ask donors to provide long
term funding for institution-building that cannot be
accomplished in a single project cycle.
Slowly Open U the Public Policy Process
Political leaders should slowly open up the national
policy making process. Environmental interests groups are
growing in developing countries. It is just a matter of time
before they become strong enough to mount effective challenges
to the government. But, political leaders can turn the
opposition of environmental groups to their advantage by using
their leadership to initiate environmental reforms.
An initial step in this process could be to delegate
authority to civil servants to provide an objective analysis
of development proposals. Political leaders often approve
projects without the benefit of an objective policy analysis.
Civil servants should be allowed to objectively compare
development proposals to national environmental policies
before the cabinet makes any decision to support a project,
such as granting landholding licenses or financial
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concessions.
The second step that is needed to open up the policy
making process is to allow civil servants who work in
different offices to openly communicate laterally between
ministries when they are dealing with common issues related
to natural resource management. One way to do this is to form
Local Ntural Resource Planning Groups, made up of civil
servants who are responsible for different aspects of natural
resource management and environmental planning. The offices
that typically would be included are planning, land use,
finance, fisheries, agriculture, forestry and water resources.
These groups could also help the government coordinate
national policy making, creating consistency that would help
when it takes part in the negotiation process.
Institution Building to Increase Self-Reliance
In return for participating in the negotiation process,
national political leaders could make a side agreement with
the donor agencies, requesting multi-year assistance that is
necessary for institution-building to improve their indigenous
capacity for development planning and policy analysis. If
governments make the case that efforts to improve their
institutional capacity cannot be successfully completed within
the constraints of the single project cycle, they may be able
to convince donors to provide soft loans and grants needed
to do so. By improving the quality of decision making in
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their public policy processes, governments will reduce their
dependency on outside experts who are not familiar with
political and cultural conditions in the developing world.
Environmental NGOs and Resource Users
These groups can have the greatest impact on the public
policy process if they form a coalition to promote reforms
in both donor agencies and national governments.
Participation in the negotiation process offers the
opportunity to form a coalition. These stakeholders need to
work together to create a common agenda that makes the most
efficient use of limited resources so they are not at cross
purposes.
There are two types of environmental NGOs to which I
am offering advice, international groups headquartered in
Washington, D.C. and the small local and regional
organizations that exist in most developing regions. Each
of these groups needs to understand how their particular
strengths and weaknesses have to be accounted for when they
engage in a negotiation process to promote environmental
reform.
The strengths of international NGOs include political
access to the U.S. Congress, which they can use to promote
environmental reforms in donor agencies, their ability to
obtain funding and the practical experience they have obtained
by participating in conservation projects all over the world.
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Their weaknesses include a lack of creditability with
political leaders in developing countries, who are often
distrustful of outsiders, the difficulties inherent in
operating in countries that possess many different cultures
and the troublesome First World bias they bring to
conservation.
Environmental NGOs located in developing countries are
able to operate effectively in the local political system and
are aware of cultural norms that underlie the public policy
process. They are weak because they are small, lack adequate
financial support, and often do not have the direct access
to political leaders that is needed to influence development
decisions. By combining their efforts, international and
local NGOs can use each others strengths to compensate for
their weaknesses.
Identify and Train Environmental Leaders
The policy making process in many instances is greatly
influenced by a few people with strong personalities who have
developed the skills needed to operate successfully within
the political system. One way to influehce public decision
making is to train individuals who are likely to assume
leadership positions in their countries. No one knows local
political and culture conditions as well as those who have
grown up and worked in a country. For example, only local
people really understand the subtleties and opposition
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politics with any particular government, and how the local
culture of decision making influences political leaders.
To train future leaders who are likely to place
environmental problems higher on the public agenda than is
currently the case, local NGOs can identify civil servants
and political leaders that show exceptional promise. Local
NGOs are familiar with local people and conditions, and in
most instances are able to judge the likely candidates are
for advanced training. Once candidates for environmental
leadership training are selected, international NGOs, in
cooperation with supportive donor agencies, can use their
expertise in administering and funding training programs to
train the candidates. Training could include conflict
resolution techniques, communication skills, project
administration and policy analysis. This should be on ongoing
program, part of an institution building effort in selected
regions. Ideally, it would take the form of a permanent
training center, perhaps a joint effort of more than one NGO,
with field offices where training would take place.
It is important that the training be designed
specifically for the political and cultural conditions
encountered in developing countries. In addition to training
future leaders, this approach will build coalitions between
future decision makers, NGOs and donors, as well as promoting
learning between governments. This is a form of technology
transfer from industrialized countries to developing nations
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that supports sustainable development.
Link Environmental Reform to the Negotiation Process
International NGOs should use their access to Congress
to urge donors to open up their decision making process, to
make it accountable for the environmental damage caused by
development projects and to build the institutional capacity
for environmental reform in both donor agencies and developing
countries/,.by adopting the model of collaborative negotiation.
The negotiation process could be carried out as part of the
standard project cycle, to be completed before donors make
funding commitments for projects. International groups can
also pressure donors to provide more soft loans and grants
fund multi-year programs to increase the institutional
capacity of governments to enable them to participate in a
negotiation process.
Strengthen Relationships Between NGOs and Resource Users
Local NGOs should develop programs to strengthen their
relationships with resource users such as farmers, fishermen
and charcoal producers. There are two ways to do this.
First, NGOs can talk to resource users to educate them about
the environmental damage caused by traditional forms of
development, such as large tourist resorts, that damage
fishing grounds, close off access to the coast, etc. Second,
NGOs can work with resource users to help make them more
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efficient producers. This can be done by sponsoring programs
to examine how resource users operate, and then designing a
strategy to increase the efficiency of their operations in
a manner that is environmentally sustainable.
This could include observing the habits of local
fishermen that may be environmentally harmful, such as
dynamiting reefs or overharvesting certain species. The NGO
could work with fisheries biologists to identify species that
can be safely harvested, and train fishermen in the techniques
needed to catch them. Then, the NGO could act on behalf of
a fishing community to seek funding from a donor agency to
build facilities for storing, processing and marketing the
fish that are caught.
By creating this kind of downward linkage with resource
users, NGOs will generate economic and political leverage for
both groups. This can translate into stronger political
influence with the government, which is turn will strengthen
both stakeholders during the negotiation process.13 If
international NGOs participate in this effort, coalitions will
be formed between local NGOs, international NGOs, and resource
users, increasing the political leverage and influence of all
13
13 Susan L. Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, 1988. Managing
Public Disputes. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. See pages 216-
18. Carpenter and Kennedy discuss the value of being able to
rewardthe other side for cooperation, the importance of a sound
alternative, and the ability to cause harm by increasing a cost.
Stakeholders who are excluded from development decisions can
offer all of these incentives to political leaders in exchange
for their participation in decision making.
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three parties. 14
Other Models for Strengthening Environmental Policies
I believe that the integrated negotiation model that I
have presented will be the most effective way to open up the
decision making process so that it includes unrepresented
stakeholders and integrates political, economic and cultural
issues in way that is needed to resolve complex environmental
problems. It reflects the important role that cultural,
political, and economic conditions play in the development
process, and can be tailored to meet the specific needs of
different countries. However, this are other methods for
resolving international environmental problems.
Several environmental problems cut across national
boundaries. These include air pollution, acid rain, the
Greenhouse effect and depletion of the earth's protective
ozone layer. During international negotiations to stabilize
the earth's climate, developing countries have formed the
Group of 77 to bargain with industrialized nations as a block.
The Group of 77 believes that by agreeing to an international
14 See H. Jeffrey Leonard, 1989. Environment and the
Poor: Development Strategies for a Common Aenda. New
Brunswick, Transaction Books. Leonard describes strategies
that combine environmental protection with improving the quality
of life for poor resource users; see pages 31-43. In The Human
Dimension in Environmental Planning, (Jeffrey A. McNeely and
David Pitt, eds., London, Croom Helm, 1985), Pitt discusses
the effectiveness of linking resource users to national
environmental planning programs; see page 283.
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treaty to reduce emissions of chlorofluorocarbons and
hydrocarbons, developing countries may have to reduce
industrial production processes that will slow down economic
growth. They argue that countries that have already developed
have caused the most global pollution, and should bare most
of the burden for resolving the problem. This is just the
most recent development in the twenty year old North v. South
debate that has marked international environmental
negotiations since the 1972 Stockholm conference on the
environment.
Developing countries believe that industrialized nations
should compensate them for reducing air pollution.
Compensation would be in the form of cash payments for
foregone economic opportunities and assistance in developing
new technologies to substitute for ones that are causing the
most pollution. The Montreal Protocols specifically called
for developed nations to accelerate their efforts to provide
new technologies to the developing world. This is starting
to happen as the United States and other countries agree to
provide some technical and financial assistance to developing
nations. However, Caldwell and others believe that existing
international institutional arrangement are not adequate to
deal with the complexities of global environmental problems. 15
15 Lynton K. Caldwell, 1984. International Environmental
Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. Durham, North Carolina, Duke
University Press. See Chapter 9.
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Countries seem to value national sovereignty more than
environmental stability. Many international treaties and
conventions have been adopted, as transboundary problems
require international solutions. But the international
community has been slow promote the institutional and legal
reforms that must accompany these complex agreements In
addition, international agreements take too long to implement,
lack formal mechanisms to achieve compliance, and address
problems on an ad hoc basis.
In response to the difficulties of implementing
international agreements, it has been suggested that regional
negotiation centers be established to address transboundary
problems on a scale that is easier to grasp. Regions often
share similar cultures, languages and political systems. One
possible model is to for countries to sign global
environmental treaties, and delegate implementation to
regional centers or quasi-governmental organizations. This
could combine the strengths inherent in international
cooperation, while accounting for the weakness in implementing
agreements on an international scale. This approach would
decentralize environmental policy implementation to the
regional level, but it is unclear how a regional strategy can
secure a binding commitment without violating the national
sovereignty of countries that participate.
Another model of implementation would take
decentralization one step further. It is based on the
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assumption that countries have too many differences to
cooperate effectively, and that international interventions
infringe on national sovereignty. An example would be the
differences between the island nations in the Caribbean. Even
though these countries seem to share much in common, they have
different languages (English, French, Spanish and Dutch, plus
many creolized versions), political systems (socialism in
Guyana, communism in Cuba, many parliamentary democracies and
several countries still administered from the United States
and European capitals), cultures and legal systems. Under
a decentralized model, it is assumed that countries will
support the indigenous change needed to reform environmental
policies. Solutions could include local people organizing
a Green Party to pressure te political leaders to undertake
reform. But, in developing countries that lack a tradition
of public participation and open political dialogue, this
approach may not be work.
Summary
The current approach that donor agencies and developing
countries use to design and implement environmental policies
does not work. It does not work because they use a closed
decision making process. It does not adequately account for
the interests of several key stakeholders, including resource
users, local and international environmental NGOs, civil
servants and environmental technicians. It also fails to
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account for the role that four elements of the public policy
process play in environmental policy implementation. The four
elements are: national politics, the culture of decision
making and economic necessity in developing countries, and
the behavior of donor agencies.
The behavior of policy makers in donor agencies and
developing countries that promotes development which damages
limited natural resources is mutually reinforcing. To account
for the interests of stakeholders that are now excluded from
environmental policy making, and to integrate the crucial four
elements of the public policy process, a new open system of
decision making should be adopted. This new open system can
be implemented using a negotiated partnership for sustainable
development. It will be hard for the closed system of
decision making to become more open, but this has to be done
to preserve limited natural resources for future economic
growth.16
A negotiation process can be designed to open up the
public policy process, but the first obstacle that has to be
overcome is to convince borrowing countries and donor agencies
to participate in a more open policy dialogue. There are
significant incentives for both parties to participate. Donor
agencies will be subject to more and more political pressure
16 See Appendix B of this dissertation for specific
recommendations to strengthen environmental policy
implementation in the Eastern Caribbean.
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from the U.S. Congress and international environmental
organizations to implement environmental reforms that work.
If the donors fail to adopt more effective strategies for
protecting natural resources, their funding may be curtailed.
Similarly, borrowing countries may not be eligible for
development assistance unless they promote effective
environmental reforms. By accounting for environmental
factors in development decisions, national political leaders
will blunt the growing opposition from pro-environmental
interest groups at home and abroad, creating political
stability that will allow them to stay in power. By
increasing the institutional capacity within their own
governments for policy analysis and environmental planning,
as an element to the development process, politicians will
enhance national self-reliance and reduce political and
economic dependency on outside parties. National governments
and donor agencies will benefit from integrating economic and
environmental factors in a manner that promotes sustainable
development, which in turn will create a more certain
investment climate.
As major stakeholders, donor agencies and borrowing
countries possess the political and financial leverage to
convince the other to take part in a more open process. Once
a decision is made to open up the policy dialogue, a
collaborative negotiation process can be convened by any one
of the stakeholders.
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National politics and the culture of decision making in
developing countries are obstacles that will be hard to
overcome. National political leaders have close ties to
developers and make decisions to support their projects in
private without public participation. The exclusion of the
public from policy making has included the absence of an open
press and media, with the government controlling the flow of
information that reaches its citizens. Political leaders exert
control over civil servants using party loyalty and family
ties as leverage to enforce their pro-development policies.
This discourages civil servants from working to enforce
environmental policies that parliament has passed, often as
a condition of approval to receive funds from donor agencies.
Local environmental groups, NGOs and resource users do
not have the personal access to national political leaders
that is needed to influence the public policy process. Policy
decisions are made based on personal trust, political loyalty
and intense man-to-man communication that outsiders, such as
donor agencies attempting to implement environmental policies,
simply do not understand. Cultural differences are
complicated by the role of informal authorities in decision
making, a resistance to innovation, which includes adoption
of new policies that change the way people relate to their
government, and a general distrust of outsiders attempting
to intervene in the political system, due to a history of
economic and political dependency. In short, outside parties
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trying to make policy interventions are hindered because they
do not understand the cultural norms and political practices
that combine to create national culture of decision making.
But there are ways to manage these differences in a new open
decision making process.
These concerns can be accounted for in the prenegotiation
phase of an open process by meeting a series of preconditions,
and in the second phase by following a series of steps. The
convener of a negotiation, whether it is a donor agency,
country or an NGO, can design the process to include
stakeholders that are excluded from the political process,
such as local resource users and NGOs. Ground rules can be
established to protect civil servants in the countries and
environmental technicians in the donor agencies. These can
include legal and procedural protections to shield them from
political retribution for participating in an open dialogue.
Weak stakeholders can be provided with financial and technical
resources, including training in economic development and
conflict resolution, to place them on a more equal basis with
more powerful stakeholders. The convener, working with a
neutral facilitator or mediator, can create protocols to help
the participants in the negotiation understand their
responsibilities to each other and the process, and show them
the importance of using objective criteria in their arguments
instead of relying on subjective judgements that favor parties
that traditionally have been the most powerful.
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The mediator can choose a co-mediator from the local
culture to help in designing a negotiation process that
accounts for the culture of decision making. The mediation
team can carry out several specific steps, such as conducting
a culturally-based stakeholder analysis and using an elicitive
model of communication that is weighted towards local cultural
norms, to account for cultural biases. If donors include the
funds and technical expertise needed to support long term
institution building in countries where they sponsor
development, several culturally-related constraints to
implementing effective environmental policies can be resolved.
Long term institution building is needed to promote the
personal trust, man-to-man communication and cultural
awareness that is necessary to design and carry out policies
that work.
The difficulty of accounting for economic factors when
designing environmental policies can also be addressed in a
negotiation process. Local NGOs can strengthen their
coalitions with local resource users who provide vital
services for their societies. Resource users are generally
not organized. If NGOs promote downward linkages with
resources users, and help them to become more efficient
producers, both groups will gain more political and economic
leverage, giving them a greater voice in development
decisions. If donors promote long term institution building
in borrowing countries, it can help harmonize conflicting
307
economic and environmental policies, and promote economic
incentives to protect natural resources.
The behavior of donor agencies that prevents
environmental policies from being enforced can also be
accounted for in a negotiation process. Negotiations should
include representatives from the field offices and
environmental units of the donors, so that the policy dialogue
includes their viewpoint. These parties are responsible for
designing and implementing strategies to protect natural
resources, but are often overruled by political appointees
who do not want to interrupt the flow of development funds.
By including all of these parties in a collaborative
negotiation, implementation strategies can be created that
incorporate the environmental reforms that donors are supposed
to be carrying out.
The stakeholders can also undertake initiatives outside
of the negotiation process to help make it more effective.
Donor agencies can take the leadership in promoting effective
environmental policies by creating economic incentives that
protect natural resources. They can use contingent agreements
that link institution building with the approval of individual
projects. As a country builds its capacity for protecting
natural resources, the donor can then provide funds for
development projects. This provides an incentive for
countries to increase their own capacity for environmental
protection. Donors should also provide career environmental
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incentives for their employees to financially reward them for
creating and promoting environmental reform, including use
of the collaborative negotiation process. NGOs should
coordinate their efforts to identify and train talented
individuals who will serve as the next generation of leaders
in their governments. This could take the form of a permanent
training center to build skills in conflict resolution, inter-
personal communication and policy analysis.
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APPENDIX A
NOTES ON 80URCES OF INFORMATION AND RESEARCH METHODS
To prepare for field work in each country, I conducted
a series of background interviews with researchers and
professionals involved in environmental planning and
economic development in the Caribbean. Contacts within
various donor agencies and NGOs gave me access to public and
private documents discussing the status of the public policy
process in the Eastern Caribbean. I used these documents,
the background interviews, my experience in the region and
several published references focusing on politics, culture,
anthropology, economics, public administration and natural
resources to formulate an approach for carrying out the
field work. All of the background and reference material
that I used is cited in the body of the dissertation.
The approach that I used to create the case studies is
described by Robert K. Yin in Case Study Research: Design
and Methods, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1984. Cases were chosen
in three different countries with similar political systems
to illustrate the different obstacles to implementing
environmental policies. The cases have several common
elements; they all involve large development projects
designed and funded by donor agencies, fragile natural
1
resources are at stake, and efforts to protect the resources
have generally failed.
After I identified the cases in each country that I
wanted to examine, it was necessary to obtain access to
politicians, civil servants and other key sources who
possessed the special knowledge I needed to create them.
This was crucial as public policy decisions in all three
countries are difficult to document, as many Cabinet
decisions and other major deliberations of government
officials are not a matter of public record. In most
instances, my association as a Research Associate with the
Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies
(CERMES) at the University of the West Indies, Barbados, and
a Fellow of the Organization of American States was
sufficient to convince my sources that I was an objective
party. However, in St. Lucia I was told that access to key
sources would not be granted unless I registered as a
researcher with the National Research and Development
Foundation, agreeing to sign a contract that guaranteed the
Foundation access to my findings. Thus, finding a suitable
institutional auspices was an essential element of preparing
for the actual field research.
The field research ws designed so that I would serve
as a Participant-Observer, relating the story of each case
from the vantage points of key parties who played integral
roles in them. Multiple sources of evidence were used to
2
prepare the cases. To establish multiple sources of
evidence, I compiled a collection of written evidence to
form a data base for the cases. Written evidence included
papers from the archives of the University of the West
Indies, Barbados, and several types of documents from the
collections of national libraries in Barbados and St. Lucia,
including National Plans, newspaper articles, planning
documents, and special studies related to natural resources,
economics and culture, including agriculture, forestry,
anthropology, coastal planning, tourism and land use
control. All of the sources I used are cited in the text of
the dissertation. The library at the National Research and
Development Foundation in St. Lucia was a valuable source of
local information.
Several national and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) also provided background information to
prepare me for field work and in-country interviews. The
library of the Island Resources Foundation in Washihgton,
D.C., compiled and managed by Edward and Judith Towle, was
invaluable. Staff at the Organization of American States
provided several reports prepared for the Economic Base
Resource Management Plurinational Project sponsored by the
OAS and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP). These reports
discuss the capabilities of St. Lucia and St. Kitts to
undertake development control and physical planning
3
activities, and include several recommendations to improve
institutional capacity in these areas.
A series of reports describing the status of national
legislation relating to natural resources management in St.
Lucia and St. Kitts, sponsored and provided to me by the
OECS NRMP, provided excellent summaries of the status of
environmental planning in these two countries. A
comprehensive review of coastal-related legislation in
Barbados, by Kenneth Atherley of the Coastal Conservation
Project Unit, was also helpful.
Before traveling to each country to conduct interviews,
I also had a series of discussions, over a period of two
years, with a range of people who have long experience
working and living in the Caribbean. The Towles of the
Island Resources Foundation, Janos Zimmerman and Mervin
Williams at the OECS NRMP in St. Lucia, Victor Williams in
St. Kitts, David Staples in Barbados, Dr. Euna Moore at
CERMES and Richard Meganck, formerly of the OAS, all
provided me with the benefit of their experience in the
Eastern Caribbean.
Once the background data for each case was collected,
I formulated a series of questions to ask of my sources in
each country. Each source was asked essentially the same
set of questions. The questions were designed to establish
a chain of evidence for each case. I wanted to find out how
each project was initiated, who sponsored it, paid for it
4
and supported it politically. The key decisions leading up
to project approval, made by both officials from national
governments and donor agencies, as project sponsors, were
generally not in a written record. The only way to obtain
this information was to conduct interviews with a wide
variety of people in each country. In total, I interviewed
sixty-eight people in four countries, including the United
States, and had about one hundred total contacts with them.
A wide range of people were interviewed, who had a
diverse set of opinions on the environment/development
dialogue. These included elected and appointed officials,
such as; an Attorney General, Permanent Secretaries and
senior civil servants in ministries of development,
agriculture, tourism, fisheries, planning, coastal
management and finance, the heads of national planning
authorities, the Director of a national development
corporation, members of the port authority, staff from a
national sugar corporation, and the chairmen of national
advisory boards for conservation, development and historical
preservation.
Several officials from the donor agencies, USAID, the
Inter-American Development Bank and OAS, were also
interviewed, in their headquarters in Washington, D.C. and
in regional offices in the Eastern Caribbean (the USAID
regional office in Bridgetown, Barbados, the Inter-American
Development Bank representatives office in Barbados, and the
5
OAS field office in St. Lucia). These sources included the
managers of the three projects; the Southeast Peninsula
Development Project in St. Kitts, the Bridgetown Fisheries
Harbor in Barbados and the proposed Piton's National Park in
St. Lucia, and specialists from the donor agencies in
economic development, environmental planning, engineering
and rural development.
Research officers from several quasi-government
agencies were interviewed, including the Caribbean Tourism
Organization, Barbados, who provided information about the
importance of the regional tourist economy. The USAID-
funded planning team in St. Kitts gave me numerous planning
studies and background documents for the Southeast Peninsula
Road Project. Directors from various Chambers of Industry
and Commerce briefed me on the economic status of each
country, and gave me insights into the local political
system. Officials from the St. Lucia National Trust
explained the history of conservation activities in the
country, and members of the Barbados Association for the
Environment described the history of their attempts to
influence national conservation policy.
The President of the Barbados Fishing Cooperative,
staff from the Folk Research Centre in St. Lucia and the
Director of the West Indies/USAID Caribbean Justice
Improvement Program, Barbados, provided data on the regional
fishery, the importance of the Piton's to the culture of St.
6
Lucia and the legal and judicial framework in individual
countries and the Eastern Caribbean region. The Technical
Advisor to the Caribbean Office of the European Development
Fund in Bridgetown, Barbados, provided vital information
about the history of the Southeast Peninsula Development
Project in St. Kitts. The Vicar General of the Archdiocese
of St. Lucia was extremely helpful in explaining how senior
civil servants in that country have attempted to reform the
national public policy process, and how the reform movement
related to the Piton's controversy.
In addition to members of official organizations, I
also spent considerable time interviewing lay people, to
ensure that the cases reflect the viewpoint of resource
users. I had long conversations with fishermen, farmers and
forest guides in all three countries. These conversations
were unstructured, and yielded useful insights into the way
that politics, economic and culture intertwine to form an
informal framework for natural resource management.
All interviews were initially conducted in person, with
multiple follow-up conversations with key sources via
telephone for a year after the field work, to ensure that
the cases reflect current events. In all instances, in
person and when using the telephone, I took notes by hand,
and did not use a tape recorder. There are two reasons for
this. First, I felt that it was essential to establishing
personal trust with my sources, given the informality of
7
interpersonal dialogue in the countries. This informality
reflects the dominance of the oral tradition in the region,
which as I mention in Chapter Three, contains the elements
of intense person-to-person dialogue and requires an acute
awareness of the surroundings and cultural ambiance in which
the interview is conducted. By taking notes, I was forced
to tune in to the surroundings, and carefully listen to the
person being interviewed, to know when to push for more
information, usually of a politically sensitive nature, and
when not to.
The second reason I depended on hand written notes was
that all of the cases were the subject of intense political
debate in the countries, and within the donor agencies.
This included the sensitive nature of the environmental
reform movement among the donors. I felt that my informants
would be unwilling to discuss elements of the cases that
were clearly of a politically sensitive nature with a tape
recorder in front of them. I am sure that one reason why I
successfully elicited candid comments on the political
aspects of the cases was the confidentially promised to my
sources. Hence, in the body of the dissertation, interviews
are cited with a letter followed by a number (ie. B 12, SK
7, SL 1), signifying the country where the case is located
(B = Barbados, SK = St. Kitts, and SL = St. Lucia), and who
the source is. Each number refers to a person interviewed.
My descriptions of the key events in the cases were
8
mainly derived from the interviews, newspaper articles and
project-related documents on file in government offices and
donor agencies. In almost all instances, key events, such
as a decision by Cabinet or a donor agency, were confirmed
by more than one source. The environmental consequences of
the projects were documented by field visits in each
country, accompanied by local residents or officials from
the government or donor agency. My experience as a land use
planner and environmental analyst helped me understand what
I was seeing (ie. the cause and extent of beach erosion,
degradation of offshore reefs, deforestation, results of
intensive coastal development, etc.).
I did encounter difficulties during the field research.
These included logistical problems, such as a shortage of
operable telephones, understanding local dialects, and
finding out how to get around in each country. Gaining
physical access to the three project sites was often
difficult. Sympathetic officials, landowners and local
guides accompanied me to all of the sites, to explain the
elements of each project, and to avoid encountering problems
with legal trespass.
Precautions were taken to avoid intervening in the
outcome of each case. If participants asked me for advice
about how to create a strategy to strengthen environmental
policies, I explained that it was not my role to provide
that kind of information. This approach, coupled with my
9
association with local and regional research institutions,
allowed me to remain neutral.
After the initial interviews were completed, and all of
the background materials summarized, I prepared three
documents for each case; an annotated chronology of key
events, and summaries of the major themes and lessons.
Next, I analyzed these documents to develop new, specific
propositions that the evidence would support. The resulting
propositions relate to the relationship of mandated
environmental policies to four major themes; national
politics, the culture of decision making, economic
conditions and the behavior of donor agencies. Chapters Two
through Five describe these relationships in the context of
specific events and conditions within each case.
The criteria for the findings in each chapter related
to the effectiveness of environmental policies. In all
instances, fragile or limited natural resources were
identified by governments, outside experts or donor
agencies, and policies adopted to protect them. In general
these policies failed. When adopted policies were compared
to the actual or likely environmental damage generated by
the projects, these inconsistencies were interpreted as the
findings for the cases, and specifically, how the four major
factors identified contributed to the degradation of natural
resources.
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APPENDIX B
Recommendations for trengthening Environmental Policies in
the Eastern Caribbean
The following recommendations for improving
environmental policy implementation in the Eastern Caribbean
are derived from my field research, the case studies in
Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Kitts, and interviews with
numerous officials in government, NGOs and donor agencies.
In addition to following these recommendations, the
stakeholders in the region can improve natural resource
management by adopting a more open decision making process,
the negotiated partnership for sustainable development that
is discussed in Chapter Six. These recommendations are
addressed to national political leaders, local and regional
environmental NGOs and donor agencies active in the region.
Recommendations for National Political Leaders
It is important that top policy makers take concrete
steps to improve their environmental accountability with
donor agencies. All of the donor agencies in the region,
including the largest (World Bank, IDB and USAID) are under
immense pressure from U.S-based environmental groups to
stop funding projects that damage natural resources. If
countries continue to follow economic policies and propose
1
projects that are harmful to the environment, donors may
have no choice but to slow down their funding programs,
resulting is less direct aid to the islands. There are
several steps that political leaders should take to assure
the continued financial support of the donors. These steps
are:
o Re-establish Environmental Ministries;
o Strengthen Local Institutional Capacity;
o Enhance Regional Environmental Cooperation;
o Establish Regional Council for Tourism and the
Environment;
o Create Regional Tourism Strategy;
o Determine Benefits of Nature-Tourism;
o Develop Strategy for Reducing Economic-Environment
Conflicts in Economic Planning;
o Sponsor Unified Strategy for Donor Assistance.
Re-Establish Environmental Ministries
To send a clear message to donors that they support
development projects that are environmentally sound, the
Prime Ministers of St. Kitts and Barbados should re-
establish cabinet-level environmental ministries. Both
countries had Environmental Ministries in the recent past.
St. Lucia created and assigned this portfolio in 1989. The
Ministries should perform two functions, related to policy
2
and projects.
Procedures should be established within the Ministries
to streamline the development approval process. The
Ministries should be responsible for coordinating input
from all government offices that deal with different aspects
of environmental management. This will prevent unnecessary
delays when projects are evaluated. In addition, the
Ministries should coordinate all environmental policy input
to the political leadership, eliminating overlapping
jurisdictions and the confusion that results.
Strengthen Local Institutional Capacity
St. Lucia's Prime Minister should formally gazette the
long-delayed Environmental Commission. The EC members
represent over twenty interest groups from the private and
public sectors. By taking this initiative, the Prime
Minister would make sure that the environmental consequences
of development projects are considered, while at the same
time including interest groups in the public policy process
that will lead to long term political stability.' If this
1 See Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, 1987.
Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving
Public Disputes. New York, Basic Books. The authors discuss
the importance of giving all of the people affected by a
policy decision a voice in the outcome. If countries such as
St. Lucia, which has a democratic tradition and free press,
continue to exclude environmental groups from development
decisions, it will lead to political instability and undermine
the legitimacy of the government. The problems caused by the
exclusion of key stakeholders in the decision of the St. Lucia
government to support the resort on the Jalousie Estate is
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step is not taken, politically damaging controversies such
as the Pitons controversy will happen time and again.
To minimize disruption to the political process, and to
insure that the Commission does not slow down the overall
rate of development, it should be accompanied by a set of
procedural rules. The rules should establish a time limit,
such as sixty days, during which the Commission can make
recommendations on a project. Protocols to guide how the
Commission communicates to the Prime Minister should also be
agreed upon, perhaps delegating direct communication to the
Chairman.
In St. Kitts, the Prime Minister should instruct the
Minister of Development to restaff the Central Planning Unit
with at least two people with college degrees in natural
resource management, and establish a formal link between the
Southeast Peninsula Advisory Board and the Unit. The Prime
Minister should also approach donor agencies to seek funding
for the proposed Environmental Unit, the National
Conservation Commission, and the implementation of the St.
Kitts/Nevis National Coastal Plan prepared by OECS.
In all countries the Prime Minister's should direct the
appropriate minister to establish Local Resource Groups.
Members would be civil servants from different agencies
responsible for natural resource management, such as
agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The purpose of LRGs is
4
evidence of this.
to promote lateral communication across ministries among
natural resource managers. The LRG could be set up as an
advisory group to the Ministry of Environment, and assisted
by a part-time staff person from the Ministry.
Enhance Reaional Environmental Cooperation
Politicians should also work cooperatively at the
regional level, within the framework of existing
organizations, to coordinate an integrated approach to
natural resource management. This is advisable because
economic growth in the region is now oriented strongly
towards international tourism. These visitors come to the
region because of its healthy natural environment; clean
beaches, living coral reefs, and the tropical setting.
When the quality of one islands environment
deteriorates tourists stop coming, because they can go to
another island that is clean and healthy. This has already
happened in Barbados, where tourism has dropped off sharply
since the 1970s. It is no coincidence that in the last
fifteen years Barbados has experienced serious problems with
beach erosion, water pollution, destruction of coral reefs
and a shortage of flying fish, the national symbol which
every tourist wants to eat. St. Kitts, Nevis, St. Lucia and
Grenada are all experiencing similar problems on a smaller
scale.
To prevent the same environmental problems from leap-
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frogging from island to island, political leaders from each
island should appoint permanent counterparts to two key
regional organizations, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
and the Caribbean Tourism rganization (CTO). CARICOM
issued the Port-of-Spain Accord on the Management and
Conservation of the Caribbean Environment in June, 1989. A
key part of the Accord recommends that all governments
should designate counterparts to work with regional and
international groups, such as donors and environmental
organizations. As a first step in integrating economic and
environmental concerns, Prime Ministers should appoint at
least one counterpart, at the ministerial level, to fulfill
the terms of the Accord.
Establish Regional council for Tourism and the Environment
Prime Ministers should work with the Caribbean Tourism
Organization to establish a permanent Regional Council for
Tourism and the Environment (RCTE), and then appoint to it
a second counterpart with environmental expertise. Local
environmental NGOs should be invited to participate so that
governments can use their expertise to help develop a
regional strategy for tourism-based development. This
initiative builds on a statement by the Secretary of the CTO
that private and public participation in planning is
necessary to develop regional tourism without damaging
6
natural resources.2
The goal of both programs should be to promote regional
cooperation on issues cutting across the economic and
environmental sectors, and to promote regional economic
integration by transferring management and problem-solving
skills between countries. This is needed because of the
shortage of well trained economists within the region, and
3the efficiency of learning from the experience of others .
CARICOM and the CTO are existing organizations, so it
will be efficient to work within them. Participants in the
RCTE program should initially focus on how one sector,
tourism, affects the environment, to avoid dissipating its
energy on broad environmental issues that are very difficult
to address. The RCTE cooperative tourism project should
initially undertake two tasks.
Create Regional Tourism trategy
First, it should work to develop a Regional Tourism
Strategy to promote the type of tourism development that
provide maximum financial benefit to the islands. Special
attention should be given to evaluating the drawbacks of
high density, large projects that have caused the most
2 Jean Holder, 1988. Tourism and Environmental Planning:
An Irrevocable Commitment. Caribiana, 1(1), Caribbean
Conservation Association, July, 1988.
3 James McElroy, Bruce Potter and Edward Towle, 1986.
Challenges for Sustainable Development in Small Caribbean
Islands. Island Resources Foundation Occasional Paper 46.
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environmental damage in the region. This traditional form
of tourism development is based on massive high-density
projects that benefit a few foreign investors and requires
huge capital investments for roads, utilities, marinas, etc.
I believe that research will show that this model of
development, which typically is based on financial
incentives (ie. tax holidays, expatriation of profits,
waivers of duty for supplies, etc.) that greatly diminish
its net public benefit, is not as profitable for national
treasuries as is commonly believed.
The benefits of projects based on the construction of
several smaller, low-density buildings, which cater to
visitors who stay longer and tend to visit throughout all
the seasons of the year, should be evaluated. This type of
land use creates projects that cause far less environmental
damage, and provide a more even flow of foreign exchange
throughout the year.4
Determine Benefits of Nature-Tourism
Nature-tourism is one model of development that should
be examined. Several islands in the region, including St.
Lucia, St. Kitts and Dominica have relatively intact
rainforest areas that tourists now visit, largely on an
4 Klaus de Albuquerque and Jerome McElroy, 1988.
Tourism Styles and Management Strategies in Small Caribbean
Islands. Prepared for the Midwest Association of Latin
Amercianists at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana,
October 20-22, 1988.
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unorganized basis, because they are remote, and possess high
nature resource values, including unique wildlife species
such as the St. Lucia parrot. The RCTE should conduct
research, using the strong research capability of the CTO,
to determine the market for nature tourism, where projects
could be located, and how much they would cost.5
After the RCTE has determined what models of tourism
development can be created without causing severe
environmental damage, it should prepare  collective funding
strategy and that the member countries can present to the
Washington, D.C. Donor's Conference.
Develop Strategy for Reducing Environment-Economic Conflicts
CARICOM should work on a broader set of public policy
issues that reflect the interdependency of economic and
environmental issues, including;
1. How to reduce the inter-sectoral conflicts between
economic and environmental concerns. It is common for
countries to have conflicting economic and environmental
5 The Ladakh Project, 1988. Ecoloaical Steps Towards
a Sustainable Future. The Ladakh Project, Bristol, England.
The RCTE should examine the history of the Ladakh Ecological
Development Group, a non-profit society in Ladakh, India, that
works with donors to promote sustainable development which is
consistent with the local cultural heritage. The Ladakh
Project, based in England, works in several countries to
promote development that fits with the local environment.
Also see; Cultural Survival Quarterly, 14(1), 1990, Breaking
Out the Tourist Trap. Cultural Survival, Cambridge, MA, USA.
This special issue has several case studies of tourism
projects in developing countries.
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policies. For example, the Southeast Peninsula Project in
St. Kitts was promoted by government because it attracted
foreign exchange to the island. At the same time, it was in
conflict with national policies intended to protect the
environment. When this happens, economic policies
predominant, even if scarce natural resources are lost.
CARICOM should sponsor a cooperative regional effort to
determine how countries can create economic incentives for
conservation of natural resources.
2. The inclusion of specific goals in the National
Development Plans for each island that are needed to achieve
more effective environmental protection. The Plans should
recognize that wise management of natural resources is
needed to assure continued economic growth.
3. The development of objective criteria that national
politicians can use when determining whether to approve
projects that damage natural resources. A simple model
should be developed that predicts the general cost of
environmental damage, such as siting a hotel so close to the
beach so that it erodes away, and how much the government
will have to spend to repair the damage at a later date.
Sponsor Unified trategy for Donor Assistance
CARICOM should coordinate the preparation of a unified
strategy for seeking assistance form donor agencies to
improve each islands institutional capacity for
10
environmental management. A Steering Committee of the
CARICOM environmental organization should be designated as
the liaison to all natural resource management projects
prepared by donors. Participants can then present a group
funding proposal at the Washington, D.C. donors conference
to enable a comprehensive approach to improving
institutional capacity.
Recommendationns for Non-Governmental Agencies
There are two main kinds of environmental NGOs to which
I am offering advice, international groups that influence
donor policies and have headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
and regional groups that are located in the Caribbean. Each
type of group has particular strengths that can be used to
promote environmental reform. But, several measures can be
taken to foster the necessary cooperation between these
organizations that share common goals but are separated by
thousands of miles, different cultures and conflicting
priorities.
Please refer to Chapter Six for additional advice for
NGOs.
The steps that NGOs should take to help protect the
limited natural resources of the region include:
o DB Reforms to Strengthen Environmental Policy
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Implementation;
- Uniform Standards for Environmental Review;
- Conditions for Aid to Regional MDBs;
- Extend Project Cycles;
o Establish Caribbean Coordinating Council;
- Increase Institutional Capacity of Regional NGOs;
- Sponsor Pilot Projects for Public Participation;
- Use Legal System to Enforce Environmental Laws.
MDB Reforms to Strengthen Environmental Policy
To build on their success in achieving general
policy reforms in the MDBs, international groups can now
work with the banks to adopt specific measures to accelerate
the rate of reform in the Caribbean. They should encourage
the MDBs to adopt uniform policies for donors and borrowing
countries to promote policy implementation and improve the
legitimacy of the environmental review process.
Uniform Standards for Environmental Review
MDBs should also be encouraged to require that all
countries in the region adopt uniform standards for
environmental review. Standards should include criteria for
conducting initial environmental assessments, hiring
qualified consultants which also train in-country
counterparts, administrative procedures that shield
consultants from being pressured by developers, and
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requirements that each EIA mitigation measure be
incorporated into the permit for a project to protect
specific local resources.
International NGOs should also encourage donors to
require that borrowers be required to consult with all
parties affected by a project, including residents, resource
users and domestic NGOs during the environmental assessment
process. Uniform standards for implementing environmental
review procedures need to be created and enforced. If all
countries are not subject to the same specific standards, it
will allow islands that don't have them to have a
competitive advantage in attracting foreign investment.
Conditions for Aid to Regional MDBs
The World Bank should be encouraged to require
environmental reform as a condition of its contributions to
the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean
Development Bank. These regional banks receive loans and
lines of credit from the World Bank with no environmental
conditions. If the World Bank is serious about
environmental reform, its contributions to the regional
banks should be accompanied by conditions that EIA
procedures will be implemented on any projects it funds.
Extend Project Cycles
All donors should be encouraged to relax and extend the
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schedules and funding for projects that are accompanied by
requirements to increase the institutional capacity of
borrowers for environmental planning. While preparing
testimony for Congress to advocate this reform,
international NGOs should consult with local and regional
NGOs to determine how much time is needed to do this.6 This
task and several others require that a formal structural
relationship be created between international and regional
NGOs to promote environmental reform as efficiently as
possible.
Establish Caribbean Coordinating Council
One international NGO with a strong interest in the
region should form a Caribbean Coordinating Committee, and
invite NGOs from the region to participate. The Committee
should initially focus on one part of the region, such as
the Eastern Caribbean. The Committee can help regional NGOs
obtain funding from foundations and donors, and develop a
joint work program that prevents duplication among its
members. The U.S. sponsor of the Committee will have to
provide initial funding for its Caribbean counterparts.
6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
6 Some environmental NGOs in the region that are
knowledgeable about local political and cultural conditions
include the Island Resources Foundation, U.S. Virgin Islands
and Washington, D.C.; the Caribbean Natural Resources
Institute, St. Lucia and U.S. Virgin Islands, the Caribbean
Conservation Association, Barbados, and the Center for
Resource Management and Environmental Studies at the
University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados.
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This approach requires a substantial commitment from a
U.S. NGO, similar to efforts underway in Latin America and
Africa, albeit on a smaller scale. It may require that
organizational resources be shifted from U.S.-based
operations to fund small NGOs in the Caribbean. Its success
will depend on how much value U.S. NGOs attach to preserving
the islands, much like the decision that donor agencies must
make to divert additional resources into institution-
building to promote environmentally sound development.
Without this kind of cooperative effort, the environmental
damage that has occurred in the last twenty years will
rapidly accelerate, given the aggressive pursuit of large
tourism projects by virtually every island government.
Increase Institutional Capacity of Regional NGOs
There are several tasks that should be undertaken by
the Caribbean Coordinating Committee. It can identify
effective regional NGOs and provide financial and technical
resources to fund them, and work with civil servants to
design a strategy to place environmental reform on the
agenda of island governments. It is crucial to strengthen
the coalition between NGOs and civil servants. NGOs in the
region are small, and civil servants few in number.
Promoting working coalitions between NGOs and civil servants
is an important part of institution-building.
This is a multi-year effort, and will take different
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forms on various islands. Regional NGOs should identify
civil servants and political leaders who are effective
advocates of environmental reform. The Committee should
train these individuals in environmental leadership and
community organizing in workshops held in the region,
preferably with the sponsorship of an existing organization,
such as the United Nations Environment Programme or the
Caribbean Conservation Association. This program would be
geared to sharpening the skills of committed individuals who
are already skillful at operating in the political culture
of the islands. It is important the this training take
place in the region rather than the U.S. so that it reflects
actual conditions in the region.
Pilot Projects for Public Participation
The Committee should choose a series of pilot projects
in the region associated with proposed donor-sponsored
development projects and design a public participation
program for them. Local NGOs can serve as sponsors so that
island governments are assured that this effort is non-
partisan. The purpose of the program is to include users of
natural resources, such as farmers, fisherman and charcoal
producers, in the development process. The model for this
program should be the Southeast Coast Development Project on
St. Lucia sponsored by the Caribbean Natural Resources
Institute. A series of case studies should be produced
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outlining the history of each project and the steps taken to
promote public involvement.7
Use Legal ystem to Enforce Environmental Laws
The CCC should consider if legal can be used action to
promote change. In consultation with regional members, a
test case could be selected where environmental laws are
being violated, and a legal suit filed to force corrective
action. This would be a powerful precedent. No such case
has ever been filed in the Eastern Caribbean. The plaintiff
would have to be carefully chosen to minimize retribution.
The CCC should help regional members organize
strategies for placing environmental issues on the agenda of
national electoral campaigns, and create press campaigns to
encourage politicians to open development decisions to the
public. Elections have not included public discussion of
environmental issues in the past. The CCC should also
assist in the development and funding of school curricula
that teaches children the value of conservation. Campaigns
that have proven effective usually focus on a single issue,
such as conservation of the St. Lucia Parrot.
7 Local resource users possess a wealth of information
about natural resource management that is not used in the
development process. For example, Klee discusses how local
knowledge is used in the South Pacific to manage fisheries;
see Gary A. Klee, 1985. Traditional Marine Resource
Management in the Pacific. In Culture and Conservation,
Jeffrey A. McNeely and David Pratt (eds.), Dover, New
Hampshire, Croon Helm Publishers.
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